Prepared by: Evelyn Chua Bergantinos-De Matias
CPC College of Law
RATIO DECIDENDI
- Ratio decidendi (Latin plural rationes decidendi) is a Latin phrase meaning "the reason" or "the rationale for the decision." The ratio decidendi is "[t]he point in a case which determines the judgment"[1] or "the principle which the case establishes."
- In other words, ratio decidendi - legal rule derived from, and consistent with, those parts of legal reasoning within a judgement on which the outcome of the case depends.
- It is a legal phrase which refers to the legal, moral, political, and social principles used by a court to compose the rationale of a particular judgment. Unlike obiter dicta, the ratio decidendi is, as a general rule, binding on courts of lower and later jurisdiction—through the doctrine of stare decisis. Certain courts are able to overrule decisions of a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction—however out of interests of judicial comity they generally try to follow co-ordinate rationes.
Ratio decidendi (plural: rationes decidendi) is a Latin phrase meaning "the reason (or rationale) for the decision."
The ratio decidendi is:
"[t]he point in a case which determines the judgment"[1] or
"the principle which the case establishes."[2]
It is a legal phrase which refers to the legal, moral, political, and social principles used by a court to compose the rationale of a particular judgment. Unlike obiter dicta, the ratio decidendi is, as a general rule, binding on courts of lower jurisdiction--through the doctrine of stare decisis. Certain courts are able to overrule decisions of a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction--however out of interests of judicial comity they generally try to follow co-ordinate rationes.
The process of determining the ratio decidendi is a correctly thought through analysis of what the court actually decided – essentially, based on the legal points about which the parties in the case actually fought. All other statements about the law in the text of a court opinion – all pronouncements that do not form a part of the court’s rulings on the issues actually decided in that particular case (whether they are correct statements of law or not) -- are obiter dicta, and are not rules for which that particular case stands.
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FALLO
- The legal document setting the reasons for judicial decisions.
- Reasons for a court’s judgment as opposed to the decision itself.
OBITER DICTUM
- Judicial opinions on points of law which is not binding but may be regarded as persuasive in a future decision.
- Words of an opinion entirely unnecessary for the decision of the case. A remark made or opinion expressed by a judge in a decision upon a cause, "by the way", that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon the question before the court or upon a point not necessarily involved in the determination of the cause, or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument. Such are not binding as precedent.
An obiter dictum (plural obiter dicta, often referred to simply as dicta), Latin for a statement "said by the way", is a remark or observation made by a judge that, although included in the body of the court's opinion, does not form a necessary part of the court's decision. In a court opinion, obiter dicta include, but are not limited to, words "introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument."[1] Unlike the rationes decidendi, obiter dicta are not the subject of the judicial decision, even if they happen to be correct statements of law. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, statements constituting obiter dicta are therefore not binding, although in some jurisdictions, such as England and Wales, they can be strongly persuasive.
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DISPOSITIVE PORTION
- The final resolution of the case found at the end of the case beginning with the word “WHEREFORE”
Manalang v Rickards GR. No. L-11986 7.31.58
F: Respondent filed an ejectment case against petitioner for refusal to pay the increased rental of their lot. Petitioner filed motion to dismiss which was denied by the court ordering suspension of the proceeding for 2 years. Upon issuance of court of the date to set the hearing, the petitioner files a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the court. Thus they file motion for certiorari and prohibition before the CFI. Responded argued that such motion is improper since the court merely issued an interlocutory order and cannot be subjected for review by certiorari and asserts that the case should be heard.
I: WON there is merit for filing petition for certiorari in this case
R: No, there is no merit for filing a motion for certiorari in this case, the dispositive portion of the decision of the lower court merely an interlocutory order which did not provide a definite resolution on the case. The lower court should hear the case and has the power to re-open the case for trial to determine the rights of the parties involved for the final resolution of the case.
People’s Homesite & Housing v Hon. Ericta GR No. L-40675 8.17.83
F: Respondent judge issued an order for a writ of execution of absolute sale to the petitioner in favor of the plaintiff but herein petitioner contested the decision asserting that the decision that should be executed is the one stated in the decretal or dispositive portion of the case.
I: WON judgment can only be found in the decretal portion of the decision.
R: Ordinarily, the decision of the case is found in the dispositive portion but there are instances that the ruling is embodied in other parts of the case as the writing style of the ponente will vary and is personal in nature. The court cannot implement a stringent rule as to how the ponente may write a decision as long as they do not violate the Rules of Court.
Brother Mike Velarde v Social Justice Society GR. No. 159357 4.28.04
Declaratory relief - should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The purpose of the remedy is to interpret or to determine the validity of the written instrument and to seek a judicial declaration of the parties’ rights or duties thereunder.
The essential requisites of the action are as follows: (1) there is a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue is ripe for judicial determination.17
Justiciable Controversy - refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory.
Legal Standing/Locus Standi – personal or substantial interest such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of an act.
Relief – specific coercive measure prayed for as a result of a violation of the right of a plaintiff or petitioner.
Cause of Action - is an act or an omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of another, causing injury to the latter. Failure of complaint to state cause of action is ground for outright dismissal.
Its essential elements are the following: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) such defendant’s act or omission that is violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the former to the latter.
Essential Parts of A Good Decision:
- Statement of the case
- Statement of the facts
- Issues or Assignments of Errors
- Court’s ruling
- Dispositive portion
Proper Proceedings Before the Trial Court:
1. Dismissal of cases without allegations:
> A compliant/petition contain clear facts on which pleading relies and clear of specification of
relief sought.
2. If complaint is filed and forwarded
> the defendant has 15 days to file an answer. Relief is granted beyond this period in which no
answer was filed.
3. When counterclaim or answer is filed
> it must be answered within 10 days and a reply may then be filed within 10 days from service of
the pleading responded to.
4. Failure to answer gives the court the ability to direct judgment on such pleading.
5. After the last pleading has been served and filed, the case shall be set for a pre-trial.
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SEPARATE OPINION
- an opinion written separately by a judge who dissents or who concurs only in the result of the majority opinion.
DISSENTING OPINION
- an opinion disagreeing with the majority decision.
A dissenting opinion is an opinion of one or more judges expressing disagreement with the majority opinion. By definition, a dissent is the minority of the court.A dissenting opinion cannot create binding precedent because the holding in the opinion is not the holding of the court in the case. Therefore the dissent's holding does not create case law. However, dissenting opinions are sometimes cited as persuasive authority when arguing that the holding should be limited or overturned. In some cases, a dissent in an earlier case is used to spurn a change in the law, and a later case will write a majority opinion for the same rule of law cited by the dissent in the earlier case.
Ruiz v Ucol GR No. L-45404 8.7.87
F: The petitioner’s laundrywoman filed an administrative complaint against the respondent who alleged that the petitioner is using the laundrywoman in retaliation for the charges filed by the respondent against petitioner. The case was dismissed by the court. The petitioner filed a case of libel against the respondent which was likewise dismissed. The petitioner again filed for damages based on the information in the case of libel which the court dismissed on grounds of res judicata. On one hand, Ucol files an appeal for certiorari questioning the dissenting opinion of the CA.
I: WON an appeal may be filed questioning a court’s dissenting opinion.
R: It would be elementary to know that a dissenting opinion is not the decision of the case. What is subject to appeal or a special civil action would be the majority opinion of the court.
Nolasco v Paño GR No. L-69803 1.30.87
F: The case at bar is a question on the validity of the search warrant and arrest of the petitioner charged for the crime of rebellion. The CA decision holds the search warrant as null and void but the articles seized shall be retained. Petitioners contend that a lawful search would only be justified by a lawful arrest therefore with the court ruling that the arrest was illegal the articles seized should also be returned to them. Respondents assert that although the search warrant was null and void the arrest was not.
I: WON the personalities that were seized by an illegal search warrant should be returned.
R: Yes, it should be returned. The court used the dissenting opinion of Justice Teehankee invoking the Constitutional provision from the Bill of Rights that mandates the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Any evidence obtained in violation of this Constitutional mandate shall be inadmissible for any purpose or proceedings.
Tolentino v Ongsiako GR. No. L-17938 4.30.63
F: Appellant is the successor of interest in behalf of the late Severino Domingo who has a case against Ongsiako. It took 20 years before he came to know about the decision of the case, prompting him to file a complaint for the enforcement of the dissenting opinion of the case and asserting erroneous decision of the court. The same was dismissed by the court due to lack of merit and without cause of action.
I: (1) WON an action for the enforcement of a dissenting opinion may be filed before the court.
(2) WON the court should act before the complaint on erroneous decision of the court.
R: (1) No because a dissenting opinion merits no right or claim as it is just merely a dissent from the majority decision of the case.
(2) Appellant is barred from assailing the decision of the court by res judicata and the decision has already been final and executory already.
People v Malmstedt 198 SCRA 401 6.19.91
F: Accused is a Swedish national arrested for carrying Hashish, a form of marijuana during a NARCOM inspection. He was tried and found guilty in violation of Dangerous Drugs Act. He contends that the arrest was illegal without the search warrant.
I: WON the arrest made was illegal in the absence of a search warrant.
A warrantless arrest may be lawfully made:
(a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
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LANDMARK CASE
- a precedent setting decision that is an outcome of a legal case that substantially changes the interpretation of the law or simply establishes new case on a particular issue.
- An important judicial decision that is frequently regarded as having settled or determined the law upon all points involved in such controversies and thereby serves as a guide for subsequent decisions.
A landmark decision is the outcome of a legal case (often thus referred to as a landmark case) that establishes a precedent that either substantially changes the interpretation of the law or that simply establishes new case law on a particular issue. Certain cases within this category are widely known in legal studies and may be reviewed by law students even if they have been overturned by later decisions.
Villaber v COMELEC GR No. 148326 11.15.01
F: Petitioner seeks to annul Comelec resolution disqualifying him as congressional candidate of Davao Del Sur and for the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy and denial of motion for reconsideration. Petitioner was disqualified upon the petition of his rival candidate for disqualification on grounds of his previous conviction in violation of BP 22 (bouncing check law) which constitutes moral turpitude, a ground for disqualification for electoral candidacy under the Omnibus Election Code.
I: WON a violation of BP 22 constitutes a disqualification for electoral candidacy.
R: A violation of BP 22 involves the following elements:
- Accused makes, draws, issues any check to apply to account or for value;
- Accused knows at the time of the issuance that there is no sufficient fund on the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment.
- The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank.
The presence of the 2nd element represents moral turpitude as stated in the ruling of People v Atty. Fe Tuanda where conviction for violation of BP 22 involves deceit and affects the good moral character of a person.
Recuerdo v People GR. No. 133036 1.22.03
F: Petitoner was found guilty in violation of BP 22 where out of the 9 checks she issued as payment for the jewelry she bought from Yolanda Floro, 5 were dishonored by the bank. A demand letter was sent to her and upon failure to make payments, a complaint was filed by which she was found guilty. On petition for certiorari, she contends that BP 22 is unconstitutional.
I: WON BP 22 is unconstitutional.
R: The court upheld the constitutionality of BP 22 citing the landmark case of Lozano v Martinez
** BP 22 is a special penal law.
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LEADING CASE
An important judicial decision that is frequently regarded as having settled or determined the law upon all points involved in such controversies and thereby serves as a guide for subsequent decisions.Philippine Export v Philippine Infrastructures GR No. 120384 1.13.04
F: The case involves a collection of sum of money by the petitioner from the respondent by virtue of their Deed of Undertaking where petitioner stands as a guarantor to the credit accommodation provided by PNB to respondent which upon failure of the respondent to pay the PNB, the petitioner was made to pay by the bank on behalf of the respondent. Upon filing of the complaint to collect the said money, respondent files a motion to dismiss due to lack of cause of action on the part of the petitioner since it does not allege that petitioner has suffered any damage, loss or penalty because of the guarantees petitioner had extended for and on behalf of respondent. Subsequently petitioner filed a Motion to Amend Complaint to Conform to Evidence and the motion to amend resulted to the dismissal of the case on the on the ground of failure to state a cause of action by RTC decision. The CA denied the motion to set aside the decision of RTC and its motion for reconsideration.
I: WON the complaint be dismissed due to lack of cause of action.
R:.Although the complaint did not allege that the petitioner sustained some actual loss, the complaint of the petitioner emanates from the obligation of the respondent to indemnify the petitioner once it fails to comply with paying its creditors by virtue of their Deed of Undertaking. Respondents’ obligation under the Deed of Undertaking to keep petitioner free and harmless from any damage or liability then became operative as soon as the liability of petitioner arose and there was no need for petitioner to first sustain actual loss before it could have a cause of action against respondents
Asufrin v San Miguel GR No. 156658 3.10.04
F: The petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the respondent after it fails to include him among the employees who signify their willingness to be absorbed by the company after its announcement for retrenchment of their workers on ground of redundancy. Apparently, respondent gave their employees the choice to opt to avail of the early retirement package they offer or for re-deployment to its other sales offices. The petitioner chose to be absorbed but was included in the list among those who want to avail of the retirement package. Despite his manifestation of his willingness to be demoted to any position as long as the company retain him for employment he was still dismissed from work. The labor arbiter dismissed his complaint due to lack of merit and on appeal the decision was set aside by the NLRC which ordered respondent to reinstate petitioner with payment of backwages. The respondent appealed to the CA which reversed the decision of the NLRC and reinstated the judgment of the labor arbiter. Thus, this petition before the SC.
I: WON there is an illegal dismissal of the petitioner from employment.
R: The court held that based from Dole Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC, citing the leading case of Wiltshire File Co., Inc. v. NLRC, the nature of redundancy is an authorized cause for dismissal wherein there is duplication of work of employees. It is upon the judgment of the employer to determine whether an employee’s services are sustainable and properly terminable. However, the employer should declare redundancy with a just cause and in good faith. The court noted that the respondent was adamant from the request of the petitioner to be retained despite his willingness to be demoted in position while the same request of other employees was granted. The warehouse which respondent claims to close remains to be in operation. The respondent also did not establish criteria in dismissing the petitioner and the court gave weight to the petitioner’s predicament that his dismissal may be related to his expose on some irregularities of transaction involving their manager. The court upholds the right of every worker for security of tenure thus due to failure of the respondent to give justifiable cause for dismissing petitioner, the decision of the CA was set aside and reinstated the decision of the NLRC, ordering reinstatement of the petitioner with full backwages .
Nicolas-Lewis v Comelec GR No. 162759 8.4.06
F: Petitioners are dual citizens (by virtue of Republic Act No. 9225 - Citizenship Retention and Re‑Acquisition Act of 2003, allowing one to retain or re-acquire Phil. Citizenship) who want to exercise their right to suffrage under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). The Comelec denies on the ground that they fail to meet the qualification of 1-year residency required by the Constitution.
I: WON dual citizens may exercise their right to suffrage as absentee voters even short of the 1-yr residency requirement.
R: Court held that there is no provision in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines Philippines
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STARE DECISIS
- “let the decision stand”
- The policy of courts to abide by or adhere to principles established by decisions in earlier cases.
- The principle of stare decisis was not always applied with uniform strictness. the principle of stare decisis has always been tempered with a conviction that prior decisions must comport with notions of good reason or they can be overruled by the highest court in the jurisdiction.
Tala Realty v Banco Pilipinas 6.20.00
“disagreement between parties on which lease contract should prevail”
RULING: It is the policy of the court to maintain judicial stability in accordance to stare decisis. The case involves the same questions relating to similarly situated conditions which the court already litigated abd decided upon and the rule on stare decisis is a bar to attempt to relitigate the same issue (“stare decisis et non quieta movere” – follow past precedents and do not disturb what has already been settled.) Stare decisis should apply if the facts are substantially the same even if the parties may be different.
El Pueblo Filipinas v Marcaida 9.18..47
F: Respondent appeals for the decision of lower court finding him guilty of treason. He was allegedly helping Japanese occupants in arresting Filipinos thought to be guerillas. He contends that he should not be tried by the court on account that his nationality and citizenship are undetermined, citing previous cases under the doctrine of stare decisis where a limitation on the application of jus soli for citizenship was established.
I: Whether stare decisis is applicable at the case at bar
R: No. The doctrine of stare decisis does not apply to the extent of perpetuating an error. The doctrine stands to be corrected once it was found out that a previous judgment was erroneous.
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JUDGES
LAWYERS
“fiduciary relationship between lawyers and clients”
Regala v Sandiganbayan GR. No. 105938 9.20.96
F: Corporation clients of petitioner consulted them regarding corporate structure and financial matters upon which legal advice were given by petitioners. Said corporation is subject to investigation by the PCGG involving ill gotten wealth. Petitioner refuses to provide information on fear that it may implicate them in the very activity from which legal advice was sought from them and it may breach the fiduciary relationship of the petitioner with their client.
I: WON fiduciary duty may be asserted by petitioner on refusal to disclose names of their clients (privilege information)
R: SC upheld the right of petitioners to refuse disclosure of names of their clients under the pain of breach of fiduciary relationship with their client.
As a general rule, a lawyer MAY NOT INVOKE THE PRIVILEGE BECAUSE:
- The court has the right to know that the client whose privilege is sought to be protected is flesh and blood.
- Privilege begins to exist only after the atty-client relationship has been established.
- Privilege generally pertains to be the subject matter of the relationship.
- With due process consideration, the opposing party should know his adversary.
EXCEPTION: LAWYERS MAY INVOKE THE PRIVILEGE WHEN:
- Strong probability exists that revealing the client’s name would implicate the client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer’s advice.
- Disclosure would open to civil liability of client. (present in this case)
- Government lawyers have no case against the lawyer’s client unless by revealing the client’s name it would provide them the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime. (present in this case)
- Relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which client seeks legal assistance. (present in this case)
- Nature of atty-client relationship has been previously disclosed and it is the identity which is intended to be confidential.
Old Code of Civil Procedure enacted by the Philippine Commission on August 7, 1901:
Section 383 of the Code specifically "forbids counsel, without authority of his client to reveal any communication made by the client to him or his advice given thereon in the course of professional employment." 28 Passed on into various provisions of the Rules of Court, the attorney-client privilege, as currently worded provides:
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. — The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional employment, can an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity. 29
Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 20. It is the duty of an attorney: (e) to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his client's business except from him or with his knowledge and approval.
This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that:
Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also demands a lawyer's fidelity to client:
The lawyers owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability," to the end that nothing be taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally applied. No fear of judicial disfavor or public popularity should restrain him from the full discharge of his duty. In the judicial forum the client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land, and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great trust of the lawyer is to be performed within and not without the bounds of the law. The office of attorney does not permit, much less does it demand of him for any client, violation of law or any manner of fraud or chicanery. He must obey his own conscience and not that of his client.
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SEPARATION OF POWERS
Francisco v HRET 11.10.03
“2 impeachment cases filed against Chief Justice Davide within a period of 1 year”
RULING: The court declared the proceeding to be unconstitutional. Article XI of the Constitution provides that no public official be subject for impeachment twice within a period of 1 year. While the Congress contends that the S.C. has no power to inquire about the impeachment proceedings against Davide by virtue of separation of powers where the Congress has the sole jurisdiction to initiate and hear impeachment proceedings, the court declared it is empowered by the Constitution to exercise judicial review with the duty vested upon it to check whether there is grave abuse of discretion on any branch of the government. The SC has the power to interpret the fundamental law of the land and to answer involving Constitutional issues. The SC is not bar to inquire about any actions of the Congress especially involving Constitutional issues.
David v Macapagal-Arroyo GR. No. 171396 5.3.06
F: The President issued Proclamation No. 1017 declaring national emergency and placing the AFP under her command to maintain law and order in the Phils., suppress all forms of lawless violence, and enforce obedience to all the laws, order, decree promulgated by her or in her direction. Such proclamation was assailed as unconstitutional and a form of encroachment upon the powers of the legislative department.
I: WON the Presidential Proclamation is unconstitutional
R: The court held that the Constitution grants the President the power to call the AFP to suppress lawless violence and during times of calamity being the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. However, the provision asserting her power to issue decrees, direct AFP to enforce obedience to ALL laws she promulgate, impose standard of media and other forms of restraints against the press are unconstitutional, all of which is the exercise of the legislative department.
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JUDICIAL REVIEW
- the court’s authority to examine executive or legislative act and invalidate that act if it is contrary to constitutional principles.
- the doctrine under which legislative and executive actions are subject to review, and possible invalidation, by the judiciary.
- A court's authority to examine an executive or legislative act and to invalidate that act if it is contrary to constitutional principles.
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
JURISDICTION
- the practical authority granted to a formally constituted legal body or to a political leader to deal with and make pronouncements on legal matters and, by implication, to administer justice within a defined area of responsibility.
- Authority to hear and determine cause of action.
- The geographic area over which authority extends; legal authority; the authority to hear and determine causes of action
Herrera v Barretto 25 PHIL 245 9.10.13
F: The case at bar involves a motion for certiorari by the petitioner against Judge Barretto for allegedly acting without jurisdiction on the case involving the cockpit license permit of Constancio Joaquin which the petitioner, in his capacity of the Caloocan Municipal President revoked to operate. Respondent judge apparently issued a provisional license upon the filing of Joaquin for a mandatory injunction without notice to the petitioner. The petitioner now files a motion for certiorari before the higher court against the respondent for acting in excess of jurisdiction for issuing the mandatory injunction of provisional license.
I: WON a writ of certiorari the proper action on the case at bar.
R: No. A writ for certiorari is not issued unless it is established whether or not the court to which it is directed acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. Once the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties in a case all decisions exercised within its jurisdiction, however erroneous or irregular, cannot be corrected by certiorari. The court held that the CFI has the jurisdiction over the present case to resolve all matters arising in question.
Court held that Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause —the right to act in a case. Since it is the power to hear and determine, it does not depend either upon the regularity of the exercise of that power or upon the rightfulness of the decisions made. Jurisdiction should therefore be distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction. The authority to decide a cause at all, and not the decision rendered therein, is what makes up jurisdiction.
Certiorari on one hand may not be used to correct errors committed within the jurisdiction of the court no matter how irregular or erroneous it is.
People v Mariano GR No. L-40527
F: Accused, a liaison officer of the Province of Bulacan
I: WON the court has jurisdiction over the case at bar.
R: The court ruled that estafa and malversation constitute different offense. The CFI has original jurisdiction over the case of estafa citing the Judicial Act of 1948 (CFI shall have original jurisdiction over all criminal cases involving a penalty of imprisonment for more than 6 months or a fine of P200.00)
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MUTATIS MUTANDIS
- necessary changes
- Latin phrase meaning "by changing those things which need to be changed" or more simply "the necessary changes having been made". The term is used when comparing two situations with a multiplicity of common variables set at the same value, in which the value of only one variable is allowed to differ – "all other things being equal" –thereby making comparison easier
ABANDONMENT V REVERSAL
People v Mapa 20 SCRA 1164 (1967)
I: WON the position of a secret agent working for a governor a defense against prosecution from illegal possession of firearms
R: Petitioner relied on the previous ruling of People v Macarandang where the secret agent was acquitted of the same charge where the court ruled that appointment of a secret agent sufficiently puts him in the category of a peace officer. But the court now abandoned such jurisprudence finding no provision from the law that exempts a secret agent from the prohibition of unlawful possession of ammunition and firearms.
Relampagos v Cumba 4.27.95
F: Both parties running are mayoralty candidates with Cumba declared as the winner. Relampagos appealed and the court declared him as a winner, the decision received by both parties on July 1. On July 4 Cumba appeal. On Jul 8 the court referred the case to the Comelec. On July 12, Relampagos filed motion for execution pending appeal which Cumbas opposed but the court granted the appeal. Cumbas filed a petition to the Comelec to annul the grant for execution. In its resolution, the Comelec resolve to declare the court’s grant for execution be lifted by virtue of its authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in election cases provided by B.P. Blg. 697. The said resolution was challenged by the petitioner questioning the appellate jurisdiction of the Comelec to decide over the issue.
I: WON Comelec has the appellate jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus involving election cases.
R: The court pointed out that the previous ruling on Garcia v Uy, the comelec was found to have no jurisdiction over the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus because there is no specific constitutional or statutory conferment to it of such jurisdiction. But the Comelec stated that Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 expressly granted it such jurisdiction which the court finds to be correct as there is no expressed repeal of the said provision. The court thereby abandons said ruling from the Garcia v Uy.
Moreover, the court points out that the petitioner made an appeal after which the court already divested its jurisdiction over the case to the comelec therefore it could no longer validly act upon its motion. (Any motion for execution pending appeal must be filed before the period for the perfection of the appeal which is 5 days after upon receipt of the court decision. An appeal would be deemed perfected on the last day for any of the parties to appeal.)
On repeal of a statute:An express general repealing clause to the effect that. all inconsistent enactments are repealed; is in legal contemplation a nullity. Repeals must either be expressed or result by implication. Although it has in some instances been held to be an express recognition that there are acts in conflict with the act in which it is included and as indicative of the legislative intent to repeal such acts, a general repealing clause cannot be deemed an express repeal because it fails to identify or designate any act to be repealed. It cannot be determinative of an implied repeal for if does not declare any inconsistency but conversely, merely predicates a repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict is found under application of the rules of implied repeals. If its inclusion is more than mere mechahical verbiage, it is more often a detriment than an aid to the establishment of a repeal, for such clause is construed as an express limitation of the repeal to inconsistent acts. 13
This Court is not unaware of the equally settled rule in statutory construction that in the revision or codification of laws, all parts and provisions of the old laws that are omitted in the revised statute or code are deemed repealed, unless the statute or code provides otherwise expressly or impliedly. 14
Serrano v NLRC 5.04.00
F: Isettan, respondent in the case files a motion for reconsideration after it was ordered to pay petitioner full backwages from the day of its termination from work until it is determined that he has been terminated for an authorized cause. The Labor Arbiter decision that Serrano was illegally dismissed and ordered to be reinstated was reversed by the NLRC on ground that he was dismissed by “authorized causes” (redundancy) which does not requires the 30 day notice. It is only for reasons of “just cause” that an employee must be issued the notice to give them due process. Serrano petitioned for review, which the court ordered Isettan to pay Serrano full backwages until it is determined whether his termination from service is of authorized cause. Isettan’s arguments include: (1) failure to issue a 30 days written notice to Serrano is not a violation of the labor law since the petitioner accepted their form of notice of giving 30 days pay to their employees in lieu of giving the 30 days notice although the petitioner did not accept the payment; (2) that the 30 day pay is more advantageous than the 30 days notice; (3) in any event the new ruling of this case should be applied prospectively.
I; WON the labor law requirement of giving 30 days notice prior to termination may be offset to giving 30 days pay.
R: Art. 283 of the Labor Code intends that the 30 day notice is mandatory. Nothing in the law gives private respondent the option to substitute the required prior written notice with payment of thirty (30) days salary. It is not for private respondent to make substitutions for a right that a worker is legally entitled to. Upon the contention of the respondent that the ruling of the case should only be applied prospectively, the court finds no compelling reason not to apply it immediately. Respondent relied on the previous rulings of case in Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals that the new ruling should be applied prospectively and should not be applied on parties who relied on the old doctrine in good faith which is not applicable in this case.
Vitarich v NLRC 5.20.99
F: Vitarich terminated Recodo for failure to comply with the memo issued upon him involving issues on company policies on credit transactions and cash advances. Prior to his termination, the Head of Personnel of the company submitted a report of its investigation finding no just cause to terminate Recodo but Vitarich still terminated Recodo, who filed a case for illegal dismissal against them. The Labor Arbiter finds Recodo was illegally dismissed but his findings were set aside by the NLRC ruling otherwise. Upon appeal of Recodo, the NLRC reversed its decision admitting some flaws on its decision. Vitarich contends that such decision of the NLRC is a grave abuse of its discretionary powers.
I; WON NLRC abused its discretionary power.
R: The court held that with its findings, although there is truth in the delayed implementation of the memo order to Recodo, such delay does not constitutes disobedience to merit the cause of his termination on grounds of loss of trust and confidence of the company upon him. In the name of social justice policy on labor, there must be sufficient grounds that the employer must prove when terminating its employees. This very norm of social justice demands the presumption of good faith credited to the employees in the performance of their duties upon failure of their employer to prove just cause for their dismissal. It is in obedience of this social policy mandate that the NLRC finds itself bound to reverse its first decision. Court re-affirmed the NLRC decision.
Astraquillo v Javier 13 SCRA 125 (1965)
F: The trial court decide in favor of the respondent declaring the real estate mortgage void and ordered the petitioners to pay respondents with unpaid rentals and damages. On appeal by the petitioners, it was assailed by the respondent that it is incomplete and defective thus the court said to wait until the appeal is perfected. For the meantime respondent moved for the writ of execution pending appeal due to the insolvency of the petitioners. The trial court granted the writ of execution which the petitioners appealed before the CA by petition for certiorari. CA ruled in favor of the petitioner but upon appeal of the respondent it reversed its decision upholding the decision of the CA. Petitioner questions the validity of the decision of CA on reversing its decision when the respondents did not raised any new issues to make it reverse its decision.
I: WON the CA erred in reversing its decision
R: No. it did not err in its decision to uphold the writ of execution pending appeal in court. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides the discretionary power of the trial court to grant or deny a motion ad the appellate courts will not interfere or modify or control such discretion unless there is an abuse thereof. The trial court has found the substantial claim in the case at bar and the appellate court affirmed this in its disputed resolution. There is no merit on the contention of the petitioner that the CA lacks substantial reason to reverse its decision. Courts have the power to amend and control its orders and processes to make them conform to law and justice. The SC finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA to uphold the writ of execution decided upon by the lower court.
Ebranilag v Division Superintendent of Schools 219 SCRA 256
F: Petitioners are children who were expelled by the respondent from school on grounds for refusal to participate in the flag ceremony in violation of RA 1265 penalizing educational institution that refuses to perform flag ceremony. Petitioners belong to the sect of Jehova’s witness and participating to the flag ceremony and patriotic pledge is against their religious belief as it amounts to idolatry. Respondent contends that his action is in accordance with the Gerona
I: WON the expulsion of the children from school is valid.
R: No, since the Gerona
The court cites the 2 fold aspect of religious freedom namely:
1. The absolute freedom to believe within the realm of thoughts
2. the freedom to act on one’s belief which may be regulated
It underscores that the only justification for relief is the existence of clear and present danger , both grave and imminent which is of serious evil to public interest. In the case at bar, the court held there is no clear and present danger to society with the refusal of the petitioner’s children to participate in the flag ceremony.
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RES JUDICATA
- the Latin term for "a matter [already] judged", and may refer to two things: in both civil law and common law legal systems, a case in which there has been a final judgment and is no longer subject to appeal.[1]; and the term is also used to refer to the legal doctrine meant to bar (or preclude) continued litigation of such cases between the same parties, which is different between the two legal systems. In this latter usage, the term is synonymous with "preclusion".
Elements of Res Judicata
- The former judgment must be final
- Judgment must be on the merits of the case
- The former decision is rendered by the court having jurisdiction over the subject.
- There is similar identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action for both cases.
Cause of action - defined as "an act or omission of second party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other, and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right."
TEST FOR APPLICATION OF RES JUDICATA
In the application of the doctrine of res judicata, if it is doubtful whether a second action is for the same cause of action as the first, the test generally applied is to consider the Identity of facts essential to their maintenance, or whether the same evidence would sustain both. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same within the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action. If, however, the two actions rest upon different states of facts, or if different proofs would be required to sustain the two actions, a judgment in one is no bar to the maintenance of the other.
LITIS PENDENTIA
Litis pendentia: "a pending suit." same parties, same cause. Interposed as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action pending in court.
Litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to that situation wherein another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, such that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious
Requisites for litis pendentia:
(a) identity of parties or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions
(b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts
(c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amounts to res adjudicata in the other.
Forum shopping à exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present, or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the final other.
Doctrine of Estoppel à an unlicensed foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines
Replivin - A legal action to recover the possession of items of Personal Property.
Agilent Technologies v Integrated Silicon Technology 4.14.04
F: Petitioner Agilent is foreign corporation not licensed to transact business in the Philippines but engaged services of the defendant Silicon Tech by a 5-year Value Added Assembly Services Agreement ("VAASA
I: (1) whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in giving due course to respondents’ petition, notwithstanding the failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration and (2) whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in dismissing Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C.
R: CA contends RTC has no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 3123-2001-C because of the pendency of Civil Case No. 3110-2001-C therefore, a motion for reconsideration was not necessary before resort to a petition for certiorari. There is no urgency of the case that merits dispensing the procedure of filing motion for reconsideration before a certiorari may be filed. Respondents availed of premature remedy which the CA should have dismissed outright.
Litis pendencia is not appreciated in the case since the instituted actions in both civil cases are different, the first is an action for "Specific Performance and Damages" the other is action for "Specific Performance, Recovery of Possession, and Sum of Money with Replevin, Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, and Damages." The issues involved are also different: WON there is a breach of oral agreement for renewing the VAASA
In assailing the legal capacity of Agilent to sue, the court cited the following principles:
The principles regarding the right of a foreign corporation to bring suit in Philippine courts may thus be condensed in four statements: (1) if a foreign corporation does business in the Philippines without a license, it cannot sue before the Philippine courts;47 (2) if a foreign corporation is not doing business in the Philippines, it needs no license to sue before Philippine courts on an isolated transaction or on a cause of action entirely independent of any business transaction48; (3) if a foreign corporation does business in the Philippines without a license, a Philippine citizen or entity which has contracted with said corporation may be estopped from challenging the foreign corporation’s corporate personality in a suit brought before Philippine courts;49 and (4) if a foreign corporation does business in the Philippines with the required license, it can sue before Philippine courts on any transaction.
Two general tests to determine whether or not a foreign corporation can be considered as "doing business" in the Philippines
1. substance test - whether the foreign corporation is continuing the body of the business or enterprise for which it was organized or whether it has substantially retired from it and turned it over to another.
2. continuity test - implies a continuity of commercial dealings and arrangements, and contemplates, to that extent, the performance of acts or works or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, and in the progressive prosecution of, the purpose and object of its organization.
The court ruled that Agilent categorically is not doing business in the Philippines , hence as a foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines
Cayana v CA 03.18.04
F: It appears that the petitioners and respondents’ father, with the marital consent of his wife, sold two parcels of land to their son, one of the respondents in this case. At the death of the father, the mother filed an Affidavit of Adverse Claims pertaining to the two parcels of land, alleging that the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of their son were forgeries. However, later on, she issued an affidavit withdrawing such adverse claims. Later on, together with petitioners of this case and respondent Marceliano, they filed a case against respondent Pastor, for the cancellation of the Deed of Absolute Sale and reconveyance of the two parcels of land. Meanwhile, respondent Pastor entered into an agreement of counter guaranty with respondent corporation using second parcel of land; mortgaged first parcel to respondent bank and sold first parcel of land to a certain Rosafina Reginaldo, who then mortgaged the land to respondent bank.
As the civil case against respondents was ongoing, respondents filed an answer but were found to be in default, the court allowed petitioners to file evidence ex parte. The court decided the civil case in favor of petitioners, declaring the deed of absolute sale null and void but denied the prayer for reconveyance saying that the mother was still the owner of the land. No appeal was entered by respondents and the decision was deemed final. The mortgage on the first parcel of land was foreclosed and the bank being the highest bidder, bought the property who then sold it to respondent spouses Marceliano Cayabyab. The respondent spouses M. Cayabyab then sold the land to respondent spouses Ramos. The petitioners filed a verified complaint for the nullification and cancellation of the deeds of absolute sale of the respondents. They asked also for the possession of the 2 parcels of land due to the alleged donation inter vivos of their mother. The trial court decided in favor of the petitioners, part of the decision included the application of res judicata. Respondents appealed this to the CA contending the misuse of res judicata. CA decided in favor of the respondents. It held that res judicata was inapplicable and also, declared the deeds of absolute sale and TCT’s valid. CA mentioned that it was evident that there was an affidavit withdrawing adverse claims over land, that the sale of parcels of land were not simulated and not done in bad faith, and that there was no evidence for the donation inter vivos being alleged by the petitioners.
I: Whether or not the decision on the first civil case constitutes a bar to the defenses and claims of respondents in the second case?
R:Both the trial court and CA misread the provisions on the effect of judgments or final orders as given by Rules of Civil Procedure:
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or status of a particular person or his relationship to another, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will or administration, or the condition, status or relationship of the person; however, the probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate;
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement to the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity;
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessarily thereto.
Res judicata and the bar of prior judgment are not applicable to this case since the requisites for these two to apply are not present. There is ‘bar by prior judgment’ when, between the first case where the judgment was rendered and the second case which is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. The judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the subsequent action. It is final as to the claim or demand in controversy, including the parties and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose and of all matters that could have been adjudged in that case. But where between the first and second cases, there is identity of parties but no identity of cause of action, the first judgment is conclusive in the second case, only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. For res judicata to apply, there must be (1) a former final judgment rendered on the merits; (2) the court must have had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and, (3) identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action between the first and second actions. According to the appellate court, the third requisite for the application of res judicata is not present in this case.
The doctrine that should have been followed in this case is conclusiveness of judgment--a fact or question which was in issue in a former suit and there was judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that action and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed by proper authority.
“Supreme court exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases in which only errors or questions of law are involved.”
"cause of action" has been defined as "an act or omission of second party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other, and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right."
F: The case at bar involves a parcel of land which the petitioner occupies and built a house thereof. Petitioner filed before the defendant corporation for the award of sale of the said parcel of land and found out that it was already awarded to defendant spouses. Petitioner filed protest before the court for annulment of deed of sale of said lot. Defendant spouses invoke res judicata in their counterclaim stating that the petitioner has no cause for action since there is a decision already to quiet the title and recovery of possession of the Lot involved in favor of the defendant spouses. The court dismissed the case on ground of res judicata stating that the court decision has already been final and executory. Petitioner appealed before the appellate court which forwarded the case to SC since the issue involved is a question of law.
I: WON res judicata is applicable at the case at bar.
R: No. For res judicata be appreciated in a case, 4 elements must be present: (1) there is a former final judgment; (2) decision rendered by court with proper jurisdiction over the case; (3) judgment must be on merit; (4) there must be identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action between 2 cases. The identity of cause of action is the main issue on the case at bar. The court held that in order to identify whether the second action is of the same cause as the first the test generally applied is to consider the Identity of facts essential to their maintenance, or whether the same evidence would sustain both. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same within the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action. If, however, the two actions rest upon different states of facts, or if different proofs would be required to sustain the two actions, a judgment in one is no bar to the maintenance of the other.
The first case involves quieting the title and recovery and possession of the land while the second case involves the action for annulment of award and deed of sale and cancellation of the land title. The case was remanded back to the lower court for further proceedings.
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LAW OF THE CASE
(Not an absolute law, just a common law)
The Law of the case is a legal term of art that is applicable mainly in common law, or Anglo-American, jurisdictions that recognize the related doctrine of stare decisis. The phrase refers to instances where "rulings made by a trial court and not challenged on appeal become the law of the case." [1] "Unless the trial court's rulings were clearly in error or there has been an important change in circumstances, the Court's prior rulings must stand." [2] Usually the situation occurs when either a case is on appeal for the second time--e.g., if the reviewing court remanded the matter back to the trial court and the party appeals again, or the case was appealed to a higher appellate court--for example, from an appellate court to the highest court.
As generally used, the term law of the case designates the principle that if an appellate court has passed on a legal question and remanded the cause to the court below for further proceedings, the legal question thus determined by the appellate court will not be differently determined on a subsequent appeal in the same case where the facts remain the same.[3]
The doctrine provides that an appellate court’s determination on a legal issue is binding on both the trial court on remand and an appellate court on a subsequent appeal given the same case and substantially the same facts.[4]
Law of the case, however, is one of policy only and will be disregarded when compelling circumstances call for a redetermination of the determination of a point of law on prior appeal, and this is particularly true where an intervening or a contemporaneous change in law has occurred by overruling former decisions or the establishment of new precedent by controlling authority.[5]
The law of the case doctrine precludes reconsideration of a previously decided issue unless one of three "exceptional circumstances" exists: (1) when substantially different evidence is raised at a subsequent trial; (2) when a subsequent contrary view of the law is decided by the controlling authority; or (3) when a decision is clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.
JM Tuason v Mariano GR. No. L-33140 10.23.78
F: The case involves the question of validity of ownership of a land title of the petitioners filed by the respondents. A previous civil case was already decided upon by the court upholding the validity of said title owned by the petitioners. The petitioners herein filed a motion for certiorari and prohibition.
I: WON the respondents may still question the validity of said land title.
R: The court held they cannot question an issue that has already been decided by the court in finality. The validity of said title is no longer open for attack as it is against public policy that matters already decided on its merits be re-litigated once again.
Buaya v Stronghold GR. No, 139020 10.11.00
F: Stronghold filed a case against Buaya who is the manager of its Cebu branch for recovery of un-remitted collection of money. The lower court ruled on Stronghold’s favor. Buaya appealed before the CA which ruled in his favor remanding the case back to the lower court. Subsequent hearings were set with failure of Buaya and his counsel to appear many times until Stronghold filed a petition to reinstate the previous decision of the court. The court decision becomes final and executory and it denied all other appeals made before it. Buaya thus herein files a motion for certiorari.
I: (1) Can a decision from the lower court that is annulled by the appellate court be reinstated by the same court that rendered the decision; (2) When the appellate court annuls the decision of the lower court on grounds of failure to give notice to Buaya at pre-trial and remanded it back to the said lower court, does the proceeding in the lower court merely requires presentation of evidence by Buaya alone without requiring Stronghold to present its evidence for cross examination by Buaya.
R: (1) On annulled decision, the court correct that the CA did not annulled the lower court’s decision but merely set aside to allow petitioner to present his evidence. There is nothing wrong when the court reinstated its decision after failure of petitioner to present evidence despite the ample time given for him to do so. It is also required for the petitioner to attach an authentic copy of the original decision to support his claim that the CA annulled the lower court’s decision. Failure to comply said requirement is a ground for dismissal of petition.
(2) On final and executory judgment, it becomes the law of the case regardless of claims that it is erroneous. Final judgments are decisions rendered by court with competent jurisdiction acting within its authority and its judgment cannot be altered even at risk of occasional legal infirmities of errors it may contain. Litigation must end sometime and somewhere. In view of efficient and effective administration of judgment once a decision has become final, the prevailing party should not be deprived of the favorable judgment rendered upon them on suits involving the same issues and parties.
Argel v Pascua A.M. No. RTJ-94-1131 8.20.01
F: Petitioner who was charged with murder was previously acquitted by Judge Pascua. After his acquittal, said Judge modified her decision on the account that she made a mistake of rendering her previous judgment believing there was no witness against the accused due to the fact that the testimony of the witness was not attached to the records when she wrote her decision. After finding the accused guilty of murder she ordered the arrest of the accused.
I: WON a final judgment by the court can be susceptible for amendment or modification.
R: No. The final judgment becomes the law of the case and is immune from alteration or modification regardless of claims of incorrectness or error. A judgment of acquittal in criminal cases becomes immediately effective upon its promulgation. It cannot be recalled for amendment only in case of any clerical error, clarify any ambiguity caused by omission or mistake in the dispositive portion. The inherent power of the court to modify its decision does not extend to a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case.
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FINALITY OF DECISION
Echegaray v Secretary of Justice 301 SCRA 96 1.19.99
F: Leo Echegaray is a convict subject to lethal injection (RA 8177). The SC issued a temporary restraining order for the execution until it ensures that there will no longer be any repeal or modification as to the implementation of RA 8177. Such action by the court was questioned since it already rendered a final judgment on the case.
I: WON the court loses its jurisdiction on a decided case with a final judgment.
R: The SC does not lose its jurisdiction over a case with a final judgment rendered upon it. What it cannot do is modify or amend the final decision. The court held that by finality of judgment, the court loses its jurisdiction to amend the decision but retains its power to execute or enforce it. There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter a decision. The former continues for the purpose of enforcing the judgment while the latter terminates after the final judgment is rendered for after the judgment becomes final, facts and circumstances may transpire which may render the execution unjust or impossible.
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OPERATIVE FACT AND PROSPECTIVITY OF LAWS
Operative Facts
- A fact that is directly relevant to deciding some question of law. When a legal question is governed by fact-driven rules, operative facts may be thought of as variables that are plugged in to those rules so that the right answer can be obtained.
- Adjudicative facts are fact that is either legally operative or important as to be controlling on some question of law. Adjudicative facts re-create the course of events that led to the dispute and help in determining the proper outcome in the case. They differ from ordinary facts in that they are considered facts only if the court recognizes and accepts them.
Que v People 154 SCRA 160 (1987)
F: Petitioner convicted in violation of BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) filed motion for reconsideration before SC on the following grounds:
(1) petition for reconsideration denied by a mere resolution with nothing else but the statement “lack of merit”
(2) The lower court has no jurisdiction to try the case.
(3) Appelate court erred in considering one of the most impt. Element in the offense against BP 22 which is place of issuance of check which is absent in the instant case.
I: WON the decision of both the trial court and appellate court and the denial of the Petition for Review are in accordance with law and evidence.
R: The findings of fact of the trial court reveal that the checks in question were issued at Quezon City Quezon City Quezon City
On denial of resolution by minute resolution, court held that these 'resolutions' are not 'decisions' within the above constitutional requirement. They merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained in view of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it. It should be remembered that a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the court's denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals' opinion.
20th Century Fox v CA 164 SCRA 655 (1988)
F: Petitioner sought the help of the NBI in connection with its anti-piracy campaign alleging that some videotape outlets are engaged in marketing copyrighted films in violation of PD 449 or Decree on the Protection of Intellectual Property. A search warrant was issued to the NBI which was later withdrawn by the court upon motion to lift search warrant due to lack of probable cause which was affirmed by the appellate court.
I: WON the court erred in lifting the search warrant due to lack of probable cause.
R: Article 3, section 2 of the Constitution provides that no search warrant shall be issued without probable cause. PROBABLE CAUSE is defined as a valid search as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. The constitutional provisions demand “no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of the search warrant may be justified” to convince the judge, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the search warrant.
In the case at bar, the issuance of the warrant was due to the misrepresentation of the NBI that copyright infringements were being committed. There was no probable cause since the agents have no personal knowledge of such fact. Court ordered that the master tapes be presented from which the copyrighted films were allegedly copied for the validity of the issuance of the search warrant since the court could not afford to make any presumption that duplicates were taken from the master copy of the petitioner.
F: Acting upon a formal complaint by the petitioner on violation of PD 449, NBI agents surveillance different video establishments in Metro Manila including the private respondent. A search warrant was secured with affidavits and depositions of the NBI with 2 witnesses. Search and seizure of copyrighted materials were taken by the NBI and a motion to lift search warrant was filed and was denied by the court. On motion for reconsideration, the court upholds the motion to lift on grounds that no original copy of the films were presented when securing the warrant citing the case of 20th Century Fox vs CA. On appeal, the CA sustained the ruling of the trial court.
I: WON the ruling on the cited case applicable in the case at bar.
R: No because rules and decisions must be applied prospectively. The ruling in the cited case is not applicable since the ruling in the case at bar happened before such ruling was ever upheld. The ruling in the 20th Century Fox only serves as a guidepost and not absolute since it is not always necessary to present the original tapes before ascertaining probable cause.
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COURTS AS ARBITERS OF RIGHTS AND POWERS
Arbiter - One who has the power to judge or ordain at will
Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v Ignacio M. Capulong GR No. 82398 4.29.88
F: Petitioner is filming a motion picture about the EDSA Revolution and informed Juan Ponce Enrile about it who opposes the project and filed a temporary restraining order. Petitioner files motion to dismiss due to lack of cause of action since the mini-series had not yet been completed. The court allowed the petitioners to resume producing and filming those portions of the projected film that do not make any reference to private respondent or his family or to any fictitious character based on the respondent. In his reply, Enrile is invoking his right to privacy.
I: WON the production of the mini-series would be an intrusion to the privacy of Enrile.
R: No, the court held there is nothing in the film that constitutes an unlawful intrusion on the respondent’s life and it could not see any danger such poses into the privacy of respondent. The court held the film is of historical value and involves public domain and is an appropriate subject on freedom of speech and expression. It further cite the fact that Enrile is a public figure and being a part of the film is one of the natural consequence of being such and it is limited only to his character as a public officer and does not extend to his family in general.
Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Association v Philippine Blooming Mills 51 SCRA 189
F: petitioners staged a mass demonstration before the Malacanang Palace expressing their grievance against the abuses of the Pasig
I: WON there is justified cause for the dismissal of the petitioners
R: Workers acted right in the exercise of their freedom to expression. The petitioners explained to the company that such is what they are trying to assert thus it is not violative of their agreement on “no strike, no lockout” rule. The company’s right to property should yield to the workers Constitutional right to freedom of speech, freedom of expression and freedom to petition for redress of grievances. The company’s loss of unrealized profits for the day of the strike is not as important as the workers fight their rights. In fact, they were even able to save money on the operational expenses for that day. The Court of Industrial Relations should not be confined by technical and procedural rules in its quest for justice. Since the CIR is a creature of the Legislature and even the rules of the legislature itself must be liberally applied if strict adherence to it would result in the denial of a person’s constitutional right, the CIR should not have denied their motion for reconsideration. In doing so, the court divested itself of their jurisdiction which renders their decision in favor of the company null and void.
The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition are not only civil rights but also political rights essential to man’s enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Human rights are supreme over property rights since property rights can be lost through prescription while human rights do not prescribe. A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely EXISTENCE OF A GRAVE AND IMMEDIATE DANGER OF A SUBSTANTIVE EVILWHICH THE STATE HAS THE RIGHT TO PREVENT. When a Court acts against the Constitution, its judgments and orders become null and void. A court may suspend its own rules whenever the purposes of justice requires it.
PEOPLE VS. CAYAT 68 PHIL 12 MAY 5, 1939
Facts: Cayat, being a member of the non-Christian tribes, was accused for possessing one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of Act No. 1639. The trial court found him guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him to pay a fine of P50 or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Issue: The accused challenges the constitutionality of the Act on the following grounds:
(1) That it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the
laws;
(2) That it is violative of the due process clause of the Constitution;
and
(3) That it is an improper exercise of the police power of the state.
R:
1. It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable,
(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only;
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon "accident of birth or parentage," as counsel for the appellant asserts, but upon the degree of civilization and culture. "The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way, to the geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities." (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, supra.) This distinction is unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes. The exceptional cases of certain members thereof who at present have reached a position of cultural equality with their Christian brothers, cannot affect the reasonableness of the classification thus established.
That it is germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. The prohibition "to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act," is unquestionably designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-Christian tribes. It has been the sad experience of the past, as the observations of the lower court disclose, that the free use of highly intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standard of life and civilization.
The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exist. The Act was not predicated, as counsel for appellant asserts, upon the assumption that the non-Christians are "impermeable to any civilizing influence." On the contrary, the Legislature understood that the civilization of a people is a slow process and that hand in hand with it must go measures of protection and security.
Finally, that the Act applies equally to all members of the class is evident from a perusal thereof. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number of non-Christians by reason of their degree of culture, is not an argument against the equality of its application.
2. Appellant contends that that provision of the law empowering any police officer or other duly authorized agent of the government to seize and forthwith destroy any prohibited liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any member of the non-Christian tribes is violative of the due process of law provided in the Constitution. But this provision is not involved in the case at bar. Besides, to constitute due process of law, notice and hearing are not always necessary. This rule is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officials in applying a law to particular cases.
Due process of law means simply:
(1) that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the government;
(2) that it shall be reasonable in its operation;
(3) that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed;
(4) that it shall be applicable alike to all citizens of the state or to all of a class.
Thus a person's property may be seized by the government in payment of taxes without judicial hearing; or
property used in violation of law may be confiscated, or when the Property constitutes corpus delicti, as in the instant case.
3. Neither is the Act an improper exercise of the police power of the state. It has been said that the police power is the most insistent and least limitable of all the powers of the government. It has been aptly described as a power coextensive with self-protection and constitutes the law of overruling necessity. Any measure intended to promote, the health, peace, morals, education and good order of the people or to increase the industries of the state, develop its resources and add to its wealth and prosperity, is a legitimate exercise of the police power, and unless shown to be whimsical or capricious as to unduly interfere with the rights of an individual, the same must be upheld.
Act No. 1639, as above stated, is designed to promote peace and order in the non-Christian tribes so as to remove all obstacles to their moral and intellectual growth and, eventually, to hasten their equalization and unification with the rest of their Christian brothers. Its ultimate purpose can be no other than to unify the Filipino people with a view to a greater Philippines
The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as "an inferior or less capable race." On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in the enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality. It is indeed gratifying that the non-Christian tribes "far from retrograding, are definitely asserting themselves in a competition world," as appellant's attorney impressively avers, and that they are "a virile, up- and-coming people eager to take their place in the world's social scheme." As a matter of fact, there are now lawyers, doctors and other professionals educated in the best institutions here and in America Philippines
In the constitutional scheme of our government, this court can go no farther than to inquire whether the Legislature had the power to enact the law. If the power exists, and we hold it does exist, the wisdom of the policy adopted, and the adequacy under existing conditions of the measures enacted to forward it, are matters which this court has no authority to pass upon. And, if in the application of the law, the educated non-Christians shall incidentally suffer, the justification still exists in the all-comprehending principle of salus populi suprema est lex. When the public safety or the public morals require the discontinuance of a certain practice by a certain class of persons, the hand of the Legislature cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinuance by any incidental inconvenience which some members of the class may suffer. The private interests of such members must yield to the paramount interests of the nation.
Gashem Shookat Baksh v CA GR No. 97336 2.19.93
F: Petitioner, an exchange student in the Philippines
I: WON the private respondent may sue under the provision of Article 21 of the Civil Code.
R: The court held that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. There was a deliberate omission of the provision that makes it so by the congress but in the interest of justice it incorporates in the Civil Code Art. 23 which provides that “any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs and public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.” Article 21 is designed to expand the concepts of torts or quasi-delict and fills the vaccum by adding legal remedy for the untold numbers of moral wrongs without which some injurious acts would be beyond redress. The private respondent therefore may claim for damages not by breach of promise to marry but because of the fraudulent and deceitful act of the petitioner that injures her honor and dignity.
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EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
- means that the states must apply the law equally and cannot give preference to one person or class of persons over another.
Tiu v CA GR No. 127410 1.20.99
F: The passage of RA 7227 (An Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, Creating the Bases Conversion and Development Authority for this Purpose, Providing Funds Therefore and for Other Purposes) paved the creation of Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ). It included City of Olongapo and the Municipality of Subic , Province of Zambales , the lands occupied by the Subic Naval bases Agreement and within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipalities of Morong and Hermosa, Province of Bataan
I: WON the issuance of EO 97-A violates the equal protection clause guaranteed by the Constitution. And WON the exclusion of some locations from the zone is discriminatory.
R: The equal-protection guarantee does not require territorial uniformity of laws. The fundamental right of equal protection of the law is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification.
Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions, (2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class.
Furthermore, RA 7227 clearly vests in the President the authority to delineate the metes and bounds of the SSEZ.
People v Cayat 68 PHIL 12
F: Cayat is a member of non-Christian tribe convicted under Act. No. 1639 for possession of an intoxicating liquor and sentenced him to pay P50.00 or subsidiary imprisonment. Cayat assails the decision on the ff. grounds: It is discriminatory, denial of equal protection of the law, violative of due process provided by the constitution, that it is an improper exercise of police power.
I: Does Act No. 1639 unconstitutional
R: It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty for equal protection of the law is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification.
For the classification to be reasonable it must have the ff requisites:
- must rest on substantial distinction
- must be germane to the purpose of the law
- must not be limited to existing conditions only
- must apply equally to all members of the same class
Due Process of Law defined:
2) that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the government.
3) That it shall be reasonable in its operation
4) That it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedures prescribed
5) That it shall be applicable alike to all citizens of the state or to all of a class
- to constitute due process of law, notice and hearings are not always necessary.
The Act No. 1639 is designed to promote peace and order in the non-Christian tribes to remove all obstacles in their intellectual and moral growth. It is meant to mark the non-Christian tribe as inferior or less capable race. When public safety or public moral requires discontinuance of a certain practice by certain classes of persons, the hand of the legislature cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinuance by any incidental inconvenience which some members of the class may suffer. The private interest of such member should yield to the paramount interest of the nation.
