CONFLICT OF LAWS NOTES

CONFLICT OF LAWS NOTES

By: Evelyn De Matias

PRINCIPLES AND DOCTRINES

Extraterritoriality

-         General rule: Philippine laws have no extraterritorial effects in another country.

Reason: One sovereign country is independent of another.

-         Exceptions:

• When our law provides respect to other countries with respect to its citizens and nationals

• When our country enters into a treaty with another country.

• Congressional legislations adopting foreign law to municipal law of the land.

-         Extraterritorial application of a foreign law allowed when the country gives consent (implied or expressed).

Exception: When the foreign law is against public policy and order.

Foreign Elements

-         consist of the following as subject matter:

a.       nationality or citizenship

b.      personal status

c.       property

-         points of contacts include:

a.       place of contracting

b.      place of negotiation of contract

c.       place of performance

d.      location of subject matter of the contract

e.       domicile, residence, place of incorporation, nationality and place of business of parties.

f.        If the place of negotiating the contract and the place of performance are in the same state, the local law of this state shall apply.

BANK OF AMERICA vs AMERICAN REALTY CO. 321 SCRA 659

“In a conflict between a Philippine law and a foreign law, Philippine law prevails”

Facts:

The Bank of America granted a loan to a corporation secured by a real estate mortgage by the respondent. Upon the loan maturity, the corporation debtor failed to pay and the petitioner bank filed 4 collection cases in the foreign courts (England and Hong Kong) against the corporation debtors. At the same time it also filed an extrajudicial foreclosure in the office of the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan, Philippines on the real estate mortgage and said was sold in a public auction. The respondent files action for damages against petitioner due to the act of foreclosing the real estate mortgage extrajudicially despite the pending civil suits before the foreign courts to collect the principal loan. Petitioner contends that the respondent is not made a party on the collection case before the foreign courts for being a third party mortgagor and such actions were filed in foreign courts and thus decisions rendered on such courts are not enforceable in the Philippines unless a separate action is filed in the Phils to enforce such judgment and that under the English law which is the law governing in the principal agreement, the mortgagee does not lose its security interest by filing a civil action for sum of money. The court rendered judgment in favor of defendants declaring that the filing of civil suit on collection of a sum of money in foreign courts constitutes a waiver on the security of the mortgages.

AZNAR vs GARCIA 7 SCRA 95

Facts:

                Edward Christensen is a citizen of the State of California and domiciled in the Philippines. He executed in his will acknowledging his natural daughter Maria Lucy Christensen as sole heir but left a legacy of some money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who is declared by the Supreme Court in its decision as acknowledged natural daughter of Edward C. Counsel of Helen asserts that her claim must be increased in view of the successional rights of illegitimate children under Phil. law. Counsel of Maria insists that Art. 16 (2) provides that the NATIONAL LAW OF THE PERSON applies in intestate and testamentary successions and since Edward C. is a citizen of CA, its law should be applied. Lower court ruled that CA law should be applied thus this petition for review.

CADALIN vs POEA ADMINISTRATOR 238 SCRA 721

“Borrowing Statute” –

Ex: Sec. 48, Rule on Civil Procedure – “if by the laws of the State or country where the cause of action arose the action is barred, it is also barred in the Philippines.”

Facts:

Cadalin et al. are Filipino workers recruited by Asia Int’l Builders Co. (AIBC), a domestic recruitment corporation, for employment in Bahrain to work for Brown & Root Int’l Inc. (BRII) which is a foreign corporation with headquarters in Texas. Plaintiff instituted a class suit with the POEA for money claims arising from the unexpired portion of their employment contract which was prematurely terminated. They worked in Bahrain for BRII and they filed the suit after 1 yr. from the termination of their employment contract.

As provided by Art. 156 of the Amiri Decree aka as the Labor Law of the Private Sector of Bahrain: “a claim arising out of a contract of employment shall not be actionable after the lapse of 1 year from the date of the expiry of the contract,” it appears that their suit has prescribed.

SALVACION vs CENTRAL BANK 278 SCRA 27

FACTS:

Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested for committing four counts of rape and serious illegal detention against Karen Salvacion. Police recovered from him several dollar checks and a dollar account in the China Banking Corp. He was, however, able to escape from prison. In a civil case filed against him, the trial court awarded Salvacion moral, exemplary and attorney’s fees amounting to almost P1,000,000.00.

Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar deposit of Bartelli with the China Banking Corp. but the latter refused arguing that Section 11 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 exempts foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever. Salvacion therefore filed this action for declaratory relief in the Supreme Court.

HSBC vs SHERMAN 176 SCRA 331 (1989)

Facts: Eastern Book & Supply Service (Singapore) was granted by HSBC Singapore an overdraft facility. Sherman, et. al. and directors of Eastern Book executed a Joint and Several Guarantee in favor of HSBC. Eastern Book defaulted. Hence, HSBC filed a suit for collection against them before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Sherman filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the complaint and persons of the defendants. The guarantee provides:  “This guarantee and all rights, obligations and liabilities arising hereunder shall be construed and determined under and may be enforced in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Singapore.”

SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES vs CA 297 SCRA 469

Facts:

On January 21, 1988 defendant SAUDIA hired plaintiff as a Flight Attendant for its airlines based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. . . .

On April 27, 1990, while on a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, plaintiff went to a disco dance with fellow crew members Thamer Al-Gazzawi and Allah Al-Gazzawi, both Saudi nationals. Because it was almost morning when they returned to their hotels, they agreed to have breakfast together at the room of Thamer. When they were in te (sic) room, Allah left on some pretext. Shortly after he did, Thamer attempted to rape plaintiff. Fortunately, a roomboy and several security personnel heard her cries for help and rescued her. Later, the Indonesian police came and arrested Thamer and Allah Al-Gazzawi, the latter as an accomplice.

When plaintiff returned to Jeddah a few days later, several SAUDIA officials interrogated her about the Jakarta incident. They then requested her to go back to Jakarta to help arrange the release of Thamer and Allah. In Jakarta, SAUDIA Legal Officer Sirah Akkad and base manager Baharini negotiated with the police for the immediate release of the detained crew members but did not succeed because plaintiff refused to cooperate. She was afraid that she might be tricked into something she did not want because of her inability to understand the local dialect. She also declined to sign a blank paper and a document written in the local dialect. Eventually, SAUDIA allowed plaintiff to return to Jeddah but barred her from the Jakarta flights.

Fausta Francisco vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. L-35787, April 11, 1980 (97 SCRA 22)

Facts:

This is a petition for review filed by the petitioner on the decision rendered by the CA reversing the CFI judgment in favor of her on a land registration case and orders the issuance of the Original Cert. of Title to the respondents Alejandro Santos and Ramona Francisco instead. Petitioner alleges that she is the absolute owner of the land in dispute covered with an Original Cert. of title of the Register of Deeds; that she is in continuous, adverse, open, peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the land since time immemorial; respondents have never been in possession of the land as they claim and that they obtained their Decree of Registration of said land by fraud. Apparently, Diego Francisco, the petitioner’s father occupied the land in dispute since 1918 and obtained a homestead patent for it. He introduced some improvements on the land such as fencing the area with barbwires, planting mango trees and palays and pasturing carabaos. He was able to secure a title in favor of his children petitioner included for the big parcel of land he cultivates and improves and when he died in 1941 the petitioner continued to possess the land in question not embraced in the Transfer of Cert. of Title issued to them in the concept of an owner.

Angel del Rosario vs. Republic of the Philippines G.R. No. 148338, June 6, 2002 (432 Phil. 824)

Facts:

The case is a petition for review on the reversal of the decision of the RTC by the CA denying the application of the petitioner for the registration of a parcel of land (forest land) located in Maragondon, Cavite. In October 13, 1997, petitioner filed an application for registration of a parcel of land, stating therein that he is resident of Poblacion, Ternate, Cavite; that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question, which was alienable and disposable land, under a bona fide claim of ownership since the 1920s or even earlier; and that such land was being occupied and cultivated by him and his family. He also indicated the owners/occupants of the adjoining properties and submitted the following documents: (a) an advance survey plan of the land applied for with technical descriptions, Survey Plan, Ap-04-0011601, (b) Technical Description of Lot No. 1891; (c) Certification in lieu of Geodetic Engineer's certification issued for registration purposes, attesting to the genuineness of the survey plan; (d) Certification, dated August 14, 1997, that the subject land is alienable and disposable;(e) Certification, dated October 7, 1997, that the property is not covered by any public land application or patent; (f) Tax Declaration No. 7414, Series of 1998, covering the parcel of land; and (g) Official Receipt No. 1038951S, dated September 9, 1997, showing petitioner's payment of the realty taxes on the said lot up to 1997.

Mariano Turquesa vs. Rosario Valera & Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 76371, January 20, 2000 (379 Phil. 618)

Facts:

Respondent applied for registration of 2 parcels of land referred to as Lot 1 and Lot 2. She alleged to have bought Lot 1 and declared it in her name for taxation purposes. Notice for the application for registration was published in the Official Gazette. Oppositors were the Director of Bureau of Lands and herein petitioners. The opposition of Bureau of Lands was denied for failure to substantiate his claim that the land is part of the public domain. Other petitioners claim that their lands were included in Lot 1 sought to be registered by the respondent. The lower court decided in favor of the respondent and denied petitioner’s motion for ocular inspection of the land in dispute. Oppositors appealed to CA regarding Lot 1. CA remanded the case to the lower court for ocular inspection. 3 Commissioners were appointed for the ocular inspection but their findings were opposed and a second ocular inspection was ordered. The trial court reiterated its former judgment to register the whole are of Lot 1 to the respondent with its encumbrance to PNB in the amount of P1,000 removed as it was already paid and thus no longer annotated on the title. The oppositors appealed with the argument that their properties were erroneously included in the respondent’s land registration. CA modified the land registration on lot 1 excluding the landholdings of the oppositors.

Respondent filed a suit for a writ of possession over 2 lots occupied by Santiago Partolan and Crispin Baltar which the court denied. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the court decision and granted the motion for writ of possession on the landholdings of Partolan,  Baltar and oppositors who did not appeal the decision of the lower court while excluding the landholdings of Segundina and Damasen who proved they have rightful and registrable rights over their claim on a specific portion of land. Thus, the oppositors filed a motion for review.

Republic vs. Maria Lee and IAC, G.R. No. 64818, May 13, 1991 (197 SCRA)

“failure to prove bonafide claim to land through tacking possession from predecessor-in –interest to meet requirements provided by law”

Facts:

Respondent filed before the RTC a registration of a parcel of land in her favor which was opposed by the Dir. Of Lands on grounds that respondent or her predecessor-in-interest acquired the land under any recognized mode for acquisition of title; they have not been in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious possession of the land in the concept of an owner for at least 30 years prior to the filing of application and the land in dispute is a public domain belonging to Republic of the Philippines. The court rendered judgment in favor of respondents. Upon appeal by RP, it affirmed the lower court decision thus this appeal to the Supreme Court.

Republic of the Phil. contends that respondent failed to prove by conclusive evidence that she has ownership of the land by fee simple title and her testimony as to the ownership of her predecessor-in-interest is self serving after claiming that she obtained her Deed of Sale of the property from Laureana Mataban and Sixto Espiritu who obtained their title from the previous owners of the land, Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan. From the time of filing the application of registration, the respondent was in possession of the land for 13 years but she sought to tack her possession on the said land from her predecessor-in-interests who were in possession of the land for 20 years. Conditions provided by Sec. 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 where one is under a bonafide claim of acquisition of ownership through their predecessor-in-interest or by themselves have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the agricultural land in public domain for 30 years shall be entitled to a certificate of title.

Director, Land Management Bureau vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112567, February 7, 2000 (381 Phil. 761)

“failure to prove possession according to the manner and no. of years required by law”

Facts:

Respondent Aquilino Cariño filed a petition for registration for Lot 6 which is a sugar land claimed to be owned by his mother of whom after she died he became the administrator of the property in behalf of his brothers and sisters. By virtue of a deed of extrajudicial settlement, he became the sole owner of the property. Report from the land investigator showed that the lot is agricultural in nature. Respondent claims that the improvements introduced were in the form of bamboo clumps, sugarcane and mango trees with the house of the tenant; that the land is free from claim and conflict and is not covered by existing public land application and no patent or title has been issued to it; that the respondent is on continuous, open and exclusive possession of the land as inherited from his deceased mother. Respondent is the sole witness for his petition and the only oppositor is the Bureau of Lands. The court granted the petition of the respondent. The petitioner filed a review for certiorari contending that the respondent failed to submit proof of his fee simple title and has not overthrown the presumption that the land is a portion of the public domain belonging to the state.

Peltan Development, Inc. v CA GR. No. 117029, March 19, 1997

Facts:

The respondents were applying for a free patent to a certain parcel of land which they have been occupying, cultivating, planting, staying, and introducing improvements thereon and neither one of petitioners was in possession thereof. They had the land surveyed but the processing and approval of their application were held in abeyance despite the absence of any opposition on grounds that there allegedly existing certificates of title on said land in the name of Peltan Development. Peltan allegedly obtained their title from spouses Lorenzo Gana and Maria Carlos, however the respondents assail that the title was spurious and fictitious. Prior to their application for a free patent, the improvements they introduced to the land were bulldozed by one of the petitioners. They filed a complaint that by virtue of the spurious title produced by the petitioners and the illegal destruction of the respondent’s plants and dwellings, their rights for a free patent to the land were substantially prejudiced by petitioners and hold them liable to pay for actual and compensatory damages. Peltan filed a motion for preliminary hearing on affirmative defense on grounds that the respondents have no cause of action against them and they are not the real party of interest in the action they sought to assert as they have no subsisting title to present over the disputed property. Their contention was based on a former jurisprudence that the government thru the Solicitor General should be the real party of interest to file a motion for cancellation of the certificate of title. In answer, the respondents re-asserted their cause of action to their complaint and showed their rights, interest and claims to have been violated thereby placing them to a status of real party of interest.

The lower court dismissed the complaint ruling that the respondents were not a real party of interest. This decision was reversed by the court of appeals ruling that the lower court should have treated the action as accion publiciana to determine which party has the right to possession. The petitioners now file a petition for review and pray for the cancellation of the notation of lis pendens on their certificate of title.

Issues:

Whether or not the respondents are the real party of interest in their action against the petitioners?

Ruling:

The SC reversed the decision of the appellate court. It is a well-settled rule that the cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint and to resolve the motion to dismiss based on failure to state cause of action, only the facts in the complaint must be considered. The court held that the CA failed to appreciate the fact that the title of the petitioners were validly upheld by the court in a court proceeding (G.R. No. 109490 and in G.R. No. 112038). Every court should take mandatory judicial notice to court decisions when resolving motion to dismiss as required by Rule 129, section 1 of the Rules of Court. The CA erred in recognizing the rights of the respondents as one based on their actual possession of the land and their pending application for a free patent thereof. It also committed a reversible error to treat the issue as one of accion publiciana since the decision has already been rendered by the court before upholding the title of the petitioners as valid and genuine. Therefore, it is no longer an option to treat the case as one.

The respondents are held not as real party of interest since although they were not praying for the reversion of the land to the government such complaint would still result to the same under the Regalian doctrine. The respondents have no right over the land as they admit that neither they nor their predecessors owned the land which is construed that the land in dispute remains to be a property of public domain. If there is any person with real interest to the land it should be the government. The SC reversed and set aside the decision of the CA and cancelled the annotation of lis pendens to the petitioners’ title.

Spouses Francisco and Angela Tankiko v Justiano Cezar, et. al. GR No. 131277, February 2, 1999

Facts:

Respondents are the actual occupants and residents of a parcel of land herein referred to as Lot 3714 who introduced improvements thereon and are sales patent applicants of the said lot. They were religiously paying taxes on the property. They filed an action for reconveyance and damages against the petitioners. Apparently, an original certificate of title (OCT) was issued to the petitioners after acquiring said lot from the heirs of the lot’s alleged former owner Patricio Salcedo who acquires his title to the lot by virtue of a decree of registration upon the decision of the cadastral court. Respondents assail the validity of the title of Salcedo by citing the Consing decision of the court that involves the neighboring lot 3715 with the following observation:  (1) there is no showing that a decision has been made on the Cadastral proceedings cited by the petitioners with no records thereof in the Land Registration Commission and (2) they found a decision that renders Lot 3715 and Lot 3714 public lands.

Republic v CA and Ceferino Paredes, Jr. GR No. 112115, March 9, 2001

Facts:

Respondent Paredes appeared to have purchased a certain parcel of land of which he applied for a free patent. His application was approved and was issued with a Free Patent and an OCT on May 1, 1976. On June 27, 1984 theSangguniang Bayan adopted a resolution undertaking the assistance of the Municipality of San Francisco to recover possession of the land as it was averred to have been designated by the Bureau of Lands as a school site for the San Francisco Town Site Reservation, long before title to it was issued in private respondent's name. They also questioned the claim of the respondent to have posted his application for free patent on the door of their Municipal Hall because if he did they would have filed an opposition thereto. The Bureau of Lands filed the necessary action on their behalf for the recovery of the land, cancellation of the free patent title under the respondent’s name and the reversion of the land to the public domain. It also amended its complaint to include the Development Bank of the Philippines as respondent where Paredes had mortgaged the property.

Heirs of Pedro Lopez et. al. v Honesto C. de Castro, et. al. GR No. 112905, February 3, 2000

“two applications of a parcel of land”

Facts:

The petitioners filed an application for registration of parcel of land located in Tagaytay City with the CFI in Cavite. The Municipality of Silang, Cavite files an opposition alleging that the land is its patrimonial property. The petitioners claim that the land is a part of the whole tract of land as their inheritance sought to be registered in Cavite but was excluded from their application upon recommendation of the chief surveyor of the Land Reg. Office because the land is located in the Province of Laguna. The motion to dismiss by the Municipality of Silang was denied by the court due to lack of merit on ground that the municipality has no personality to intervene because the lot was outside its territorial limits. And even if it is a communal property of both municipalities, the incorporation of Cavite to the city of Tagaytay makes it a property of the latter. Thus the right to action accrues to the municipality of Tagaytay. Upon deliberation, the Clerk of Court recommended to grant the application with its report disclosing that since time immemorial, the De Los Reyes family owned and possessed the land and sold it to the father of the applicant, Pedro Lopez who later took over the ownership and possession of the land. Upon his death, his heirs succeeded over the property and subsequently partitioned it. The court thus approved the application and ordered the registration of the land in favor of the petitioner.

Teofilo Cacho v CA GR No. 123361, March 31, 1997

Land Registration as a Proceeding In Rem

Facts:

Doña Cacho applied for a registration of two parcels of land in Lanao Province and is situated within the limits of a military conservation. The two petitions were jointly tried and the court promulgated a decision for the issuance of two decrees subject to certain conditions of submitting the deed of sale for the first lot and the new plan for the second lot. The sole heir of Doña Cacho, Teofilo Cacho files a motion for the reconstitution of the two original certificates of title. His petition was opposed by the respondents Republic of the Philippines, National Steel Corporation (NSC), and the City of Iligan. The lower court dismissed the petition for the reason that the proper remedy would be to file a motion for reconstitution of the decrees after appreciating that two decrees were already issued which although subject to certain conditions are indisputably final. The petitioner’s motion to amend their petition was denied by the court but upon appeal, the SC remanded the case back to the lower court to hear their petition for the re-issuance of the decrees. The lower court upheld the decrees previously issued to Doña Cacho and order the Register of Deeds to re-issue said decrees. On appeal to the CA by the respondents, they assail the decision on grounds that the petition suffers from jurisdictional infirmities, with no compliance to the conditions over the decrees and there is no real party of interest involved to prosecute the case. The CA sustained the validity of the decrees while brushing aside the issue on jurisdictional infirmities but nevertheless reversed the lower court decision on the re-issuance of the decrees on the grounds that the final decision was reserved pending compliance to the conditions imposed by the court, hence this petition before the SC.

Egao v CA, 174 SCRA 484 G.R. No. 79787, 29 June 1989

Notice to the Whole World

Facts:

The respondents filed a motion for quieting the title and recovery of possession and ownership against the petitioners. Apparently, they claim they are the owners of the parcel of land by virtue of the deed of sale they entered into with Roberto Marfori to whom the petitioners allegedly sold their land to. The Egaos acquired their land title by virtue of a free patent and transferred their ownership in favor of Marfori by virtue of a deed of sale. However, the Certificate of Title was not transferred in Marfori’s favor. Upon purchase of the land from Marfori, the respondents introduced improvements thereon and paid taxes for the property. However, the petitioners illegally occupied portions of the land. Petitioner answers that they are the true owner of the land by virtue of the Certificate of Title issued by the Register of Deeds pursuant to their Free Patent. The lower court ruled in favor of Egao. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the lower court on grounds that the main issue should be whether Egao can validly sell the land to Marfori who subsequently transferred the ownership to the respondents. The CA holds both Egao and Marfori to be in pari delicto for violating the 5-year restriction provided by Commonwealth 141 against encumbrance and alienation of public lands acquired thru free patent or homestead patent. They cannot therefore obtain affirmative relief. It also declares the respondents as innocent purchasers for value who the obtained the duplicate of the OCT still in the name of the Egaos from Marfori and ownership was transferred to them by physical possession of the property. It thus promulgated judgment holding the respondents the absolute owners of the land in dispute, to cancel the OCT of the petitioner and its transfer thereof to the respondents and to surrender peaceful possession of the land to the respondents.

Jose Stillanopulos v City of Legaspi, GR No. 113913, October 12, 1999

"Sending of notice"

Facts:

The City of Legaspi filed a petition for judicial reconstitution of its titles to 20 parcels of land which certificates of title allegedly been lost during the World War II. The OCT was ordered by the court to be reconstituted in favor of the City of Legaspi. On 1970, the City filed a complaint for quieting of title on Lot 1 against the petitioner’s father and other parties. When the petitioner’s father died, his title was cancelled and transferred to the petitioner. The court upheld the title of the petitioner was declared the lawful owner of Lot 1. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision in favor of City of Legaspi. Its appeal before the SC was denied on grounds that the issues raised were questions of facts that the court could not entertain. Petitioner now filed an action for the cancellation of the OCT of the City of Legaspi which was denied by the trial court on ground of res judicata which the CA affirms. The petitioner now files an action for annulment of said OCT based on 3 grounds: (1) extrinsic fraud in the procurement by the City of Legaspi of its title; (2) its OCT that was judicially reconstituted does not exist; and (3) the court reconstituting the title lacks jurisdiction. It also contends that his father who was the registered and possessor of said lot was omitted by the City of Legaspi in its petition for reconstitution of title. He also asserted that his predecessor-in-interest owned lots 1 and 2 and donated lot 2 to the City of Legaspi, the deed of donation of which shows that the respondent acknowledge his predecessor-in-interest as the absolute owner of said donated lot.

CA ruling: The CA ruled that the prescriptive period for extrinsic fraud of 4 years already lapsed and held that the petitioner is guilty of latches for filing the annulment case. Petitioner is further barred by res judicata between the earlier case of quieting of title and his petition for annulment there being identical parties, issues, and cause of action. He is also guilty of latches for not bringing the issue on lack of jurisdiction of the court.

Flordeliza L. Valisno v Judge Andres B. Plan, GR No. L-55152 August 19, 1986

"answer and opposition"

Facts:

Petitioners purchased 2 parcels of land from the family of Blanco’s and subsequently declared ownership over the land for taxation purposes and took possession thereof by assigning a caretaker over the property who built his house thereon. Respondent Cayaba claims to be the owner of the property by virtue of a deed of sale executed in his and Bienvenido Noriega’s favor from the heirs of Verano and ousted the caretaker from the property and constructed an apartment thereon. Petitioners filed an action for recovery of possession of the land. The court decided in favor of the petitioner but on appeal, the CA reversed the decision and dismissed the complaint of the petitioner on grounds that the description of the property in the complaint is different from the subdivision plan provided by the respondents with their respective area and boundaries appearing to be completely different. The court did not find any compliance to the requirement of the law that the property in dispute must be clearly identified. Under the Civil Code, Articles 433 and 541, the actual possessor of the property has the presumption of a just title and he need not be compelled to show or prove why he possesses the same. It was clear that the respondent is the current possessor of the property having constructed the apartment on the property in dispute. Contrasting the evidence of the respondent and petitioner, the court choose the respondent’s evidence as they were able to provide a vicinity plan that shows the land position in relation to the adjoining properties with known boundaries and landmarks. Petitioner merely presented a sketch prepared by Dr. Blanco constituting as mere guess works. Subsequently, the respondents filed a petition for registration of the property before the CFI which was opposed by the petitioner. Respondent moved for the dismissal of the opposition that the same is barred by a prior judgment of the court. The CFI dismissed the opposition on ground of res judicata thus this appeal before the SC. With the petition given due course by the SC, it orders both parties to submit their briefs. Only the petitioner submitted their own brief within the given period thus the SC considered the case submitted for decision with the brief of the respondent. The petitioner filed a motion to amend the application to include Bienvenido Noriega as a co-applicant to the petition.

Republic of the Philippines v Alexander Lao, GR No. 150413, July 1, 2003

"answer and opposition"

Facts:

Lao filed before the RTC of Tagaytay City application for registration of a parcel of land. She allegedly acquired the land by purchase from the siblings Raymundo Noguera and Ma. Victoria Valenzuela who inherited it from Generosa Medina. The latter, in turn, inherited the land from her father, Jose Medina, who acquired the same from Edilberto Perido by transfer. She prayed that the land be registered in her name under Commonwealth Act 141 (Public Land Act) based on her and her predecessor-in-interests’ open, public, actual, continuous, exclusive, notorious and adverse possession and occupancy under bona fide claim of ownership for more than thirty (30) years. She presented witnesses and evidence constituting of deed of sale, survey plan, the technical description of property and tax declarations in her and her predecessors’ names. The court approved the application. The petitioner represented by the Solicitor General appealed the decision before the CA which re-affirmed the lower court decision, hence this petition for review before the SC. The petitioner contends that there is no sufficient evidence to warrant the issuance of the title to the respondent as she fails to comply with the required periods and acts of possession mandated by law and her failure to prove that the land is alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

Biblia Toledo-Banaga and Jovita Tan v CA, GR nO, 127941, January 28, 1989 (302 SCRA 331)

Buyer in Good Faith

Facts:

Petitioner Banaga filed an action for redemption of her property which was earlier foreclosed and later sold in a public auction to the respondent. The trial court declared petitioner to have lost her right for redemption and ordered that certificate of title be issued to the respondent which the petitioner caused an annotation of notice of lis pendens to the title. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision and allowed the petitioner to redeem her property within a certain period. Banaga tried to redeem the property by depositing to the trial court the amount of redemption that was financed by her co-petitioner Tan. Respondent opposed in that she made the redemption beyond the period ordered by the court. The lower court however upheld the redemption and ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the respondent’s title and issue a new title in favor of the petitioner. In a petition for certiorari before the CA by the respondent, another notice of lis pendens was annotated to the title. CA issued a temporary restraining order to enjoin the execution of the court order. Meanwhile, Banaga sold the property to Tan in the absolute deed of sale that mentions the title of the property still in the name of the respondent which was not yet cancelled. Despite the lis pendens on the title, Tan subdivided the lot into a subdivision plan which she made not in her own name but that of the respondent. Tan then asked the Register of Deeds to issue a new title in her name. New titles were issued in Tan’s name but carried the annotation of the two notices of lis pendens. Upon learning the new title of Tan the respondent impleaded her in his petition. The CA later sets aside the trial court’s decision and declared the respondent as the absolute owner of the property for failure of the petitioner to redeem the property within the period ordered by the court. The decision was final and executory and ordered the Register of Deeds to reinstate the title in the name of the respondent. The Register of Deeds refused alleging that Tan’s certificate must be surrendered first. The respondent cited the register of deeds in contempt but the court denied contending that the remedy should be consultation with the Land Registration Commissioner and in its other order denied the motion of respondent for writ of possession holding that the remedy would be to a separate action to declare Tan’s title as void. In its motion for certiorari and mandamus to the CA, the court set aside the two assailed orders of the trial court and declared the title of Tan as null and void and ordered the Register of Deeds to reinstate the title in the name of the respondent. Petitioners now argued that Tan is a buyer in good faith and raised the issue on ownership of the lot.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner Tan is a buyer in good faith?

Ruling:

The court held that Tan is not a buyer in good faith because when the property was sold to her she was aware of the interest of the respondent over the property. She even furnished the amount used by Banaga to redeem the property. When she bought the property from Banaga she knows that at that time the property was not registered to the seller’s name. The deed of sale mentioned the title which was named to the respondent. Moreover the title still carries 2 notices of lis pendens. Tan therefore cannot feign ignorance on the status of the property when she bought it. Because Tan was also impleaded as a party to the litigation, she is bound by the decision promulgated to the subject of such litigation. It is a settled rule that the party dealing with a registered land need not go beyond the Certificate of Title to determine the true owner thereof so as to guard or protect her interest.  She has only to look and rely on the entries in the Certificate of Title. By looking at the title Tan would know that the certificate is in the name of respondent. Being a buyer in bad faith, Tan does not acquire any better right over the property. The adjudication of the ownership in favor to the respondent includes the delivery of the possession by the defeated party to the respondent.

Edilberto Cruz v Bancom Finance Corp. GR No. 147788, March 19, 2002

Innocent purchaser

Facts:

The petitioners are the registered owners of an agricultural land. Candelaria Sanchez introduced the petitioner to Norma Sulit who offered to buy the petitioner’s lot. The asking price for the property is P7000,000 but Norma only has P25,000 which the petitioner accepted as an earnest money with agreement that the title will be transferred in the name of Norma after she pays the remaining balance. Norma failed to pay the balance but negotiated to transfer the title in her name which the petitioner refused. However, through Candelaria Sanchez the title was transferred to Norma upon the execution of a deed of sale made by the petitioner in favor of Sanchez who obtained a bank loan using the petitioner’s land as collateral. She then executed on the same day another deed of sale in favor of Norma. Both deed of sales reflect the amount of only P150,000.00. Using the deed of sale Norma was able to register the property in her name. Norma obtained a loan from Bancom while mortgaging the land title. Meanwhile, a special agreement was entered into by petitioner and Norma. When Norma failed to pay the remaining balance stipulated in their special agreement, the petitioner filed a complaint for the reconveyance of the land. Bancom claimed priority as mortgagee in good faith. Norma defaulted payment with the bank and the property was foreclosed and auctioned with Bancom as the highest bidder.

Trial Court decision: The trial court held that the contract of sale between petitioner and Candelaria was absolutely simulated thereby producing no legal effect. Bancom was not a mortgagee in good faith cannot claim priority rights over the property.

Court of Appeals: Reversed the RTC decision holding the deed of sale as valid and binding and not simulated. The mortgage contract between Norma and Bancom is likewise valid and Bancom has a priority rights over the property. It also ruled that the petitioner intended to be bound by the sale and mortgage since they did not seek to annul the same but instead executed a special agreement to enforce payment of the remaining balance.

Issues:

Whether or not the sale and mortgage are valid?

Whether or not the respondent is an innocent mortgagee in good faith?

Ruling:

As a general rule, if the terms of the contract are clear and unambiguous its stipulations shall control but when its words contravene with the intention of the parties, the intention shall prevail over the words of the contract. Simulation of contract takes place when the parties do not want the express words of the contract to have its legal effect. It may be absolute or relative. When parties do not intend to be bound at all it is absolute simulated contract and considered void. When the parties conceal their true agreement, it is a relative simulated contract and binds the parties when it does not prejudice third persons and is not contrary to law, morals, good custom, public order, and public policy. It was shown that although a deed of absolute sale was executed in the amount of P150,000 no consideration was involved as no exchange of money took place between them. Norma and Candelaria also did not assert their right to ownership over the property. It was clear that the deed of sale was simulated in order to facilitate the bank loan to be secured by Candelaria using the property as collateral. The fact that Norma obtained registration of the property in her name does not entitle her to ownership since the simulated deed of sale produced no legal effect. A simulated contract is not a recognized mode of transferring ownership.

With the contention of Bancom that it is a mortgagee in good faith, the court ruled otherwise pointing out that it is a mortgagee-bank thus is expected to exercise greater care and prudence when dealing with registered lands. Failure to observe due diligence was shown with judicial notice that the bank did not conduct an ocular inspection on the property and did not send a representative to investigate the ownership of the land, these being a standard procedure before approving loans. It is also aware of the adverse claim because of the notice of lis pendens annotated to the title. Because it was established that the two deeds of sale were simulated thus null and void, it does not convey any right that may ripen into a valid title. The mortgage was also null and void because Norma was not the owner of the property. The property cannot be validly foreclosed by the respondent. The court declares the petitioner to remain as the valid owner of the property.

Domingo Lao v Estrella Villones- Lao et al. GR NO. 126777, April 29, 1999 (306 SCRA 387)

Holder in Bad Faith

Facts:

Domingo Lao and Estrella Lao, during their marriage, acquired a real property worth 1.5M including improvements. The property was mortgaged with Metrobank at the time they separated. After full payment of the mortgage, Estrella was able to obtain her own copy of the property title. The property was leased by Domingo to Filmart and learned that the title to the property was already cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of Villena spouses when the Villena came to visit the property and informed the tenants that they are the new property owners. Estrella was at that time in dire need of money and the Malanas spouses approached her and introduced themselves as agents of Carlos Villena who is willing to grant her a loan. Carlos Villenas required Estrella to obtain a Special Power of Attorney from Domingo and his son Ernesto who are also named in the title as owners of the property. Estrella admitted it would be difficult to obtain the SPA because she and her husband are not on good and speaking terms. The Malana spouses however assured her that they could help her obtain the SPA. 3 days after they returned to Villena with the SPA and was able to secure the loan. Upon failure of Estrella to pay, Carlos Villena effected an extrajudicial foreclosure of the property and a new certificate of title was issued in favor of the Villena spouses. Domingo filed a complaint for the annulment of the SPA, mortgage and extrajudicial foreclosure, cancellation of the TCT and reconveyance of title.

The lower court ruled in favor of Domingo and ordered spouses Villena and Malanas together with Estrella to jointly and severally pay for damages and litigation costs to Domingo while Villena can recover the indebtedness of Estrella through an ordinary suit. In its modified judgment the court further ordered the Villenas to vacate the premises and a new Cert. of title to be issued to Domingo and Estrella Lao with 20% share to Ernesto Lao.

On appeal, the CA reversed the decision declaring the mortgage and foreclosure sale valid and ordered the transfer of the title to the Villena spouses. It held that the respondents are mortgagees in good faith and not privy to the forgery of the SPA and the petitioner was negligent to entrust the title to Estrella.

Issue: Whether or not the Villena spouses are mortgagees in good faith?

Ruling:

The court ruled that it was established that the Malana spouses are the agent brokers of Villena and not of Estrella. The court believes that the Malanas and Villena are business partners in credit financing. They were the ones who approached Estrella and offered the loan to be financed by Villena. Estrella informed Carlos Villena about the difficulty of securing the signature of Domingo yet they pursue the offer of loan with the Malanas helping to secure the SPA. Estrella was just asked to sign a black SPA with her signature affixed on the portion stating “with my marital consent.” She did not read and understand the document. They took advantage of her dire need for money at that time. The participation of the Malanas extends beyond as mere witness to the mortgage while Villena was aware of the situation. Estrella as a co-owner is entitled to obtain her own copy of the title of the property thus she can’t be denied to secure her own title. The court has reason to believe that Villena feign his innocence on the flawed character of the SPA contending that as a legitimate businessman he should exercise due diligence to consider the fact dealing with a conjugal property of an estranged wife. The NBI also confirmed that the signatures of Domingo and Ernesto are forged. Therefore the mortgage contract is deemed to be invalid and likewise the foreclosure is also invalid. A holder in bad faith of a certificate of title is not entitled to the protection of the law, for the law can not be used as a shield for fraud. The court revived and affirmed the lower court decision. 

Pacifico Garing v Heirs of Marco Silva, et. al. GR No. 150173, September 5, 2007 (532 SCRA 294)

Indefeasibility of TorrensTitle

Facts:

Pacifico Garing and his wife filed before the RTC complaint for reconveyance of property alleging that they are the lawful possessor of the Lot C of a subdivision plan bounded southeast by the Mangop River. Over the years accretion caused by the Mangop River led to the formation of land between the river and Lot C. He alleges that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of this land formation and cultivated the same. Marcos Silva informed him that the two lots are within the boundaries of his property and was later ordered to stop gathering coconuts from the said lots. They assail the Original Cert. of Title issued to Marcos Silva to have unlawfully included in its Lot No. 4891-B the two parcels of land they allegedly possess. The heirs of Silva answered that they are the lawful owner of the said lots and that the petitioner forcibly with threat took possession of the said lots. Pending the case for reconveyance of property, Jose Acosta, another respondent filed a motion for intervention. He alleges to have purchased the two lots from the heirs of Silva as shown by extrajudicial partition and simultaneous sale and contends that the petitioners were present when they have the lot surveyed. They did not raise any objection thereto. He further raise that the original registration for Lot No. 4891-B was on Aug. 5, 1969 and the petitioner filed its complaint only on March 14, 1984 thus the action has already prescribed. 

Ernesto David et al v Cristito Malay GR No. 132644, November 19, 1999 (318 SCRA 711)

Facts:

Andres Adona, married to Leoncia Abad, applied for a homestead patent over a parcel of agricultural land. When Leoncia died, he cohabited with Ma. Espiritu without the benefit of marriage. When Andres died Ma. Espiritu succeeded in obtaining title over the land in her name. After Maria Espiritu died, her children as well as descendants of Andres Adona by his marriage with Leoncia Abad, continued to be in peaceful and quiet possession of the subject land. The petitioners executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement with sale over the property to Mrs. Ungson. Respondents protested contending they are the true owners of the land. The sale was however rescinded because Mrs. Ungson failed to pay in full the amount agreed upon. Subsequently, the petitioners executed another deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale, dividing equally among themselves the land and sold their respective shares to their co-petitioner Ubago et al. where an Original Cert. of Title was issued in their favor on Nov. 27, 1992. Respondents filed a complaint for annulment of sale with restraining order, injunction and damages against the petitioners contending that the Original Cert. of Title was obtained by Ma. Espiritu by false representation as the widow of Andres Adona.

Lower court ruling: dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action and on ground of prescription. The action, being an annulment of sale based on fraudulent titling of the property constitutes a cause of action of a collateral attack on the Torrens Title. Even if the action was treated as one of conveyance, the suit will still fail because the action for reconveyance could be brought within 10 years from the date of issuance of certificate of title and the action has already prescribed.

Bernardino Ramos and Rosalia Oli v CA GR No. 1110227, February 3, 1999 (302 SCRA 589)

Facts:

Pedro Tolentino who claims ownership over Lots 572 and 579 separately sold each lot to the petitioners, Bernardino Ramos. The petitioners instituted an action for reconveyance with damages against the respondents, Rodolfo Bautista and Felisa Lopez who allegedly wrongfully registered the said lots in their name. The respondents acquired their title from Lucia Bautista to whom a Certificate of title covering both lots is issued by the Register of Deeds. As Lucia’s heir, Rodolfo is able to acquire title to the lots through a Transfer of Certificate of Title. Petitioners contend that they are in open, public, continuous, and adverse possession of said lots for not less than 50 years personally and through their predecessors-in-interest and that Lucia neither claimed ownership thereto nor took possession of the same. They assail the Certificate of Title in the name of the respondents as null and void and that they have acquired the lots by acquisitive prescription. Respondents claims absolute ownership over the said lots pointing out that based from the cadastral survey, Pedro Tolentino was able to acquire only a different lot that is adjacent to Lot 572 which is the portion occupied by the petitioners by tolerance of the original registrant Lucia Bautista. In the affirmative defense respondents maintained that the action for reconveyance brought by the petitioners is tantamount to a collateral attack to the decrees of registration while asserting the indefeasible of the Torrens Title.

The lower court ruled to dismiss the petition citing the cadastral proceeding in 1940 where Bernardino Ramos did not answer to the proceeding despite his claim of possession over the lots and only Lucia filed an answer and appeared to be the lawful claimant in the proceedings thus was issued an Original Certificate of Title to the lots in dispute. The trial court presumed that everyone is notified of the cadastral proceeding, it being in rem in nature. The petitioner has 1 year from the issuance of the decree to file for the reopening of the proceeding on ground of fraud but he did not do so. Latches against him have set in for filing the action for reconveyance 36 years after. The court of appeals upheld the decision of the lower court hence this petition before the SC.

Francisco Baguio v RP, GR No. 119682, January 21, 1999 (301 SCRA 450)

"Free Patent"

Facts:

William Michael filed with the Bureau of Lands an application for foreshore lease of a public land. The application was recommended for approval by the land investigator who also recommended that the applicant be granted a provisional permit to occupy the land for one year. By virtue of the permit, Michael made reclamation of the land introducing improvements therein. Upon the expiration of the permit the Highways District Engineer recommended to the Director of Lands that the land be leased to Michael. On the other hand, the land investigator recommended granting Michael the authority to survey the foreshore land in view of the completion of the reclamation made by him on the premises. On February 25, 1968, Michael filed a miscellaneous sales application covering the reclaimed foreshore land. On the other hand, petitioner Baguio applied to the Bureau of Lands for a free patent over the same land stating that the land was agricultural and he has been in actual and continuous possession of the same. A free patent was issued in Baguio’s favor by the Register of Deeds of Cebu. The petitioner now demands rental payment from Michael for using the land occupied by Michael Slipways, Inc. and filed an opposition to Michael’s miscellaneous sales application on the said land. In turn, Michael filed a protest on the issuance of the free patent to Baguio by the Bureau of Lands since he is the actual possessor of the land since 1963 and introduced substantial improvement thereon.

Upon recommendation of the Land Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the government filed a petition for the cancellation of the patent and reversion of land to the public domain. Ricardo Michael was allowed to intervene as heir and successor-in-interest of William Michael. The trial court cancelled the free patent of Baguio and ordered the reversion of the land to public domain. It ruled that the false statement that Baguio made in his application for free patent had the effects of ipso facto canceling the free patent granted to him. On appeal, petitioner assails the court decision of cancelling his patent since the action has already prescribed and that it erred in ruling that he acted in bad faith and procured the registration of his free patent through fraud and misrepresentation.

Romeo Co. v CA GR No. 93687, May 6, 1991

Double Sale of Immovable Property

Facts:

Petitioner Marcelita Co brought two parcels of land. She sold one of the lots and the other lot was titled in the name of her brother Ruperto Padonan as a trustee of the property and a house was constructed thereon. In furtherance of their trust agreement, Ruperto executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Marcelita who took possession of the house and lot. The deed of sale however was not registered. More than a year later, Ruperto executed another deed of sale of the house and lot registered in his name in favor of the respondent Eduardo Memije who was unable to take possession of the properties because the petitioners are occupying the same. Respondent now sued for recovery of possession and quieting of title but it was dismissed. Thereafter they filed petition for writ of possession in the original land registration proceeding, which the lower court issued but was set aside by the appellate court. Petitioner now filed an action to annul the deed of sale and title against the respondents before the RTC of Caloocan City. This was dismissed on ground of improper venue. Respondents filed for the recovery of possession of the property and the petitioner raised the affirmative defense of fraud on their ownership of the property and interposed the same as compulsory counterclaim instead of re-filing a separate action for annulment of the deed of sale executed in favor of the respondents.

Lower court: ruled against petitioner

Director, Land Management Bureau vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112567, February 7, 2000 (381 Phil. 761)

“failure to prove possession according to the manner and no. of years required by law”

Facts:

Respondent Aquilino Cariño filed a petition for registration for Lot 6 which is a sugar land claimed to be owned by his mother of whom after she died he became the administrator of the property in behalf of his brothers and sisters. By virtue of a deed of extrajudicial settlement, he became the sole owner of the property. Report from the land investigator showed that the lot is agricultural in nature. Respondent claims that the improvements introduced were in the form of bamboo clumps, sugarcane and mango trees with the house of the tenant; that the land is free from claim and conflict and is not covered by existing public land application and no patent or title has been issued to it; that the respondent is on continuous, open and exclusive possession of the land as inherited from his deceased mother. Respondent is the sole witness for his petition and the only oppositor is the Bureau of Lands. The court granted the petition of the respondent. The petitioner filed a review for certiorari contending that the respondent failed to submit proof of his fee simple title and has not overthrown the presumption that the land is a portion of the public domain belonging to the state.

Republic vs. Maria Lee and IAC, G.R. No. 64818, May 13, 1991 (197 SCRA)

“failure to prove bonafide claim to land through tacking possession from predecessor-in –interest to meet requirements provided by law”

Facts:

Respondent filed before the RTC a registration of a parcel of land in her favor which was opposed by the Dir. Of Lands on grounds that respondent or her predecessor-in-interest acquired the land under any recognized mode for acquisition of title; they have not been in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious possession of the land in the concept of an owner for at least 30 years prior to the filing of application and the land in dispute is a public domain belonging to Republic of the Philippines. The court rendered judgment in favor of respondents. Upon appeal by RP, it affirmed the lower court decision thus this appeal to the Supreme Court.

Republic of the Phil. contends that respondent failed to prove by conclusive evidence that she has ownership of the land by fee simple title and her testimony as to the ownership of her predecessor-in-interest is self serving after claiming that she obtained her Deed of Sale of the property from Laureana Mataban and Sixto Espiritu who obtained their title from the previous owners of the land, Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan. From the time of filing the application of registration, the respondent was in possession of the land for 13 years but she sought to tack her possession on the said land from her predecessor-in-interests who were in possession of the land for 20 years. Conditions provided by Sec. 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 where one is under a bonafide claim of acquisition of ownership through their predecessor-in-interest or by themselves have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the agricultural land in public domain for 30 years shall be entitled to a certificate of title.

Mariano Turquesa vs. Rosario Valera & Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 76371, January 20, 2000 (379 Phil. 618)

"What defines a piece of land is not the size/area mentioned in its descriptions but the boundaries laid down as enclosing the land and indicating its limits. "

Facts:

Respondent applied for registration of 2 parcels of land referred to as Lot 1 and Lot 2. She alleged to have bought Lot 1 and declared it in her name for taxation purposes. Notice for the application for registration was published in the Official Gazette. Oppositors were the Director of Bureau of Lands and herein petitioners. The opposition of Bureau of Lands was denied for failure to substantiate his claim that the land is part of the public domain. Other petitioners claim that their lands were included in Lot 1 sought to be registered by the respondent. The lower court decided in favor of the respondent and denied petitioner’s motion for ocular inspection of the land in dispute. Oppositors appealed to CA regarding Lot 1. CA remanded the case to the lower court for ocular inspection. 3 Commissioners were appointed for the ocular inspection but their findings were opposed and a second ocular inspection was ordered. The trial court reiterated its former judgment to register the whole are of Lot 1 to the respondent with its encumbrance to PNB in the amount of P1,000 removed as it was already paid and thus no longer annotated on the title. The oppositors appealed with the argument that their properties were erroneously included in the respondent’s land registration. CA modified the land registration on lot 1 excluding the landholdings of the oppositors.

Respondent filed a suit for a writ of possession over 2 lots occupied by Santiago Partolan and Crispin Baltar which the court denied. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the court decision and granted the motion for writ of possession on the landholdings of Partolan,  Baltar and oppositors who did not appeal the decision of the lower court while excluding the landholdings of Segundina and Damasen who proved they have rightful and registrable rights over their claim on a specific portion of land. Thus, the oppositors filed a motion for review.

Fausta Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-35787, April 11, 1980 (97 SCRA 22)

Facts:

This is a petition for review filed by the petitioner on the decision rendered by the CA reversing the CFI judgment in favor of her on a land registration case and orders the issuance of the Original Cert. of Title to the respondents Alejandro Santos and Ramona Francisco instead. Petitioner alleges that she is the absolute owner of the land in dispute covered with an Original Cert. of title of the Register of Deeds; that she is in continuous, adverse, open, peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the land since time immemorial; respondents have never been in possession of the land as they claim and that they obtained their Decree of Registration of said land by fraud. Apparently, Diego Francisco, the petitioner’s father occupied the land in dispute since 1918 and obtained a homestead patent for it. He introduced some improvements on the land such as fencing the area with barbwires, planting mango trees and palays and pasturing carabaos. He was able to secure a title in favor of his children petitioner included for the big parcel of land he cultivates and improves and when he died in 1941 the petitioner continued to possess the land in question not embraced in the Transfer of Cert. of Title issued to them in the concept of an owner.