Abbot Laboratories Philippines, et al. vs Perlie Alcaraz GR No. 192571, July 23, 2013

Case Doctrine:

Compliance with the certification against forum shopping is separate from and independent of the avoidance of the act of forum shopping itself.

Facts:

The respondent Alcaraz was the Regulatory Affairs and Information Manager of Aventis Pasteur Philippines who showed interest in applying as a Medical and Regulatory Affairs Manager, a position that was published by the petitioner Abbot Laboratories in the newspaper. When the petitioner formally offered the position to the respondent, the latter accepted the position. It was on May 23, 2005 that Walsh, Almazar and Bernardo formally handed to the respondent a letter terminating her employment with the detailed explanation for her termination. The respondent then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with damages against the petitioner and its officers. The Labor Arbiter upheld the termination of probationary employment of the respondent holding that the termination was justified with no evidence showing that the officers of the Abbot Lab acted in bad faith when terminating her services.

The NLRC annulled and set aside the ruling of the Labor Arbiter which prompted the petitioners to file before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction. Meanwhile, the action of the petitioner on its motion for reconsideration of the CA’s resolution in the second CA petition was denied that became final on January 10, 2011 because the petitioner failed to file a timely appeal on the said decision. Alcaraz, in her comment, raised the issue on forum shopping when the petitioner filed its second petition to the CA pending the resolution of the motion for reconsideration that they filed earlier in the December 10, 2009 decision. Alcaraz further contends that the petitioners failed to comply with certification requirement under Section 5, Rule 7 of the rules of court when they failed to disclose in their petition filed on June 16, 2010 Memorandum of Appeal filed before the NLRC.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner violated the rule against forum shopping and have violated the certification requirement under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.

Carlito C. Encinas v PO1 Alfredo Agustin, Jr and PO1 Joel Caubang GR No. 187317, April 11, 2013

Case Doctrine:

There is forum shopping when litis pendencia or res judicata is present.

FACTS:

The petitioner Encinas was the Provincial Fire Marshall of Nueva Ecija. He was charged administratively with grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service in violation of the Administrative Code of 1987. He was dismissed from the service. The two respondents were holding the positions of Fire Officer I. He petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari under rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Civil Service Commission to dismiss the petitioner from the service.

The case arose when the petitioner allegedly required the respondents to pay him P5,000 in order not to relieve them from their station at the Cabanatuan City and re-assign them to a far flung area. The respondents decided to pay in fear of the re-assignment, but they manage to come up with P2,000 only causing the petitioner to order for their re-assignment to Cuyapo and Talugtug.

As a result, the respondents decided to file a complaint for illegal transfer before the Bureau of Fire Protection and at the same time filed another complaint before the Civil Service Commission Regional Office in Pampanga and the Civil Service Commission in Cabanatuan. Based on the filed complaints, the petitioner alleges that the respondents are guilty of forum shopping by filing the two identical complaints. The petitioner claims that the charges of dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to public interest that were filed before the Civil Service Commission and the BFP are in violation of the rules against forum shopping.

ISSUE:

Is there a violation on the rules against forum shopping?

People vs Yabut, 311 SCRA 590 (July 28, 1999)

“judicial notice can be taken of the fact that testimonies in court are much more exact and elaborate than those stated in the sworn statement.”

Facts:

Yabut is accused for a crime of rape of a 10-year child and was sentenced as guilty by the trial court. Yabut now assails the decision of the court contending that there were irregularities on the testimony of the victim during the interrogation of the police and what she testified in court. He contends that (1)  She told the police that she was awakened by the accused who is pulling down her panties but in court she testified that she was awakened by a man making an up and down movement on top of her, (2) it was impossible for the victim to see who her assailant as it was dark in the room; (3) it was bizarre to believe when the victim said he came back to get his driver’s license; (4) that the testimony of the victim’s father showed that the victim did not show any anxiety when her father came home after the incident happened; (5) pointed out that the medical result showed the victim to be negative in spermatozoa hence no rape occurred, (6) it is unlikely for the victim to be raped as she was sleeping with her other siblings in the room and (7) victim’s allegation that there was a lock in the room is contradictory to the testimony of her father who said the room has no lock.

Prieto vs Arroyo, 14 SCRA 549 (1965)

“if the party desires the court to take judicial notice of the record of another case, he should file the necessary pleading for the purpose and give the other party the chance to be heard on the matter.”

Facts

Gabriel Prieto and Zeferino Arroyo are owners of parcels of land adjoining to each other. When Arroyo died, the certificate of title in his name was cancelled and a transfer of certificate of title was then issued to his heirs.  The heirs of Arroyo filed a petition before the CFI claiming that the technical description in their title does not conform to the decision of the land registration court where the area given in their title is less than 157 sq meters than to what they are entitled and thus prayed for the correction of the description in their title. The court directed the Register of Deeds to change the description in the transfer certificate of title. Prieto now filed an action against the defendants with the petition to annul the order made by the court claiming that a portion of his land was unjustly added to the defendant’s title. But during the special proceeding Prieto and his counsel failed to appear and the court issued an order dismissing the petition for failure to prosecute.

Prieto filed an action for annulment of the special proceeding and prayed to reconvey the 157 sq meters of lot that was taken from him and was added to the title of the defendants. Defendants move to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata which the court allowed. Prieto now contends that there is no res judicata and invoked the court to have been erred in dismissing his first petition to annul the special proceeding even when he did not appear in court as no parole evidence is needed to support his petition where the matters concerning the land registration proceeding are parts of the record of the court which are well within the court’s judicial notice.

Issue:

Whether or not the court should have taken judicial notice on the land registration case adjudicated in the same court instead of dismissing the first petition to annul the special proceeding?

Primicias v Fugoso 80 PHIL 71 (1948)

Facts: An action was instituted by the petitioner for the refusal of the respondent to issue a permit to them to hold a public meeting in Plaza Miranda for redress of grievances to the government. The reason alleged by the respondent in his defense for refusing the permit is, "that there is a reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, specially on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order." Giving emphasis as well to the delegated police power to local government. Stating as well Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting as an offense against public peace, and penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful assembly." Included herein is Sec. 1119, Free use of Public Place.

Creser Precision Systems Inc. v CA and Floro International Co. GR NO. 118708, February 2, 1998

Facts: 

Respondent was granted by the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer (BPTTT) a Letter of patent for its aerial fuze on January 23, 1990. Sometime in 1993, respondent discovered that the petitioner submitted samples of its patented aerial fuze to the AFP for testing claiming to be his own. To protect its right, respondent sent letter of warning to petitioner on a possible court action should it proceed its testing by the AFP. In response the petitioner filed a complaint for injunction and damages arising from alleged infringement before the RTC asserting that it is the true and actual inventor of the aerial fuze which it developed on 1981 under the Self Reliance Defense Posture Program of the AFP. It has been supplying the military of the aerial fuze since then and that the fuze of the respondent is similar as that of the petitioner. Petitioner prayed for restraining order and injunction from marketing, manufacturing and profiting from the said invention by the respondent. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner citing the fact that it was the first to develop the aerial fuze since 1981 thsu it concludes that it is the petitioner’s aerial fuze that was copied by the respondent. Moreover, the claim of respondent is solely based on its letter of patent which validity is being questioned. On appeal, respondent argued that the petitioner has no cause of action since he has no right to assert there being no patent issued to his aerial fuze. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court dismissing the complaint of the petitioner. It was the contention of the petitioner that it can file under Section 42 of the Patent Law an action for infringement not as a patentee but as an entity in possession of a right, title or interest to the patented invention. It theorizes that while the absence of a patent prevents one from lawfully suing another for infringement of said patent, such absence does not bar the true and actual inventor of the patented invention from suing another in the same nature as a civil action for infringement.

Pearl and Dean Inc. v Shoemart Inc. GR No. 148222, August 15, 2003

Facts:

Plaintiff P and D is engaged in manufacturing advertising display units called as light boxes. These are specialty printed posters with plastic sheets and illuminated back lights that are mainly used as stationeries. They secure copyright registration over these advertising light boxes and marketed using the trademark “poster ads.” They applied for the registration of trademark before the Bureau of Patents, Trademark and Technology Transfer which was approved on September 12, 1988. P and D negotiated with the defendant Shoemart for the lease and installation of the light boxes in SM City North Edsa but was given an alternative to have them leased to SM Makati and SM Cubao while the said branch was under construction. Only the contract with SM Makati was returned with signature. In 1986 the counsel of Shoemart informed P and D that it is rescinding its contract for SM Makati due to non-performance of the terms thereof. Two years later, the Metro Industrial Services, the same company contracted by the plaintiff to fabricate their display units offered to construct light boxes for the Shoemart chain of stores wherein 10 light boxes were created for them. Upon the termination of contract with Metro Industrial Service, SM hired EYD Rainbow Advertising Co. to make light boxes. When P and D knew about the exact copies of its light boxes installed at SM City branches in 1989, it investigated and found out that North Edsa Marketing Inc (NEMI), sister company of SM was primarily selling ad space in lighted display units. P and D sent letter to both NEMI and SM enjoining them to cease from using the subject light boxes and remove them from SM establishments. It also demanded to discontinue the use of its trademark “poster ads” with compensatory damages of 20M. SM suspended the lease of light boxes in its branches while NEMI took down its advertisement for poster ads. Claiming both failed to meet its demand P and D filed a case for infringement of trademark, copyright, unfair competition and damages.

SM denied the charges against it and noted that the registration of mark “poster ads” is limited to stationeries like letterhead and envelope. It further stresses that it independently develop its own poster panels using techniques and available technology without notice to P and D copyright. It further contends that “poster ads” is a generic name that cannot be appropriated for a trademark and that P and D’s advertising display units contained no copyright notice in violation of Section 27 of P.D. 49. NEMI likewise repleaded the averments of SM and denied to have manufactured, installed or advertised the display units. The RTC decided in favor of P and D but on appeal the Court of Appeals reversed its decision. In its judgment its stand is that the copyright of the plaintiff is limited to its technical drawings only and not the light boxes itself. When a drawing is technical, the copyright over the drawing does not extend to actual object. Thus the CA is constrained to adopt the view of the respondents that the “poster ads” is a generic poster term ads and in the absence of convincing proof that such wording acquired secondary meaning, the P and D’s exclusive right to use “poster ads” is limited to what is written on its certificate of registration which is stationaries.

Smith Kline Beckman Co. v Court of Appeals and Tryco Pharma GR No. 126627, August 14, 2003

Facts:

Petitioner Smith Kline Beckman Co., licensed to do business in the Philippines, filed on October 8, 1976 as assignee before the Bureau of Patents an application for patent on its invention called “Methods and Compositions for Producing Biphasic Parasiticide Activity Using Methyl 5 Propylthio-2-Benzimidazole Carbanate.” A Letters of Patent was issued to the petitioner on September 24, 1981 for a period of 17 years. The patent provides that the patented invention consists of Methyl 5 Propylthio-2-Benzimidazole Carbanate used as an active ingredient in treating gastrointestinal parasites and lung worms in animals. The respondent Tryco Pharma manufactures, distributes and sells veterinary product, one of which is the Impregon, a drug having Albendazole as its active ingredient effective against gastrointestinal worms in animals. Petitioner now sues the respondent for patent infringement and unfair competition before the RTC as it claims that their patent includes the substance Albendazole used by the respondent and they sold and used the drug Impregon without the petitioner’s authorization and committed unfair competition for selling as its own the drug that substantially functions to achieve the same result. Petitioner further contends that under the doctrine of equivalents in determining patent infringement, the active substance Albendazole used by the respondent is substantially the same as Methyl 5 Propylthio-2-Benzimidazole Carbanate covered by its patent with the same use of combating worm infestations in animals. It prodded the court to go beyond the literal words used in the Letter of Patent issued to them to consider that the words Methyl 5 Propylthio-2-Benzimidazole Carbanate and Albendazole are the same. Respondent avers that the Letter of Patents issued to petitioner does not cover Albendazole in that the word does not appear on it. Even if the patent were to include Albendazole it is unpatentable. They secured approval from the Bureau of Foods and Drugs to manufacture and market Impregon with the Albendazole as its active ingredients. The petitioner has no proof that they passed their veterinary products as that of the petitioner.

Francisco Joaquin vs Franklin Drilon GR No. 108946, January 28, 1999

Facts:

BJ Productions, Inc (BJPI) is a holder of a Certificate of Copyright no. M922 issued on January 28, 1971 of “Rhoda and Me” which is a dating show aired from 1970 to 1977. It submitted to the National Library an addendum its certificate of copyright specifying the show’s format and style of presentation. While watching the television, its President, Francisco Joaquin saw on RPN Channel 9 the episode on “It’s a Date” produced by IXL Productions. He wrote a letter to IXL’s president Gabriel Zosa informing him that BJPI has a copyright of the same format as shown on their “It’s a Date” show in their “Rhoda and Me” show. Zosa sought to register IXL’s copyright to their first episode of “It’s a Date” to the National Library. Petitioner filed a complaint in violation of PD No. 49 against the respondent before the RTC of Quezon City. Respondent sought a review of the resolution from the Asst. City Prosecutor before the Department of Justice.

Sec. of Justice Franklin Drilon directed to move for dismissal of the case against the respondents and denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration hence this petition before the Supreme Court.

Manly Sportswear Manufacturing Inc. v Dadodette Enterprises and/or Hermes Sports Center GR No. 165306, September 20, 2005

Facts:

The NBI secured a search warrant on March 14, 2003 from the RTC to act upon the information that respondents were in possession of goods copyright of which belongs to the petitioner. Finding reasonable grounds in violation of Section 172 and 217 of RA 8293 a search warrant was issued. Respondents move to quash and annul the search warrant contending it is invalid and the requisites for its issuance are not complied with. They insist that the sporting goods manufactured and registered in the name MANLY is just ordinary and common and not among the classes protected under RA 8293. The court granted the motion to quash declaring the search warrant null and void because there were certificates of registrations issued earlier than MANLY for the same sporting goods under various brands thereby negating the fact that their products are copyrighted and original creations. Motion for reconsideration was denied by the appellate court sustaining the lower court’s decision thus this instant petition for review for certiorari.

De Los Santos v Yatco (106 PHIL 745)

Article IX (B), Section 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. (2) Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, and, except to positions which are policy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical, by competitive examination. (3) No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. (4) No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political campaign. (5) The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees. (6) Temporary employees of the Government shall be given such protection as may be provided by law.

Facts:

Petitioner files for certiorari to revoke the order of respondent Judge Yatco for cancelling his previous order for execution on the parcel of land owned by the petitioner. The said parcel of land is being occupied by Fernando Mendoñez with an agreement to pay in installment the said land to the petitioners and that he shall voluntarily vacate the land and the payments he previously made shall be forfeited in favor of the plaintiff. A civil case was filed by the petitioner against Mendoñez for failure to pay as per agreement of both parties. Petitioner later filed a motion for execution to take the land back. Defendant Mendoñez moved for postponement to give both parties sufficient time to come to an agreement which was allowed by the respondent judge. It was settled by both parties that Mendoñez will secure a GSIS loan however when he was ready to make the payment the petitioner refused to abide with their agreement and now asking for a higher amount of money for payment. Finding no justification on the issuance of the writ of execution, Judge Yatco quashed said order hence this petition for certiorari based on lack of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion.

Acena v Civil Service Commission 193 SCRA 623 (1991)

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari to annul the resolution of the Civil Service Commission which set aside the order of the Merit Systems Protection Board declaring the herein petitioner as the legitimate Administrative Officer of Rizal Technological Colleges. Acena was assigned as Admin. Officer by then President of Rizal Technological Colleges and was subsequently promoted as Associate Professor on temporary status pending his compliance to obtain a Master’s Degree while assuming the position of Acting Admin Officer at the same time. The Board of Trustees designated Ricardo Salvador as Acting Admin Officer and pursuant to the same, the new College President Dr. Estolas revoked the designation of the petitioner as acting Admin Officer. Petitioner sent a letter to the CSC stating his desire to keep his appointment as Admin Officer instead of Associate Professor. Thus the latter’s appointment was withdrawn. He also filed a complaint for injunction of damages to Dr. Estolas assailing the validity of his dismissal from his position as violation of security of tenure. He filed another complaint for illegal termination against Dr. Estolas before the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). The CSC opined that Acena is still the Admin Officer since his appointment as Asso. Prof. was withdrawn. Dr. Estolas filed petition for review to the Office of the President. The Presidential Staff Director referred the complaint back to the CSC. In the dispositive portion of its resolution, the CSC finds the action of Dr. Estolas valid and set aside the previous opinion made by the CSC and the order of the MSPB. The petitioner files a petition for certiorari against the CSC decision on jurisdictional issue.

Saligumba v COA (117 SCRA 669)

Article IX (D), Section 2.  Section 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post- audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and universities; (c) other government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the Government, which are required by law or the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. However, where the internal control system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt such measures, including temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts of the Government and, for such period as may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto. 
(2) The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds and properties. 

Saligumba v COA (117 SCRA 669)

FACTS:

This is a petition for review of the decision rendered by the COA regarding the Administrative case filed by petitioner against Leonardo Estella, Auditing Examiner III of the Auditor’s office of Misamis Occidental. The charge was that the respondent raped Editha Saligumba on several occasions. The COA dropped the administrative complaint due to insufficient evidence. Saligumba petition the court to review such action taken by the COA.

Civil Liberties Union v Executive Secretary (194 SCRA 317)

Article IX (B), Section 7. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including Government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

Civil Liberties Union v Executive Secretary (194 SCRA 317)

FACTS: The petitioner are assailing the Executive Order No. 284 issued by the President allowing cabinet members, undersecretary or asst. secretaries and other appointive officials of the executive department to hold 2 positions in the government and government corporations and to receive additional compensation. They find it unconstitutional against the provision provided by Section 13, Article VII prohibiting the President, Cabinet members and their deputies to hold any other office or employment. Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B further states that “Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries." In the opinion of the DOJ as affirmed by the Solicitor General, the said Executive Order is valid and constitutional as Section 7 of Article IX-B stated “unless otherwise allowed by law” which is construed to be an exemption from that stipulated on Article VII, section 13, such as in the case of the Vice President who is constitutionally allowed to become a cabinet member and the Secretary of Justice as ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council.

Tobias v Abalos 239 SCRA 106 G.R. No. L-114783 December 8, 1994

Facts:

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong.” Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. The petitioners contend on the following:

(1) Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 contravenes from the "one subject-one bill" rule provided in the Constitution by involving 2 subjects in the bill namely (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.

(2) The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution.

(3) The said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements.

(4) That Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5(4) of the Constitution stating that “within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section

WILD VALLEY SHIPPING CO. vs. CA 342 SCRA 213 October 6, 2000

“PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION DOCTRINE”

Facts:

The Philippine Roxas, a vessel owned by Philippine President Lines, Inc., private respondent herein, arrived in Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, to load iron ore. Upon the completion of the loading and when the vessel was ready to leave port, an official pilot of Venezuela, was designated by the harbour authorities in Puerto Ordaz to navigate the Philippine Roxas through the Orinoco River. The Philippine Roxas experienced some vibrations when it entered the San Roque Channel. The vessel proceeded on its way, with the pilot assuring the watch officer that the vibration was a result of the shallowness of the channel. The master (captain) checked the position of the vessel and verified that it was in the centre of the channel. The Philippine Roxas ran around in the Orinoco River, thus obstructing the ingress and egress of vessels. As a result of the blockage, the Malandrinon, a vessel owned by herein petitioner Wild valley Shipping Company, Ltd., was unable to sail out of Puerto Ordaz on that day. Subsequently, Wild valley Shipping Company, Ltd. filed a suit with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch III against Philippine President Lines, Inc. and Pioneer Insurance Company (the underwriter/insurer of Philippine Roxas) for damages in the form of unearned profits, and interest thereon amounting to US $400,000.00plus attorney's fees, costs, and expenses of litigation.

BELLIS vs BELLIS 20 SCRA 358 G.R. No. L-23678, June 6, 1967

FACTS:

Amos Bellis, a US citizen, died a resident of Texas. He left two wills -- one devising a certain amount of money to his first wife and three illegitimate children and another, leaving the rest of his estate to his seven legitimate children. Before partition, the illegitimate children who are Filipinos opposed on the ground that they are deprived of their legitimes.

ISSUE:

Whether the applicable law is Texas law or Philippine laws

Bank of the Philippine Island vs. Reynald Suarez G.R. No. 167750, March 15, 2010

Facts:

Suarez represents a client who wants to buy parcels of land without having to directly deal with the land owners. They made arrangements that Suarez will make the transactions on his behalf to make it appear he is the one buying the lots. The client issued a check from Rizal Commercial Banking Co. to be credited to the checking account of Suarez with BPI in the amount of P19,129,100.00 as consideration to the lots. Knowing that the bank observes a 3-day clearing check policy, he asked his secretary to call BPI if the RCBC check was already credited to his account on the same day the check was issued by his client. Upon the confirmation of his secretary from BPI that the amount was already credited to his account, he subsequently issued 5 checks to the land owners and left to the US for a vacation the next day. He was thereafter informed by his secretary that the 5 checks were dishonored on June 16, 1997, the same day the 5 checks were issued and he incurred charges because of it. On June 19, 1997, the payees again presented the 5 checks and this time they were honored rendering the account of Suarez to be sufficiently funded. Suarez demanded an apology from BPI and for the reversal of the charges incurred from his account. His checks were apparently returned due to “drawn against insufficient funds” (DAIF) instead of “drawn against uncollected deposit (DAUD). Upon examination of the checks, Suarez insisted that the checks were tampered where the DAIF mark on the check was changed to DAUD. He sued the bank for damages and rejected the bank’s offer to reverse the charges from his account. The RTC ruled in favor of Suarez awarding him actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed the RTC decision after establishing that there were indeed intercalations made on the DAIF marking to make it appear as DAUD. The court finds it proper to award moral and exemplary damages because Suarez could be criminally held liable in violation of BP 22 if the reason of dishonoring the check is due to DAIF. Although he may not have been liable for a criminal prosecution, he also suffered humiliation from his client because the land owners aborted their transaction thinking he is not capable of fulfilling his obligation. The act of reversion of the bank on the charges imposed on Suarez’s account is tantamount to their admission of having committed blunder in handling the account of their client. The bank however insisted that Suarez is liable for paying the charges mandated by Philippine Clearing House Rules and Regulations (PCHRR).

Phil. Banking Corp. vs CA GR. No. 127469

Facts:

Leonilo Marcos filed in court a complaint for sum of money with damages against Phil. Banking Corporation (PBC). Marcos allegedly made a time deposit in 2 occasions the amt. of P664,897.67 and P764,897.67 through the persuasion of his friend Pagsaligan, one of the bank’s officials. The bank issued receipt for the first deposit while a letter-certification was issued for his second deposit by Pagsaligan. Pagsaligan kept the various time deposit certificates. When Marcos wanted to withdraw his time deposit and its accumulated interest Pagsaligan encouraged him to open a letter of credit to the bank by executing 3 trust receipts agreement. He signed blank forms for domestic letter of credits, trust receipts agreements and promissory notes. He was required to deposit 30% of the total amount of credit and his time deposit will secure the remaining 70% of the letters of credit.

He is now accusing the bank for unjustly collecting payment without deducting the 30% of his down payment and charging him with accumulating interests since his time deposit serves as collateral for his remaining obligation. He further denied making a loan of P500,000 with 25% interest per annum covered by a promissory note produced by the bank. The bank explained that the promissory notes he executed are distinct from the trust receipt agreement and denied falsifying the promissory note covering for the loan of P500,000. The evidence presented on the promissory note however is merely a machine copy of the document. The said loan was already paid by offsetting it from his time deposit.

Citibank vs spouses Cabamongan GR No. 146918, May 2, 2006

FACTS:

Spouses Cabamongan opened a joint and/or foreign currency time deposit in favor of their two children with Citibank. On a material date, a person who claimed to be Carmelita sought the pre-termination of the account. She presented identification cards to ascertain her identity to the then account officer. When she left with the money, she left an identification card. She filled up the necessary forms for pre-termination of deposits with the assistance of Account Officer Yeye San Pedro. While the transaction was being processed, she was casually interviewed by San Pedro about her personal circumstances and investment plans. Since the said person failed to surrender the original Certificate of Deposit, she had to execute a notarized release and waiver document in favor of Citibank, pursuant to Citibank's internal procedure, before the money was released to her. The release and waiver document was not notarized on that same day but the money was nonetheless given to the person withdrawing. The transaction lasted for about 40 minutes.

After said person left, San Pedro realized that she left behind an identification card. The account officer then called up the address. The spouses and their family knew of the incident. They were presently residing in the US and there was a prior incident wherein they got robbed in their house with the jewelry box and cards stolen. Spouses made several demands for the return of the amount but Citibank refused to do so.