Due Process of Law
**Philippine Phospate Fertilizer Co. v Torres 231 SCRA 335 (1994)
Facts: Philphos Movement for Progress, Inc. (PMPI for brevity), filed with the Department of Labor and Employment a petition for certification election among the supervisory employees of petitioner, alleging that as a supervisory union duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment it was seeking to represent the supervisory employees of Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation. Mediator-Arbiter Rodolfo S. Milado issued an order directing the holding of a certification election among the supervisory employees of petitioner, excluding therefrom the superintendents and the professional and technical employees. However, the PMPI filed an amended petition with the Mediator-Arbiter wherein it sought to represent not only the supervisory employees of petitioner but also its professional/technical and confidential employees. The parties therein agreed to submit their respective position papers and to consider the amended petition submitted for decision on the basis thereof and related documents. Mediator-Arbiter Milado issued an order granting the petition and directing the holding of a certification election among the "supervisory, professional (engineers, analysts, mechanics, accountants, nurses, midwives, etc.), technical, and confidential employees. PHILPHOS appealed the order to the Secretary of Labor and Employment who rendered a decision through Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma dismissing the appeal. PHILPHOS moved for reconsideration but the same was denied; hence, the instant petition alleging denial of due process on the part of the DOLE to which the mediator-arbiter was under.
Issue: Whether or Not there was denial of due process.
Held: There was no denial of due process. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of petitioner PHILPHOS agreed to file its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter and to consider the case submitted for decision on the basis of the position papers filed by the parties, there was sufficient compliance with the requirement of due process, as petitioner was afforded reasonable opportunity to present its side. Moreover, petitioner could have, if it so desired, insisted on a hearing to confront and examine the witnesses of the other party. But it did not; instead it opted to submit its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter. Besides, petitioner had all the opportunity to ventilate its arguments in its appeal to the Secretary of Labor.
Issue: Whether or Not there was denial of due process.
Held: There was no denial of due process. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of petitioner PHILPHOS agreed to file its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter and to consider the case submitted for decision on the basis of the position papers filed by the parties, there was sufficient compliance with the requirement of due process, as petitioner was afforded reasonable opportunity to present its side. Moreover, petitioner could have, if it so desired, insisted on a hearing to confront and examine the witnesses of the other party. But it did not; instead it opted to submit its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter. Besides, petitioner had all the opportunity to ventilate its arguments in its appeal to the Secretary of Labor.
** Rubi v Provincial Board of Mindoro 39 PHIL 660 (1919)
“AO requires Mangyans to live within the reservation provided for them”
Facts: The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 wherein non-Christian inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) will be directed to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands. It is resolved that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation providing that said homestead applications are previously recommended by the provincial governor.
In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, were ordered to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code.
Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as necessary measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them. It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished.
It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao,Mindoro , against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation.
Issue: Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprives a person of his liberty pf abode. Thus, WON Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.
Held: The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty of abode and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. The Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.
Assigned as reasons for the action: (1) attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.
One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of thePhilippines
“Liberty
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law.
Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.
In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, were ordered to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code.
Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as necessary measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them. It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished.
It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao,
Issue: Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprives a person of his liberty pf abode. Thus, WON Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.
Held: The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty of abode and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. The Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.
Assigned as reasons for the action: (1) attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.
One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the
“
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law.
Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.
** Javier v Comelec 144 SCRA 194 (1986)
Facts: The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. The former appeared to enjoy more popular support but the latter had the advantage of being the nominee of the KBL with all its perquisites of power. On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, the bitter contest between the two came to a head when several followers of the petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter's men. Seven suspects, including respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders. Owing to what he claimed were attempts to railroadthe private respondent's proclamation, the petitioner went to theCommission on Elections to question the canvass of the election returns. His complaints were dismissed and the private respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said body. The petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void because made only by a division and not by the Commissionon Elections en banc as required by the Constitution. Meanwhile, on the strength of his proclamation, the private respondent took his oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa.
Issue: Whether or Not the Second Division of the Commission on Elections authorized to promulgate its decision of July 23, 1984, proclaiming the private respondent the winner in the election.
Held: This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" as the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play cans for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extra-judicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.
Issue: Whether or Not the Second Division of the Commission on Elections authorized to promulgate its decision of July 23, 1984, proclaiming the private respondent the winner in the election.
Held: This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" as the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play cans for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extra-judicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.
Aniag Jr. v Comelec 237 SCRA 424 (1994)
“Driver underwent illegal search and seizure on check pt. – petitioner charged in violation of Omnibus Election Code (gun ban)– invokes deprivation of Constitutional right on due process of law.”
Facts: Upon the issuance of declaration of gun ban by the Comelec in connection to the national & local election, the Sgt-at-Arms of the House of Representatives requested petitioner to return the 2 firearms issued by the House to him. In compliance, petitioner ordered his driver Arellano to pick up the firearms in his house to return them to Congress. On his way back to the Batasan Complex, Arellano was flagged down in a check point and police search the car. Upon finding the guns, he was apprehended and detained and his case was referred for inquest to the City prosecutor office. Petitioner was not made a party to the charge but was invited to shed light on the incident. Petitioner explained the purpose how Arellano came to have the firearms boarded on the car and wrote the prosecutor to exonerate Arellano from the charges. The prosecutor recommended dismissing the case. The Comelec however issued a resolution filing information in violation of the gun ban against petitioner. Petitioner moves for reconsideration to the Comelec which was denied hence this petition contending that the search on his car was illegal and that he was not impleaded as respondent in the preliminary investigation and his constitutional rights for due process was violated.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was denied of due process of law.
Held: The court held that as a rule, a valid search must be authorized by a search warrant duly issued by an appropriate authority. However, this is not absolute. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of (1) moving vehicles (2) the seizure of evidence in plain view and (3) search conducted at police or military checkpoints which are not illegal for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual search, and (4) Stop-and-search without warrant conducted by police officers on the basis of prior confidential information which were reasonably corroborated by other attendant matters is also recognized by the court to be legal. An extensive search without warrant could only be resorted to if the officers conducting the search had reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that either the motorist was a law offender or that they would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to the commission of a crime in the vehicle to be searched. Because there was no sufficient evidence that would impel the policemen to suspect Arellano to justify the search they have conducted, such action constitutes an unreasonable intrusion of the petitioner’s privacy and security of his property in violation of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. Consequently, the firearms obtained in violation of petitioner's right against warrantless search cannot be admitted for any purpose in any proceeding. The manner by which COMELEC proceeded against petitioner runs counter to the due process clause of the Constitution. The facts show that petitioner was not among those charged by the PNP with violation of the Omnibus Election Code. Nor was he subjected by the City Prosecutor to a preliminary investigation for such offense. Thus the court declared the warrantless search and seizure of the firearms as illegal hence inadmissible to court as evidence in any proceeding against the petitioner.
** Philcomsat v Alcuaz 180 SCRA 218 (1989)
Facts: Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving telecommunications. Charging rates for certain specified lines that were reduced by order of herein respondent Jose Alcuaz Commissioner of the National Telecommunications Commission. The rates were ordered to be reduced by fifteen percent (15%) due to Executive Order No. 546 which granted the NTC the power to fix rates. Said order was issued without prior notice and hearing.
Issue: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.
Held: Yes. Respondents admitted that the application of a policy like the fixing of rates as exercised by administrative bodies is quasi-judicial rather than quasi-legislative. But respondent’s contention that notice and hearing are not required since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings and temporary in nature is erroneous. Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act, providing for the proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing, dictates that a Commission has power to fix rates, upon proper notice and hearing, and, if not subject to the exceptions, limitations or saving provisions.
It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial whether the same is made upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the commission's own motion as in the present case.
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is GRANTED and the order of respondents is hereby SET ASIDE.
Issue: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.
Held: Yes. Respondents admitted that the application of a policy like the fixing of rates as exercised by administrative bodies is quasi-judicial rather than quasi-legislative. But respondent’s contention that notice and hearing are not required since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings and temporary in nature is erroneous. Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act, providing for the proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing, dictates that a Commission has power to fix rates, upon proper notice and hearing, and, if not subject to the exceptions, limitations or saving provisions.
It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial whether the same is made upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the commission's own motion as in the present case.
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is GRANTED and the order of respondents is hereby SET ASIDE.
** Ang Tibay v CIR 69 PHIL 635 (1940)
Facts: There was agreement between Ang Tibay and the National Labor Union, Inc (NLU). The NLU alleged that the supposed lack of leather material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharge all the members of the NLU, from work. And this averment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the records of the Bureau of Customs and Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather. That National Worker's Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, which was alleged by the NLU as an illegal one. The CIR, decided the case and elevated it to the Supreme Court, but a motion for new trial was raised by the NLU. But the Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said motion.
Issue: Whether or Not, the motion for new trial is meritorious to be granted.
Held: To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the CIR. The CIR is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation which is the Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the CIR, as will appear from perusal of its organic law is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entirePhilippines
As laid down in the case of Goseco v. CIR, the SC had the occasion to point out that the CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.
The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:
(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and submit evidence in support thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.
The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth. So ordered.
Issue: Whether or Not, the motion for new trial is meritorious to be granted.
Held: To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the CIR. The CIR is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation which is the Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the CIR, as will appear from perusal of its organic law is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire
As laid down in the case of Goseco v. CIR, the SC had the occasion to point out that the CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.
The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:
(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and submit evidence in support thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.
The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth. So ordered.
** Ateneo de Manila University v Capulong 222 SCRA 644 (1993)
Facts: Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of Petitioner University , died of serious physical injuries at Chinese General Hospital after the initiation rites of Aquila Legis. Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized at the Capitol Medical Center Mendoza
Issue: Was there denial of due process against the respondent students.
Held: There was no denial of due process, more particularly procedural due process. Dean of theAteneo Law School
Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to file the instant petition under Rule 65 considering that they failed to file a motion for reconsideration first before the trial court, thereby by passing the latter and the Court of Appeals. It is accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is when the case involves a question of law, as in this case, where the issue is whether or not respondent students have been afforded procedural due process prior to their dismissal fromPetitioner University
Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions, such as petitioner university herein, thus:
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them;
(2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of counsel, if desired:
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
Issue: Was there denial of due process against the respondent students.
Held: There was no denial of due process, more particularly procedural due process. Dean of the
Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to file the instant petition under Rule 65 considering that they failed to file a motion for reconsideration first before the trial court, thereby by passing the latter and the Court of Appeals. It is accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is when the case involves a question of law, as in this case, where the issue is whether or not respondent students have been afforded procedural due process prior to their dismissal from
Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions, such as petitioner university herein, thus:
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them;
(2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of counsel, if desired:
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
Equal Protection of Law
People v Vera 65 PHIL 56 (1937)
In criminal cases, the elements were laid down in Vera v. People:
a. Accused is informed why he is proceeded against, and what charge he must answer.
b. Judgment of conviction is based on evidence that is not tainted by falsity, and after the defendant was heard.
If the prosecution produces the conviction based on untrue evidence, then it is guilty of depriving the accused of due process. Thus false testimony can be questioned by the accused regardless of the time that lapsed.
c. Judgment according to law
d. Tribunal with jurisdiction
** Villegas v Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho 86 SCRA 270 (1978)
Facts: The controverted Ordinance no. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on February 22, 1968 and signed by Mayor Villegas. It is an ordinance making it unlawful for any person not a citizen of the Philippines to be employed in any place of employment or to be engaged in any kind of trade business or occupation within the city of Manila
Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed inManila
Issue: Whether or Not Ordinance no.6537 violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
Held: It is a revenue measure. The city ordinance which imposes a fee of 50.00 pesos to enable aliens generally to be employed in the city ofManila
While it is true that the first part which requires the alien to secure an employment permit from the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in processing and approval or disapproval of application is regulatory in character, the second part which requires the payment of a sum of 50.00 pesos is not a regulatory but a revenue measure.
Ordinance no. 6537 is void and unconstitutional. This is tantamount to denial of the basic human right of the people in thePhilippines
Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in
Issue: Whether or Not Ordinance no.6537 violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
Held: It is a revenue measure. The city ordinance which imposes a fee of 50.00 pesos to enable aliens generally to be employed in the city of
While it is true that the first part which requires the alien to secure an employment permit from the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in processing and approval or disapproval of application is regulatory in character, the second part which requires the payment of a sum of 50.00 pesos is not a regulatory but a revenue measure.
Ordinance no. 6537 is void and unconstitutional. This is tantamount to denial of the basic human right of the people in the
** Dumlao v Comelec 95 SCRA 392 (1980)
Facts: Petitioner questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution.
Section 4 provided that any retired municipal or provincial city official that already received retirement benefits and is 65 years of age shall not be qualified to run for the same local elective office from which he has retired.
Issue: Whether or Not Sec. 4 of BP.52 is unconstitutional being contrary to the equal protection and due process rights.
Held: No. The guarantee of equal protection is subject to rational classification based on reasonable and real differentiations. In the present case, employees 65 years of age have been classifieddifferently from younger employees. The former are subject to compulsory retirement while the latter are not.
Retirement is not a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials because there can be retirees who are even younger and a 65year old retiree could be as good as a 65 year old official who is not a retiree. But there is reason to disqualify a 65 year old elective official who is trying to run for office because there is the “need for new blood to assume relevance”. When an official has retired he has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same government work.
WHEREFORE, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid.
Section 4 provided that any retired municipal or provincial city official that already received retirement benefits and is 65 years of age shall not be qualified to run for the same local elective office from which he has retired.
Issue: Whether or Not Sec. 4 of BP.52 is unconstitutional being contrary to the equal protection and due process rights.
Held: No. The guarantee of equal protection is subject to rational classification based on reasonable and real differentiations. In the present case, employees 65 years of age have been classifieddifferently from younger employees. The former are subject to compulsory retirement while the latter are not.
Retirement is not a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials because there can be retirees who are even younger and a 65year old retiree could be as good as a 65 year old official who is not a retiree. But there is reason to disqualify a 65 year old elective official who is trying to run for office because there is the “need for new blood to assume relevance”. When an official has retired he has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same government work.
WHEREFORE, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid.
** Philippine Asso. of Service Exporters v Drilon 163 SCRA 386 (1988)
Facts: Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled “Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers.” It claims that such order is a discrimination against males and females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the court that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers.
Issue: Whether or not there has been a valid classification in the challenged Department Order No. 1.
Held: SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been valid classification, the Filipino female domestics working abroad were in a class by themselves, because of the special risk to which their class was exposed. There is no question that Order No.1 applies only to female contract workers but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between sexes. It is well settled hat equality before the law under the constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classification, provided that:
1. Such classification rests on substantial distinctions
2. That they are germane to the purpose of the law
3. They are not confined to existing conditions
4. They apply equally to al members of the same class
In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on substantial distinctions.
Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The consequence of the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right, as the right to travel is subjects among other things, to the requirements of “public safety” as may be provided by law. Deployment ban of female domestic helper is a valid exercise of police power. Police power as been defined as the state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote general welfare. Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power as the labor code vest the DOLE with rule making powers.
Issue: Whether or not there has been a valid classification in the challenged Department Order No. 1.
Held: SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been valid classification, the Filipino female domestics working abroad were in a class by themselves, because of the special risk to which their class was exposed. There is no question that Order No.1 applies only to female contract workers but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between sexes. It is well settled hat equality before the law under the constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classification, provided that:
1. Such classification rests on substantial distinctions
2. That they are germane to the purpose of the law
3. They are not confined to existing conditions
4. They apply equally to al members of the same class
In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on substantial distinctions.
Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The consequence of the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right, as the right to travel is subjects among other things, to the requirements of “public safety” as may be provided by law. Deployment ban of female domestic helper is a valid exercise of police power. Police power as been defined as the state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote general welfare. Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power as the labor code vest the DOLE with rule making powers.
** Himagan v People 237 SCRA 538 (1994)
F: Petitioner, a policeman assigned w/ the medical co. of the PNP HQ at Camp Catitigan, Davao City was implicated in the killing of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and the attempted murder of Bernabe Machitar. After the informations for murder and attempted murder were filed w/ the RTC, the trial court issued an order suspending petitioner until termination of the case on the basis of Sec. 47 of RA 6975, w/c provides:
Sec. 47.Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused.
Petitioner filed a motion to lift the order for his suspension relying on Sec. 42 of PD 807, that his suspension should be limited to 90 days and also, on our ruling in Deloso v. SB, and Layno v. SB. The motion and the subsequent MFR were denied. Hence, this petition forcertiorar i andma nda mus.
HELD: We find the petition to be devoid of merit.
(1) The language of the first sentence is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. xxx The second sentence xx providing the trial must be terminated w/in 90 days from arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The 2 can stand independently of each other. The first refers to the period of suspension. The 2nd deals w/ the time frame w/in w/c the trial should be finished.
Suppose the trial is not terminated w/in the 90day period, should the suspension of accused be lifted? Certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word "shall" bef. the phrase "be terminated w/in 90 days," there is nothing in the law that suggests that the preventive suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated w/in that period. But this is w/o prejudice to the administrative sanctions, and, in appropriate cases where the facts so warrant, to criminal or civil liability of the judge. Should the trial be unreasonably delayed w/o the fault of the accused, he may ask for the dismissal of the case. Should this be refused, he can compel its dismissal bycer tiorari, prohibition orma nda mus, or secure his liberty by
(2) Petitioner misapplies Sec. 42 of PD 807. A meticulous reading of the section clearly shows that it refers to the lifting of the preventive suspension in pending admin. investigation, not in crim. cases, as here. xxx Sec. 91 of RA 6975 w/c states that the CS law and its implementing rules shall apply to members of the PNP insofar as the provisions, rules and regulations are not inconsistent w/ RA 6975.
(3) The petitioner's reliance on Layno and Deloso is misplaced. xxx Sec. 13 of RA 3019 upon w/c the preventive suspension of the accused in Layno and Deloso was based was silent w/ respect to the duration of the preventive suspension, such that the suspension of the accused therein for a prolonged and unreasonable length of time raised a due process question. Not so in the instant case. Petitioner is charged w/ murder under the RPC and it is undisputed that he falls squarely under Sec. 47 RA 6975 w/c categorically states that hissuspension shall last until the case is terminated.
(4) The deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee on National Defense relative to the bill that became RA 6975 reveal the legislative intent to place on preventive suspension a member of the PNP charged w/ grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six yrs. of imprisonment and w/c suspension continues until the case against him is terminated.
** Ormoc Sugar Co. Inc. v Treasurer of Ormoc City
Facts: On January 29, 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964, imposing "on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America
On June 1, 1964, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, with service of a copy upon the Solicitor General, a complaint against the City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging that the afore-stated ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause (Sec. 1[1], Art. III, Constitution) and the rule of uniformity of taxation (Sec. 22[1]), Art. VI, Constitution).
Answering, the defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was within defendant city's power to enact under the Local Autonomy Act and that the same did not violate the afore-cited constitutional limitations. After pre-trial and submission of the case on memoranda, the Court of First Instance, on August 6, 1964, rendered a decision that upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance and declared the taxing power of defendant chartered city broadened by the Local Autonomy Act to include all other forms of taxes, licenses or fees not excluded in its charter.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause under Sec. 1[1], Art. III, Constitution.
(2) Whether or not it was violative of the rule of uniformity of taxation under the Bill of Rights, Sec. 22[1], Art. VI, Constitution.
Held: The Constitution in the bill of rights provides: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws." (Sec. 1 [1], Art. III) In Felwa vs. Salas, We ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.
A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city ofOrmoc
Appellant, however, is not entitled to interest; on the refund because the taxes were not arbitrarily collected (Collector of Internal Revenue v. Binalbagan). 6 At the time of collection, the ordinance provided a sufficient basis to preclude arbitrariness, the same being then presumed constitutional until declared otherwise.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, the challenged ordinance is declared unconstitutional and the defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to refund the P12,087.50 plaintiff-appellant paid under protest. No costs. So ordered.
On June 1, 1964, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, with service of a copy upon the Solicitor General, a complaint against the City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging that the afore-stated ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause (Sec. 1[1], Art. III, Constitution) and the rule of uniformity of taxation (Sec. 22[1]), Art. VI, Constitution).
Answering, the defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was within defendant city's power to enact under the Local Autonomy Act and that the same did not violate the afore-cited constitutional limitations. After pre-trial and submission of the case on memoranda, the Court of First Instance, on August 6, 1964, rendered a decision that upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance and declared the taxing power of defendant chartered city broadened by the Local Autonomy Act to include all other forms of taxes, licenses or fees not excluded in its charter.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause under Sec. 1[1], Art. III, Constitution.
(2) Whether or not it was violative of the rule of uniformity of taxation under the Bill of Rights, Sec. 22[1], Art. VI, Constitution.
Held: The Constitution in the bill of rights provides: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws." (Sec. 1 [1], Art. III) In Felwa vs. Salas, We ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.
A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of
Appellant, however, is not entitled to interest; on the refund because the taxes were not arbitrarily collected (Collector of Internal Revenue v. Binalbagan). 6 At the time of collection, the ordinance provided a sufficient basis to preclude arbitrariness, the same being then presumed constitutional until declared otherwise.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, the challenged ordinance is declared unconstitutional and the defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to refund the P12,087.50 plaintiff-appellant paid under protest. No costs. So ordered.
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