Fausta Francisco vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. L-35787, April 11, 1980 (97 SCRA 22)

Facts:

This is a petition for review filed by the petitioner on the decision rendered by the CA reversing the CFI judgment in favor of her on a land registration case and orders the issuance of the Original Cert. of Title to the respondents Alejandro Santos and Ramona Francisco instead. Petitioner alleges that she is the absolute owner of the land in dispute covered with an Original Cert. of title of the Register of Deeds; that she is in continuous, adverse, open, peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the land since time immemorial; respondents have never been in possession of the land as they claim and that they obtained their Decree of Registration of said land by fraud. Apparently, Diego Francisco, the petitioner’s father occupied the land in dispute since 1918 and obtained a homestead patent for it. He introduced some improvements on the land such as fencing the area with barbwires, planting mango trees and palays and pasturing carabaos. He was able to secure a title in favor of his children petitioner included for the big parcel of land he cultivates and improves and when he died in 1941 the petitioner continued to possess the land in question not embraced in the Transfer of Cert. of Title issued to them in the concept of an owner.

Angel del Rosario vs. Republic of the Philippines G.R. No. 148338, June 6, 2002 (432 Phil. 824)

Facts:

The case is a petition for review on the reversal of the decision of the RTC by the CA denying the application of the petitioner for the registration of a parcel of land (forest land) located in Maragondon, Cavite. In October 13, 1997, petitioner filed an application for registration of a parcel of land, stating therein that he is resident of Poblacion, Ternate, Cavite; that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question, which was alienable and disposable land, under a bona fide claim of ownership since the 1920s or even earlier; and that such land was being occupied and cultivated by him and his family. He also indicated the owners/occupants of the adjoining properties and submitted the following documents: (a) an advance survey plan of the land applied for with technical descriptions, Survey Plan, Ap-04-0011601, (b) Technical Description of Lot No. 1891; (c) Certification in lieu of Geodetic Engineer's certification issued for registration purposes, attesting to the genuineness of the survey plan; (d) Certification, dated August 14, 1997, that the subject land is alienable and disposable;(e) Certification, dated October 7, 1997, that the property is not covered by any public land application or patent; (f) Tax Declaration No. 7414, Series of 1998, covering the parcel of land; and (g) Official Receipt No. 1038951S, dated September 9, 1997, showing petitioner's payment of the realty taxes on the said lot up to 1997.

Mariano Turquesa vs. Rosario Valera & Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 76371, January 20, 2000 (379 Phil. 618)

Facts:

Respondent applied for registration of 2 parcels of land referred to as Lot 1 and Lot 2. She alleged to have bought Lot 1 and declared it in her name for taxation purposes. Notice for the application for registration was published in the Official Gazette. Oppositors were the Director of Bureau of Lands and herein petitioners. The opposition of Bureau of Lands was denied for failure to substantiate his claim that the land is part of the public domain. Other petitioners claim that their lands were included in Lot 1 sought to be registered by the respondent. The lower court decided in favor of the respondent and denied petitioner’s motion for ocular inspection of the land in dispute. Oppositors appealed to CA regarding Lot 1. CA remanded the case to the lower court for ocular inspection. 3 Commissioners were appointed for the ocular inspection but their findings were opposed and a second ocular inspection was ordered. The trial court reiterated its former judgment to register the whole are of Lot 1 to the respondent with its encumbrance to PNB in the amount of P1,000 removed as it was already paid and thus no longer annotated on the title. The oppositors appealed with the argument that their properties were erroneously included in the respondent’s land registration. CA modified the land registration on lot 1 excluding the landholdings of the oppositors.

Respondent filed a suit for a writ of possession over 2 lots occupied by Santiago Partolan and Crispin Baltar which the court denied. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the court decision and granted the motion for writ of possession on the landholdings of Partolan,  Baltar and oppositors who did not appeal the decision of the lower court while excluding the landholdings of Segundina and Damasen who proved they have rightful and registrable rights over their claim on a specific portion of land. Thus, the oppositors filed a motion for review.

Republic vs. Maria Lee and IAC, G.R. No. 64818, May 13, 1991 (197 SCRA)

“failure to prove bonafide claim to land through tacking possession from predecessor-in –interest to meet requirements provided by law”

Facts:

Respondent filed before the RTC a registration of a parcel of land in her favor which was opposed by the Dir. Of Lands on grounds that respondent or her predecessor-in-interest acquired the land under any recognized mode for acquisition of title; they have not been in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious possession of the land in the concept of an owner for at least 30 years prior to the filing of application and the land in dispute is a public domain belonging to Republic of the Philippines. The court rendered judgment in favor of respondents. Upon appeal by RP, it affirmed the lower court decision thus this appeal to the Supreme Court.

Republic of the Phil. contends that respondent failed to prove by conclusive evidence that she has ownership of the land by fee simple title and her testimony as to the ownership of her predecessor-in-interest is self serving after claiming that she obtained her Deed of Sale of the property from Laureana Mataban and Sixto Espiritu who obtained their title from the previous owners of the land, Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan. From the time of filing the application of registration, the respondent was in possession of the land for 13 years but she sought to tack her possession on the said land from her predecessor-in-interests who were in possession of the land for 20 years. Conditions provided by Sec. 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 where one is under a bonafide claim of acquisition of ownership through their predecessor-in-interest or by themselves have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the agricultural land in public domain for 30 years shall be entitled to a certificate of title.

Director, Land Management Bureau vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112567, February 7, 2000 (381 Phil. 761)

“failure to prove possession according to the manner and no. of years required by law”

Facts:

Respondent Aquilino Cariño filed a petition for registration for Lot 6 which is a sugar land claimed to be owned by his mother of whom after she died he became the administrator of the property in behalf of his brothers and sisters. By virtue of a deed of extrajudicial settlement, he became the sole owner of the property. Report from the land investigator showed that the lot is agricultural in nature. Respondent claims that the improvements introduced were in the form of bamboo clumps, sugarcane and mango trees with the house of the tenant; that the land is free from claim and conflict and is not covered by existing public land application and no patent or title has been issued to it; that the respondent is on continuous, open and exclusive possession of the land as inherited from his deceased mother. Respondent is the sole witness for his petition and the only oppositor is the Bureau of Lands. The court granted the petition of the respondent. The petitioner filed a review for certiorari contending that the respondent failed to submit proof of his fee simple title and has not overthrown the presumption that the land is a portion of the public domain belonging to the state.

Spouses Francisco and Angela Tankiko v Justiano Cezar, et. al. GR No. 131277, February 2, 1999

Facts:

Respondents are the actual occupants and residents of a parcel of land herein referred to as Lot 3714 who introduced improvements thereon and are sales patent applicants of the said lot. They were religiously paying taxes on the property. They filed an action for reconveyance and damages against the petitioners. Apparently, an original certificate of title (OCT) was issued to the petitioners after acquiring said lot from the heirs of the lot’s alleged former owner Patricio Salcedo who acquires his title to the lot by virtue of a decree of registration upon the decision of the cadastral court. Respondents assail the validity of the title of Salcedo by citing the Consing decision of the court that involves the neighboring lot 3715 with the following observation:  (1) there is no showing that a decision has been made on the Cadastral proceedings cited by the petitioners with no records thereof in the Land Registration Commission and (2) they found a decision that renders Lot 3715 and Lot 3714 public lands.

Republic v CA and Ceferino Paredes, Jr. GR No. 112115, March 9, 2001

Facts:

Respondent Paredes appeared to have purchased a certain parcel of land of which he applied for a free patent. His application was approved and was issued with a Free Patent and an OCT on May 1, 1976. On June 27, 1984 theSangguniang Bayan adopted a resolution undertaking the assistance of the Municipality of San Francisco to recover possession of the land as it was averred to have been designated by the Bureau of Lands as a school site for the San Francisco Town Site Reservation, long before title to it was issued in private respondent's name. They also questioned the claim of the respondent to have posted his application for free patent on the door of their Municipal Hall because if he did they would have filed an opposition thereto. The Bureau of Lands filed the necessary action on their behalf for the recovery of the land, cancellation of the free patent title under the respondent’s name and the reversion of the land to the public domain. It also amended its complaint to include the Development Bank of the Philippines as respondent where Paredes had mortgaged the property.

Heirs of Pedro Lopez et. al. v Honesto C. de Castro, et. al. GR No. 112905, February 3, 2000

“two applications of a parcel of land”

Facts:

The petitioners filed an application for registration of parcel of land located in Tagaytay City with the CFI in Cavite. The Municipality of Silang, Cavite files an opposition alleging that the land is its patrimonial property. The petitioners claim that the land is a part of the whole tract of land as their inheritance sought to be registered in Cavite but was excluded from their application upon recommendation of the chief surveyor of the Land Reg. Office because the land is located in the Province of Laguna. The motion to dismiss by the Municipality of Silang was denied by the court due to lack of merit on ground that the municipality has no personality to intervene because the lot was outside its territorial limits. And even if it is a communal property of both municipalities, the incorporation of Cavite to the city of Tagaytay makes it a property of the latter. Thus the right to action accrues to the municipality of Tagaytay. Upon deliberation, the Clerk of Court recommended to grant the application with its report disclosing that since time immemorial, the De Los Reyes family owned and possessed the land and sold it to the father of the applicant, Pedro Lopez who later took over the ownership and possession of the land. Upon his death, his heirs succeeded over the property and subsequently partitioned it. The court thus approved the application and ordered the registration of the land in favor of the petitioner.

Teofilo Cacho v CA GR No. 123361, March 31, 1997

Land Registration as a Proceeding In Rem

Facts:

Doña Cacho applied for a registration of two parcels of land in Lanao Province and is situated within the limits of a military conservation. The two petitions were jointly tried and the court promulgated a decision for the issuance of two decrees subject to certain conditions of submitting the deed of sale for the first lot and the new plan for the second lot. The sole heir of Doña Cacho, Teofilo Cacho files a motion for the reconstitution of the two original certificates of title. His petition was opposed by the respondents Republic of the Philippines, National Steel Corporation (NSC), and the City of Iligan. The lower court dismissed the petition for the reason that the proper remedy would be to file a motion for reconstitution of the decrees after appreciating that two decrees were already issued which although subject to certain conditions are indisputably final. The petitioner’s motion to amend their petition was denied by the court but upon appeal, the SC remanded the case back to the lower court to hear their petition for the re-issuance of the decrees. The lower court upheld the decrees previously issued to Doña Cacho and order the Register of Deeds to re-issue said decrees. On appeal to the CA by the respondents, they assail the decision on grounds that the petition suffers from jurisdictional infirmities, with no compliance to the conditions over the decrees and there is no real party of interest involved to prosecute the case. The CA sustained the validity of the decrees while brushing aside the issue on jurisdictional infirmities but nevertheless reversed the lower court decision on the re-issuance of the decrees on the grounds that the final decision was reserved pending compliance to the conditions imposed by the court, hence this petition before the SC.

Egao v CA, 174 SCRA 484 G.R. No. 79787, 29 June 1989

Notice to the Whole World

Facts:

The respondents filed a motion for quieting the title and recovery of possession and ownership against the petitioners. Apparently, they claim they are the owners of the parcel of land by virtue of the deed of sale they entered into with Roberto Marfori to whom the petitioners allegedly sold their land to. The Egaos acquired their land title by virtue of a free patent and transferred their ownership in favor of Marfori by virtue of a deed of sale. However, the Certificate of Title was not transferred in Marfori’s favor. Upon purchase of the land from Marfori, the respondents introduced improvements thereon and paid taxes for the property. However, the petitioners illegally occupied portions of the land. Petitioner answers that they are the true owner of the land by virtue of the Certificate of Title issued by the Register of Deeds pursuant to their Free Patent. The lower court ruled in favor of Egao. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the lower court on grounds that the main issue should be whether Egao can validly sell the land to Marfori who subsequently transferred the ownership to the respondents. The CA holds both Egao and Marfori to be in pari delicto for violating the 5-year restriction provided by Commonwealth 141 against encumbrance and alienation of public lands acquired thru free patent or homestead patent. They cannot therefore obtain affirmative relief. It also declares the respondents as innocent purchasers for value who the obtained the duplicate of the OCT still in the name of the Egaos from Marfori and ownership was transferred to them by physical possession of the property. It thus promulgated judgment holding the respondents the absolute owners of the land in dispute, to cancel the OCT of the petitioner and its transfer thereof to the respondents and to surrender peaceful possession of the land to the respondents.

Jose Stillanopulos v City of Legaspi, GR No. 113913, October 12, 1999

"Sending of notice"

Facts:

The City of Legaspi filed a petition for judicial reconstitution of its titles to 20 parcels of land which certificates of title allegedly been lost during the World War II. The OCT was ordered by the court to be reconstituted in favor of the City of Legaspi. On 1970, the City filed a complaint for quieting of title on Lot 1 against the petitioner’s father and other parties. When the petitioner’s father died, his title was cancelled and transferred to the petitioner. The court upheld the title of the petitioner was declared the lawful owner of Lot 1. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision in favor of City of Legaspi. Its appeal before the SC was denied on grounds that the issues raised were questions of facts that the court could not entertain. Petitioner now filed an action for the cancellation of the OCT of the City of Legaspi which was denied by the trial court on ground of res judicata which the CA affirms. The petitioner now files an action for annulment of said OCT based on 3 grounds: (1) extrinsic fraud in the procurement by the City of Legaspi of its title; (2) its OCT that was judicially reconstituted does not exist; and (3) the court reconstituting the title lacks jurisdiction. It also contends that his father who was the registered and possessor of said lot was omitted by the City of Legaspi in its petition for reconstitution of title. He also asserted that his predecessor-in-interest owned lots 1 and 2 and donated lot 2 to the City of Legaspi, the deed of donation of which shows that the respondent acknowledge his predecessor-in-interest as the absolute owner of said donated lot.

CA ruling: The CA ruled that the prescriptive period for extrinsic fraud of 4 years already lapsed and held that the petitioner is guilty of latches for filing the annulment case. Petitioner is further barred by res judicata between the earlier case of quieting of title and his petition for annulment there being identical parties, issues, and cause of action. He is also guilty of latches for not bringing the issue on lack of jurisdiction of the court.

Flordeliza L. Valisno v Judge Andres B. Plan, GR No. L-55152 August 19, 1986

"answer and opposition"

Facts:

Petitioners purchased 2 parcels of land from the family of Blanco’s and subsequently declared ownership over the land for taxation purposes and took possession thereof by assigning a caretaker over the property who built his house thereon. Respondent Cayaba claims to be the owner of the property by virtue of a deed of sale executed in his and Bienvenido Noriega’s favor from the heirs of Verano and ousted the caretaker from the property and constructed an apartment thereon. Petitioners filed an action for recovery of possession of the land. The court decided in favor of the petitioner but on appeal, the CA reversed the decision and dismissed the complaint of the petitioner on grounds that the description of the property in the complaint is different from the subdivision plan provided by the respondents with their respective area and boundaries appearing to be completely different. The court did not find any compliance to the requirement of the law that the property in dispute must be clearly identified. Under the Civil Code, Articles 433 and 541, the actual possessor of the property has the presumption of a just title and he need not be compelled to show or prove why he possesses the same. It was clear that the respondent is the current possessor of the property having constructed the apartment on the property in dispute. Contrasting the evidence of the respondent and petitioner, the court choose the respondent’s evidence as they were able to provide a vicinity plan that shows the land position in relation to the adjoining properties with known boundaries and landmarks. Petitioner merely presented a sketch prepared by Dr. Blanco constituting as mere guess works. Subsequently, the respondents filed a petition for registration of the property before the CFI which was opposed by the petitioner. Respondent moved for the dismissal of the opposition that the same is barred by a prior judgment of the court. The CFI dismissed the opposition on ground of res judicata thus this appeal before the SC. With the petition given due course by the SC, it orders both parties to submit their briefs. Only the petitioner submitted their own brief within the given period thus the SC considered the case submitted for decision with the brief of the respondent. The petitioner filed a motion to amend the application to include Bienvenido Noriega as a co-applicant to the petition.

Republic of the Philippines v Alexander Lao, GR No. 150413, July 1, 2003

"answer and opposition"

Facts:

Lao filed before the RTC of Tagaytay City application for registration of a parcel of land. She allegedly acquired the land by purchase from the siblings Raymundo Noguera and Ma. Victoria Valenzuela who inherited it from Generosa Medina. The latter, in turn, inherited the land from her father, Jose Medina, who acquired the same from Edilberto Perido by transfer. She prayed that the land be registered in her name under Commonwealth Act 141 (Public Land Act) based on her and her predecessor-in-interests’ open, public, actual, continuous, exclusive, notorious and adverse possession and occupancy under bona fide claim of ownership for more than thirty (30) years. She presented witnesses and evidence constituting of deed of sale, survey plan, the technical description of property and tax declarations in her and her predecessors’ names. The court approved the application. The petitioner represented by the Solicitor General appealed the decision before the CA which re-affirmed the lower court decision, hence this petition for review before the SC. The petitioner contends that there is no sufficient evidence to warrant the issuance of the title to the respondent as she fails to comply with the required periods and acts of possession mandated by law and her failure to prove that the land is alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

Edilberto Cruz v Bancom Finance Corp. GR No. 147788, March 19, 2002

Innocent purchaser

Facts:

The petitioners are the registered owners of an agricultural land. Candelaria Sanchez introduced the petitioner to Norma Sulit who offered to buy the petitioner’s lot. The asking price for the property is P7000,000 but Norma only has P25,000 which the petitioner accepted as an earnest money with agreement that the title will be transferred in the name of Norma after she pays the remaining balance. Norma failed to pay the balance but negotiated to transfer the title in her name which the petitioner refused. However, through Candelaria Sanchez the title was transferred to Norma upon the execution of a deed of sale made by the petitioner in favor of Sanchez who obtained a bank loan using the petitioner’s land as collateral. She then executed on the same day another deed of sale in favor of Norma. Both deed of sales reflect the amount of only P150,000.00. Using the deed of sale Norma was able to register the property in her name. Norma obtained a loan from Bancom while mortgaging the land title. Meanwhile, a special agreement was entered into by petitioner and Norma. When Norma failed to pay the remaining balance stipulated in their special agreement, the petitioner filed a complaint for the reconveyance of the land. Bancom claimed priority as mortgagee in good faith. Norma defaulted payment with the bank and the property was foreclosed and auctioned with Bancom as the highest bidder.

Trial Court decision: The trial court held that the contract of sale between petitioner and Candelaria was absolutely simulated thereby producing no legal effect. Bancom was not a mortgagee in good faith cannot claim priority rights over the property.

Court of Appeals: Reversed the RTC decision holding the deed of sale as valid and binding and not simulated. The mortgage contract between Norma and Bancom is likewise valid and Bancom has a priority rights over the property. It also ruled that the petitioner intended to be bound by the sale and mortgage since they did not seek to annul the same but instead executed a special agreement to enforce payment of the remaining balance.

Issues:

Whether or not the sale and mortgage are valid?

Whether or not the respondent is an innocent mortgagee in good faith?

Ruling:

As a general rule, if the terms of the contract are clear and unambiguous its stipulations shall control but when its words contravene with the intention of the parties, the intention shall prevail over the words of the contract. Simulation of contract takes place when the parties do not want the express words of the contract to have its legal effect. It may be absolute or relative. When parties do not intend to be bound at all it is absolute simulated contract and considered void. When the parties conceal their true agreement, it is a relative simulated contract and binds the parties when it does not prejudice third persons and is not contrary to law, morals, good custom, public order, and public policy. It was shown that although a deed of absolute sale was executed in the amount of P150,000 no consideration was involved as no exchange of money took place between them. Norma and Candelaria also did not assert their right to ownership over the property. It was clear that the deed of sale was simulated in order to facilitate the bank loan to be secured by Candelaria using the property as collateral. The fact that Norma obtained registration of the property in her name does not entitle her to ownership since the simulated deed of sale produced no legal effect. A simulated contract is not a recognized mode of transferring ownership.

With the contention of Bancom that it is a mortgagee in good faith, the court ruled otherwise pointing out that it is a mortgagee-bank thus is expected to exercise greater care and prudence when dealing with registered lands. Failure to observe due diligence was shown with judicial notice that the bank did not conduct an ocular inspection on the property and did not send a representative to investigate the ownership of the land, these being a standard procedure before approving loans. It is also aware of the adverse claim because of the notice of lis pendens annotated to the title. Because it was established that the two deeds of sale were simulated thus null and void, it does not convey any right that may ripen into a valid title. The mortgage was also null and void because Norma was not the owner of the property. The property cannot be validly foreclosed by the respondent. The court declares the petitioner to remain as the valid owner of the property.

Domingo Lao v Estrella Villones- Lao et al. GR NO. 126777, April 29, 1999 (306 SCRA 387)

Holder in Bad Faith

Facts:

Domingo Lao and Estrella Lao, during their marriage, acquired a real property worth 1.5M including improvements. The property was mortgaged with Metrobank at the time they separated. After full payment of the mortgage, Estrella was able to obtain her own copy of the property title. The property was leased by Domingo to Filmart and learned that the title to the property was already cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of Villena spouses when the Villena came to visit the property and informed the tenants that they are the new property owners. Estrella was at that time in dire need of money and the Malanas spouses approached her and introduced themselves as agents of Carlos Villena who is willing to grant her a loan. Carlos Villenas required Estrella to obtain a Special Power of Attorney from Domingo and his son Ernesto who are also named in the title as owners of the property. Estrella admitted it would be difficult to obtain the SPA because she and her husband are not on good and speaking terms. The Malana spouses however assured her that they could help her obtain the SPA. 3 days after they returned to Villena with the SPA and was able to secure the loan. Upon failure of Estrella to pay, Carlos Villena effected an extrajudicial foreclosure of the property and a new certificate of title was issued in favor of the Villena spouses. Domingo filed a complaint for the annulment of the SPA, mortgage and extrajudicial foreclosure, cancellation of the TCT and reconveyance of title.

The lower court ruled in favor of Domingo and ordered spouses Villena and Malanas together with Estrella to jointly and severally pay for damages and litigation costs to Domingo while Villena can recover the indebtedness of Estrella through an ordinary suit. In its modified judgment the court further ordered the Villenas to vacate the premises and a new Cert. of title to be issued to Domingo and Estrella Lao with 20% share to Ernesto Lao.

On appeal, the CA reversed the decision declaring the mortgage and foreclosure sale valid and ordered the transfer of the title to the Villena spouses. It held that the respondents are mortgagees in good faith and not privy to the forgery of the SPA and the petitioner was negligent to entrust the title to Estrella.

Issue: Whether or not the Villena spouses are mortgagees in good faith?

Ruling:

The court ruled that it was established that the Malana spouses are the agent brokers of Villena and not of Estrella. The court believes that the Malanas and Villena are business partners in credit financing. They were the ones who approached Estrella and offered the loan to be financed by Villena. Estrella informed Carlos Villena about the difficulty of securing the signature of Domingo yet they pursue the offer of loan with the Malanas helping to secure the SPA. Estrella was just asked to sign a black SPA with her signature affixed on the portion stating “with my marital consent.” She did not read and understand the document. They took advantage of her dire need for money at that time. The participation of the Malanas extends beyond as mere witness to the mortgage while Villena was aware of the situation. Estrella as a co-owner is entitled to obtain her own copy of the title of the property thus she can’t be denied to secure her own title. The court has reason to believe that Villena feign his innocence on the flawed character of the SPA contending that as a legitimate businessman he should exercise due diligence to consider the fact dealing with a conjugal property of an estranged wife. The NBI also confirmed that the signatures of Domingo and Ernesto are forged. Therefore the mortgage contract is deemed to be invalid and likewise the foreclosure is also invalid. A holder in bad faith of a certificate of title is not entitled to the protection of the law, for the law can not be used as a shield for fraud. The court revived and affirmed the lower court decision. 

Director, Land Management Bureau vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112567, February 7, 2000 (381 Phil. 761)

“failure to prove possession according to the manner and no. of years required by law”

Facts:

Respondent Aquilino Cariño filed a petition for registration for Lot 6 which is a sugar land claimed to be owned by his mother of whom after she died he became the administrator of the property in behalf of his brothers and sisters. By virtue of a deed of extrajudicial settlement, he became the sole owner of the property. Report from the land investigator showed that the lot is agricultural in nature. Respondent claims that the improvements introduced were in the form of bamboo clumps, sugarcane and mango trees with the house of the tenant; that the land is free from claim and conflict and is not covered by existing public land application and no patent or title has been issued to it; that the respondent is on continuous, open and exclusive possession of the land as inherited from his deceased mother. Respondent is the sole witness for his petition and the only oppositor is the Bureau of Lands. The court granted the petition of the respondent. The petitioner filed a review for certiorari contending that the respondent failed to submit proof of his fee simple title and has not overthrown the presumption that the land is a portion of the public domain belonging to the state.

Republic vs. Maria Lee and IAC, G.R. No. 64818, May 13, 1991 (197 SCRA)

“failure to prove bonafide claim to land through tacking possession from predecessor-in –interest to meet requirements provided by law”

Facts:

Respondent filed before the RTC a registration of a parcel of land in her favor which was opposed by the Dir. Of Lands on grounds that respondent or her predecessor-in-interest acquired the land under any recognized mode for acquisition of title; they have not been in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious possession of the land in the concept of an owner for at least 30 years prior to the filing of application and the land in dispute is a public domain belonging to Republic of the Philippines. The court rendered judgment in favor of respondents. Upon appeal by RP, it affirmed the lower court decision thus this appeal to the Supreme Court.

Republic of the Phil. contends that respondent failed to prove by conclusive evidence that she has ownership of the land by fee simple title and her testimony as to the ownership of her predecessor-in-interest is self serving after claiming that she obtained her Deed of Sale of the property from Laureana Mataban and Sixto Espiritu who obtained their title from the previous owners of the land, Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan. From the time of filing the application of registration, the respondent was in possession of the land for 13 years but she sought to tack her possession on the said land from her predecessor-in-interests who were in possession of the land for 20 years. Conditions provided by Sec. 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 where one is under a bonafide claim of acquisition of ownership through their predecessor-in-interest or by themselves have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the agricultural land in public domain for 30 years shall be entitled to a certificate of title.

Mariano Turquesa vs. Rosario Valera & Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 76371, January 20, 2000 (379 Phil. 618)

"What defines a piece of land is not the size/area mentioned in its descriptions but the boundaries laid down as enclosing the land and indicating its limits. "

Facts:

Respondent applied for registration of 2 parcels of land referred to as Lot 1 and Lot 2. She alleged to have bought Lot 1 and declared it in her name for taxation purposes. Notice for the application for registration was published in the Official Gazette. Oppositors were the Director of Bureau of Lands and herein petitioners. The opposition of Bureau of Lands was denied for failure to substantiate his claim that the land is part of the public domain. Other petitioners claim that their lands were included in Lot 1 sought to be registered by the respondent. The lower court decided in favor of the respondent and denied petitioner’s motion for ocular inspection of the land in dispute. Oppositors appealed to CA regarding Lot 1. CA remanded the case to the lower court for ocular inspection. 3 Commissioners were appointed for the ocular inspection but their findings were opposed and a second ocular inspection was ordered. The trial court reiterated its former judgment to register the whole are of Lot 1 to the respondent with its encumbrance to PNB in the amount of P1,000 removed as it was already paid and thus no longer annotated on the title. The oppositors appealed with the argument that their properties were erroneously included in the respondent’s land registration. CA modified the land registration on lot 1 excluding the landholdings of the oppositors.

Respondent filed a suit for a writ of possession over 2 lots occupied by Santiago Partolan and Crispin Baltar which the court denied. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the court decision and granted the motion for writ of possession on the landholdings of Partolan,  Baltar and oppositors who did not appeal the decision of the lower court while excluding the landholdings of Segundina and Damasen who proved they have rightful and registrable rights over their claim on a specific portion of land. Thus, the oppositors filed a motion for review.

Fausta Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-35787, April 11, 1980 (97 SCRA 22)

Facts:

This is a petition for review filed by the petitioner on the decision rendered by the CA reversing the CFI judgment in favor of her on a land registration case and orders the issuance of the Original Cert. of Title to the respondents Alejandro Santos and Ramona Francisco instead. Petitioner alleges that she is the absolute owner of the land in dispute covered with an Original Cert. of title of the Register of Deeds; that she is in continuous, adverse, open, peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the land since time immemorial; respondents have never been in possession of the land as they claim and that they obtained their Decree of Registration of said land by fraud. Apparently, Diego Francisco, the petitioner’s father occupied the land in dispute since 1918 and obtained a homestead patent for it. He introduced some improvements on the land such as fencing the area with barbwires, planting mango trees and palays and pasturing carabaos. He was able to secure a title in favor of his children petitioner included for the big parcel of land he cultivates and improves and when he died in 1941 the petitioner continued to possess the land in question not embraced in the Transfer of Cert. of Title issued to them in the concept of an owner.

Petronito Maylem vs. Ellano G.R. No. 162721, July 13, 2009

"emancipation patent"


Facts:
Petitioner files a motion for recovery of possession of a piece of agricultural land.
Bonifacio Abad was awarded a parcel of land that was under a leasehold agreement
he entered with the petitioner’s husband by virtue of PD No, 27 under Emancipation
Patent. The land transfer was covered by a transfer certificate of title registered with the
Register of Deeds. Petitioner persuaded Abad to allow her to a one year possession of the
land which he allowed. After the lapse of the agreed period petitioner refused to return
the land to Abad who subsequently filed complaint for recovery of possession of said
property before the provincial adjudicator of DAR after learning that it was mortgaged
by the petitioner to a third party. Meantime, the petitioner filed exclusion of her property
from the coverage of the Agrarian Reform Law. The Provincial adjudicator rendered
favor of Abad ruling that ownership of Abad of the property by virtue of emancipation
patent is absolute. Petitioner contends that pending the appeal for retention Abad’s
ownership of the land is not yet absolute and that the action brought by Abad already
prescribed. CA ruled in favor of Abad rendering him absolute owner of the property by
virtue of emancipation patent.