Republic vs CA, 296 SCRA 171 181-182 (1998)

“failure to deny the genuineness and due execution of an actionable document does not bar a party at the trial that there is a mistake or imperfection in the writing, or that it does not express the true agreement of the parties, or that the agreement is invalid or that there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing.”

Facts:

Petitioner files an expropriation case against the Quetulio et al for the two parcels of land to be used for constructing the terminal building for international flights in Laoag International Airport. A compromise agreement was entered by the parties setting forth the just compensation for the expropriated property which was adopted by the court. Harold Hernando, representing the respondents as their attorney-in-fact filed a petition for the issuance of a duplicate copy of the said property and sold the same to spouses Abadilla. The petitioner files a complaint for the rescission of the deed of sale and cancellation of the transfer of certificate of title, reconveyance and damages against the respondents contending that the sale was null and void because the property is already owned by the Republic and that the vendees were in bad faith with their prior knowledge of the first sale. Hernando filed an answer beyond the reglementary period but was allowed by the court to present his answer praying for the dismissal of the complaint on the basis of the “affidavit of revocation” cancelling the compromise agreement between the Republic’s counsel in the person of Atty. Pedro who allegedly withheld the 10 checks as part of the consideration of the expropriated property and signed the rescission of the compromise agreement and deed of conveyance in favor of the Abadilla spouses.

Plaintiff failed to reply to the answer of the respondent who was then held by the trial court to have admitted the due execution and genuineness of the instruments presented by respondents in their motion to dismiss. As a result, the court finds that the plaintiff, after having admitted the genuineness of the documents, in effect waived/abandoned its claim to the land in suit. Motion for reconsideration was denied hence the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari to the CA which was dismissed after treating the same as an ordinary appeal filed out of time.

People vs Cartuano, 255 SCRA 403 (1996)

“the court can take judicial notice of blood grouping test which can establish conclusively that a man is not the father of a child, where the child has none of the father’s phenotypes. However, blood grouping test cannot show that a man is the father of the child, as the presence of the father’s phenotypes in the child can only show the possibility that he is.”

Facts:

Cartuano was charged for 2 counts of rape against Adela Villa, a mentally retarded person which was allegedly committed in May 4, 1991 and August 20, 1991. The complaint was filed by the victim’s father, Antonio Villa who testified that he learned about the rape when he went home on August 20, 1991 and saw his 5 years old grandson crying. The child explained that he was crying because the accused threatened him with a sharp instrument and pulled her aunt Adela Villa inside the room and witnessed that he had carnal knowledge with her. Adela also testified and related how she was raped against her will. The accused provided an alibi that he could not have been at the victim’s house when the alleged rape happened because he was far away working as a farm worker where he stayed and lived with his employer. It was only after his uncle died in August 3, 1991 when he went home to their place and stayed with his aunt. He returned to his employer’s place in Aug. 19, 1991 to ask permission that he will stop working for him but he was not allowed to leave his work. But he was permitted by his employer to go home again to inform his aunt that he will continue working for his employer and came home to his aunt’s house in August 21, 1991. He was resting when the Brgy. Captain came over to invite him to the police station. The court rendered decision finding the accused guilty of two counts of rape and ordered to support the victim’s child. Assailing the decision of the trial court, the accused on appeal indicates the assignment of errors for failure of the court to give credence that the testimony of the father of the accused is purely hearsay; that the testimony of the victim is not convincing; that the court erred in holding that the father of the child of the victim is the accused and for convicting the accused despite the failure of the prosecution to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Issue: Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused?

People vs Villagonzalo, 238 SCRA 215 (Nov. 18, 1994)

“the court takes judicial notice of the common (human) experience of mankind and non-adherence thereto renders testimonies inherently improbable.”

Facts:
Accused-appellants Leoniza Villagonzalo and Renito Moro were accused for committing a crime of murder and was sentenced guilty by the court. Both were allegedly conspirators in killing Ricardo Tan, the common-law spouse of Villagonzalo and they conspired with other respondents Dela Cruz and Asentista who were not apprehended by the police. Dela Cruz and Asentista were allegedly hired by both Moro and Villagonzalo to kill Tan as evidenced by the testimony of Tito Alquizar and Prescilla Villarin who also work for Tan. Villarin is the helper and Alquizar is both the helper and farmhand of Tan.

According to Alquizar and Villarin, they were present when the four accused were contemplating a plan on how to kill Tan. They alleged to be present from the time Moro and Villagonzalo offered Dela Cruz and Asentista money to kill Tan and also during the time Moro provided a gun to both men before the victim was shot. They alleged that Moro and Villagonzalo are having an affair and want to kill Tan so they can live together. The court rendered a judgment of guilty for murder to Villagonzalo and Moro. The appellants now pray for the reversal of the judgment contending that the lower court erred in believing prosecution witnesses Alquizar and Villarin whose testimony are patently false and contrary to human experience and assailed the credibility of the witnesses whose testimonies were relied upon by the court in giving judgment.

Issue: Whether or not the witnesses Alquizar and Villarin credible witnesses?

People vs Yabut, 311 SCRA 590 (July 28, 1999)

“judicial notice can be taken of the fact that testimonies in court are much more exact and elaborate than those stated in the sworn statement.”

Facts:

Yabut is accused for a crime of rape of a 10-year child and was sentenced as guilty by the trial court. Yabut now assails the decision of the court contending that there were irregularities on the testimony of the victim during the interrogation of the police and what she testified in court. He contends that (1)  She told the police that she was awakened by the accused who is pulling down her panties but in court she testified that she was awakened by a man making an up and down movement on top of her, (2) it was impossible for the victim to see who her assailant as it was dark in the room; (3) it was bizarre to believe when the victim said he came back to get his driver’s license; (4) that the testimony of the victim’s father showed that the victim did not show any anxiety when her father came home after the incident happened; (5) pointed out that the medical result showed the victim to be negative in spermatozoa hence no rape occurred, (6) it is unlikely for the victim to be raped as she was sleeping with her other siblings in the room and (7) victim’s allegation that there was a lock in the room is contradictory to the testimony of her father who said the room has no lock.

Gener vs De Leon, GR No. 130730, October 19, 2001

“courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or pending in the same court, except when with the knowledge of the adverse party reference is made to these cases and the latter did not object thereto.”

Facts

Respondent De Leon filed a forcible entry case against petitioner Gener, alleging that he is the original claimant and actual possessor in good faith under a bona fide claim of ownership to a certain parcel of agricultural land in Bulacan. The said land was part of the bed of the Angat River which was formerly adjacent to the boundary of lot that is covered by the Certificate of Title of De Leon. A flood caused that part of the river to develop and elevated and dried up land where De Leon extended occupation, planting and cultivating coconuts, bananas and vegetables. In May 1989, Gener allegedly through force, threat and intimidation unlawfully entered the property and deprived De Leon possession thereof. De Leon demand Gener to vacate the premises but was ignored. Efforts to settle the dispute amicably thru the brgy justice system did not prosper prompting De Leon to file an ejectment case against Gener.

Gener on the other hand denied all allegations of the respondent and claimed to be the real owner of the property as evidenced by the notarized deed of sale which was executed in October 1988 by Benjamin Joaquin who is the heir of the former possessor of the land, Proceso Joaquin. The land was declared for taxation purposes in the name of Gener and declared the land as private. De Leon’s father, in an affidavit, mentioned that P. Joaquin was the owner the neighboring lot in the east side of their lot.

Gener further attested that it was De Leon who forcibly entered the lot in question as evidenced by two criminal cases on malicious mischief he filed against the workers of De Deleon who entered the disputed land and destroyed the planted trees thereon. He also invoked that the right to file an action for ejection already prescribed after filing the same beyond the 1 year prescription period. Trial ensued where Gener is the only witness to his defense while De Leon presented oral testimonies of witnesses who stated that he was the owner of the lot in dispute. Gener presented a deed of sale, a tax declaration of the land in his name and recalled the 2 criminal cases he filed on malicious mischief against the worker of De Leon. The MTC ruled in favor of De Leon but the decision was reversed by the RTC and dismissed the forcible entry case against Gener. On appeal, the appellate court reversed the decision of the RTC and reinstated the decision of the MTC. A motion for reconsideration was then filed before the SC.

Republic vs CA, 277 SCRA 633, 641 (1997)

”Judicial notice will be taken of the record, pleading or judgment of a case in another court between the same parties or involving one of the same parties as well as of the record of another case between different parties in the same court. Judicial notice will also be taken of court personnel.”

Facts:

Josefa Gacot claimed a parcel of land, the area of which is not indicated, in Palawan. Gacot claims that she has been in actual possession of the property for more than 30 year and bought the land from Cipriana Dantic-Llanera by virtue of a deed of sale and introduced improvement thereon and paid taxes for the land in her name. It appears that a certain Ceferino Sabenacio is a co-owner of the land who later waived his claim in favor of Gacot and admitted that he was only a boundary owner of the land and it was Gacot who is in actual possession of it. Prior to the hearing, the Land Registration Authority intervened, calling the attention of the court on the decision made by Judge Lorenzo Garlitos declaring the property as owned by the Republic. However, it did not bar Gacos from filing her answer, presenting evidence of her actual possession of the said property and tax declaration and payment made in her name. The counsel of the petitioner did not present evidence and submitted the case for resolution.

The court rendered a decision in favor of Gacot thus the Solicitor General elevated the case to the CA and filed a motion for the court to reopen and remand the case back to the trial court to allow the Republic to present the decision of Judge Garlitos which motion was granted by the court. The hearing was set several times and Gacot was able to submit her memorandum while the Republic was unable to submit any evidence to support the claim of the government in court. For failure of the government to refute and to present their evidence contrary to Gacot’s claim, the court decided not to disturb its former decision.

Philippine Veterans Affairs vs Segundo, 164 SCRA 365 (8/15/1988)

“lower courts from the CA down to the lowest level must take judicial notice of decisions of the SC as they are duty bound to know the rulings of the high tribunal and to apply them in the adjudication of cases, they being part of the legal system.”

Facts:

Brigida Segundo is the widow of a veteran of the 2^nd World War, the late Feliciano Segundo who applied for a pension benefit from the Phil. Veterans Affairs. Her application was approved in April 1947 and was entitled in receiving a monthly pension for life on the condition that she will remain unmarried and no similar benefits from the US Government has been granted to her. In November 1951, the respondent cancelled and terminated the monthly pension benefits because she became a recipient of a similar benefit from the US Veterans Administration which is in violation of the Phil Veterans Affairs standing policy. However in June 1973, the Supreme Court declared the other policy Segundo was receiving as null and void in the case of Del Mar vs Phil. Veterans Administration. Despite this ruling by the SC, Philippine Veterans Affairs refused to restore the monthly pension of Segundo. The trial court, in a decision promulgated in March 1975, ordered the Phil. Veterans to pay Segundo her monthly life pension effective November 1951.

Phil. Veterans Affair now assailed the decision of the court contending that it erred in deciding that the right of Segundo to compel them to restore her pension had not prescribed; that the ruling in Del Mar vs Phil. Veterans Administration is not applicable in the case and that the court should have dismissed the petition for mandamus for lack of cause of action for her failure to demand the restoration of her pension and there was no refusal on their part.

Prieto vs Arroyo, 14 SCRA 549 (1965)

“if the party desires the court to take judicial notice of the record of another case, he should file the necessary pleading for the purpose and give the other party the chance to be heard on the matter.”

Facts

Gabriel Prieto and Zeferino Arroyo are owners of parcels of land adjoining to each other. When Arroyo died, the certificate of title in his name was cancelled and a transfer of certificate of title was then issued to his heirs.  The heirs of Arroyo filed a petition before the CFI claiming that the technical description in their title does not conform to the decision of the land registration court where the area given in their title is less than 157 sq meters than to what they are entitled and thus prayed for the correction of the description in their title. The court directed the Register of Deeds to change the description in the transfer certificate of title. Prieto now filed an action against the defendants with the petition to annul the order made by the court claiming that a portion of his land was unjustly added to the defendant’s title. But during the special proceeding Prieto and his counsel failed to appear and the court issued an order dismissing the petition for failure to prosecute.

Prieto filed an action for annulment of the special proceeding and prayed to reconvey the 157 sq meters of lot that was taken from him and was added to the title of the defendants. Defendants move to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata which the court allowed. Prieto now contends that there is no res judicata and invoked the court to have been erred in dismissing his first petition to annul the special proceeding even when he did not appear in court as no parole evidence is needed to support his petition where the matters concerning the land registration proceeding are parts of the record of the court which are well within the court’s judicial notice.

Issue:

Whether or not the court should have taken judicial notice on the land registration case adjudicated in the same court instead of dismissing the first petition to annul the special proceeding?

State Prosecutors vs Muro, 236 SCRA 505 (19 September 1994)

“the doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by the courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and reasonable doubt on the subject should be resolved in the negative”

Facts:

The state prosecutors who are members of the DOJ Panel of Prosecution filed a complaint against respondent Judge Muro on the ground of ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violation of the provisions in the Code of Judicial Conduct. The case at bar involves the prosecution of the 11 charges against Imelda Marcos in violation of the Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restriction in the Central Bank Circular 960. The respondent judge dismissed all 11 cases solely on the basis of the report published from the 2 newspapers, which the judge believes to be reputable and of national circulation, that the Pres. of the Philippines lifted all foreign exchange restrictions. The respondent’s decision was founded on his belief that the reported announcement of the Executive Department in the newspaper in effect repealed the CB 960 and thereby divested the court of its jurisdiction to further hear the pending case thus motu propio dismissed the case. He further contends that the announcement of the President as published in the newspaper has made such fact a public knowledge that is sufficient for the judge to take judicial notice which is discretionary on his part.

ELECTION CONTESTS

SECTION 1. Jurisdiction of regional trial courts. - Regional trial courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all election contests involving elective municipal officials.

SEC. 2. Jurisdiction of municipal trial courts. - Municipal trial courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all election contests involving elective barangay officials.

SEC. 3. How initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto against an elective municipal or barangay official. An election protest or a petition for quo warranto shall be filed directly with the proper court in three legible copies plus such number of copies corresponding to the number of protestees or respondents. An election protest shall not include a petition for quo warranto, nor shall a petition for quo warranto include an election protest.

SEC. 4. Modes of service and filing. - Service and filing of pleadings, including the initiatory petition and other papers, shall be done personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from the court, a resort to other modes of service must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not done personally. A violation of this Rule shall be cause to consider the pleading or paper as not filed.

SEC. 5. Election protest. - A petition contesting the election or returns of an elective municipal or barangay official shall be filed with the proper regional trial court or municipal trial court by any candidate who was voted for the same office and who received the second or third highest number of votes or, in a multi-slot position, was among the next four candidates following the last-ranked winner duly proclaimed, as reflected in the official results of the election contained in the Statement of Votes By Precinct. The party filing the protest shall be designated as the protestant; the adverse party shall be known as the protestee. Each contest shall refer exclusively to one office; however, contests for offices of Sangguniang Bayan or Sangguniang Barangay may be consolidated in one case.

Tano vs Socrates 278 SCRA 154

Facts

The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princessa enacted ordinance no. 15-92 banning the shipment of live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princessa City for a period of 5 years. In the same light, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan also enacted a resolution that prohibits the catching, gathering, buying, selling and possessing and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for a period of 5 years within the Palawan waters. The petitiones Airline Shippers Association of Palawan together with marine merchants were charged for violating the above ordinance and resolution by the city and provincial governments. The petitioners now allege that they have the preferential rights as marginal fishermen granted with privileges provided in Section 149 of the Local Government Code, invoking the invalidity of the above-stated enactments as violative of their preferential rights.

Issue

Whether or not the enacted resolutions and ordinances by the local government units violative of the preferential rights of the marginal fishermen ?

Estreller vs Manatad Jr., 268 SCRA 608

Facts

Respondent Manatad is a Court Interpreter I of the MTC in Southern Leyte against whom a complaint was filed by the petitioner for disgraceful and misconduct in violation of the Civil Service Law. Respondent’s conduct allegedly resulted to the birth of a child with the petitioner who alleges that she does not know that the respondent is a married man. The respondent admitted being the father of the child but denied the allegation that petitioner does not know he is married. The case was investigated in the RTC and during the initial hearing the complainant withdrew her complaint. Respondent has no objection to the motion to withdraw and both parties agreed to terminate the investigation and to submit the case for resolution of the investigating judge who found the respondent guilty of the administrative case filed against him. The judge recommended a sanction and warning because of the mitigating circumstances that the complainant withdrew her complaint. The office of the Court Administrator recommended an additional fine of P2,000.

Issue

Whether or not the administrative complaint and the imposition of its penalty may be imposed in view of the withdrawal of the complaint?

Department of Public Services Labor Union vs Court Industrial Relations 1 SCRA 316

Facts

The petitioners sought for the implementation of RA 1880 which fixes the legal number of hours of labor in every government agency to 8 hours, 5 days a week for a total of 80 hours a week. They also pray for the recovery of an overtime pay before the court of Industrial Relations against the city mayor and the municipality board of the City of Manila. The respondent court filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the petition that states no cause of action. The judge affirmed the dismissal of the petition. Their motion for reconsideration was denied hence this petition for review before the Supreme Court.

Issue

Whether or not the Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction over the petition?

Municipality of Makati vs CA 190 SCRA 206

Facts

An expropriation proceeding was filed by the Municipality of Makati, herein petitioner, against the private property of Arceli Jo. In compliance to PD 42, the petitioner opened an account under its name at PNB depositing an amount of P417,510.00. The court fixed the appraised value of the expropriated property at P5,291,666.00 and an advanced payment was made in the amount of P338,160 leaving a balance of P4,953,506. After the decision becomes final and executory, the private respondent moved for the issuance of a writ of execution. A notice of garnishment was thereafter issued by the court to the PNB account. A manifestation was filed by the petitioner informing the court that the private respondent was no longer the true owner of the expropriated property. The court consolidated the ownership of the property to PSB as a mortgagee/purchaser. The private respondent and PSB agreed to divide the compensation due from the expropriation proceeding. The judge ordered PNB to immediately release to them the sum of P4,953.506 corresponding to the balance of the appraised value of the expropriated property. The PNB bank manager refused as he is waiting for the approval of their head office. The Municipality of Makati contends that its fund with DBP could neither be be garnished or levied upon execution for to do so would result to the disbursement of public funds without the proper appropriation required under the law. The lower court denied the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner ruling that the account with DBP of the petitioner was an account specifically opened for the expropriation proceeding. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the lower court’s decision. A petition for review with a prayer for preliminary injunction was filed to the S.C. A temporary restraining order was issued by the S.C.

Issue 

Whether or not the PNB funds may be levied in the expropriation proceeding ?

Cordillera vs COA 181 SCRA 495

Facts

The constitutionality of E.O. 220 was assailed which created the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) on the ground that it pre-empts the enactment of an Organic Act by the Congress and the creation of autonomous region in the Cordillera conditional on the approval of the act through a plebiscite.

Issue

Whether or not CAR is a territorial and political subdivision?

Whether or not E.O 220 is unconstitutional?

Province of Zamboanga Del Norte vs City of Zamboanga 22 SCRA 1334

Facts

Prior to the incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of Zamboanga was the provincial capital of Zamboanga Province. By virtue of Commonwealth Act 39, section 50 providing that the buildings and other properties that the Province will abandon in view of its conversion as Zamboanga City shall be paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the Auditor General, the said properties consisting of 50 lots were identified and the price were fixed thereof. An allotment for its payment was authorized by the BIR Commissioner. In June 17, 1961, RA 3039 was approved and it amended section 50 of the Commonwealth Act 39 providing that all buildings, properties, and assets belonging to the Province of Zamboanga and located in the City of Zamboanga are transferred free of charge in favor of the City of Zamboanga. The Province of Zamboanga del Norte filed a complaint for declaratory relief with preliminary injunction contending that the RA 3039 is unconstitutional as it deprives the Province of its properties without just compensation and due process.

Issue

Whether or not RA 3039 is unconstitutional?

Villanueva vs Castaneda 154 SCRA 142

Facts

Respondent Macalino, OIC of the Office of Mayor of San Fernando issued a resolution requiring the demolition of stalls constructed on what the respondent claims to be a public land which is now proliferated with the vendors’ stalls called “talipapa.” The petitioners contend that by virtue of the contract of lease issued to them by the previous municipal council they have the right to stay and do business at the place in issue. Thus, the petitioners filed a petition for prohibition with the Court of First Instance contending that they are protected by the lease contract. Their petition was denied hence this action to the Supreme Court was filed for certiorari.

Issue

Whether or not the land in issue is a public land?

Whether or not the respondent’s act to order the demolition of the stalls amount to grave abuse of discretion and whimsical?

Rabuco vs Villegas 55 SCRA 656

Facts

The constitutionality of RA No. 3120 was assailed by the city officials of the City of Manila contending that the conversion of the lots in Malate area into disposable and alienable lands of the state and placing its administration and disposal to the LTA to be subdivided into lots and selling it to bona fide occupants thereof in installments constitutes a deprivation of the City of Manila of its property by providing for its sale without the payment of just compensation.

Vilas vs City of Manila 42 Phil 935

Facts

Prior to the incorporation of the City of Manila under the Republic Act No. 183, petitioner Vilas is the creditor of the City. After the incorporation, Vilas brought an action to recover the sum of money owed to him by the city. The City of Manila that incurred the debts has changed its sovereignty after the cession of the Philippines to the US by the Treaty of Paris and its contention now is founded on the theory that by virtue of the Act No. 183 its liability has been extinguished.

Surigao Electric Company vs Municipal of Surigao 24 SCRA 898

Facts

Congress amended the Public Service Act changing the requirements of a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the Public Service Commission for public services owned and controlled by the government but at the same time affirming its power of regulation. The petitioners Surigao Electric Co. and Arturo Lumanlan to whom the rights and privileges of the former including its plants and facilities were transferred challenged the validity of such order of the Public Service Act holding that it had no alternative but to approve the tentative schedules of rate submitted by the Municipality of Surigao.

Pearl & Dean Inc. v Shoemart Inc. GR No. 148222, August 15, 2003

Facts:

Plaintiff P&D is engaged in manufacturing advertising display units called as light boxes. These are specialty printed posters with plastic sheets and illuminated back lights that are mainly used as stationeries. They secure copyright registration over these advertising light boxes and marketed using the trademark “poster ads.” They applied for the registration of trademark before the Bureau of Patents, Trademark and Technology Transfer which was approved on September 12, 1988. P&D negotiated with the defendant Shoemart for the lease and installation of the light boxes in SM City North Edsa but was given an alternative to have them leased to SM Makati and SM Cubao while the said branch was under construction. Only the contract with SM Makati was returned with signature. In 1986 the counsel of Shoemart informed P&D that it is rescinding its contract for SM Makati due to non-performance of the terms thereof. Two years later, the Metro Industrial Services, the same company contracted by the plaintiff to fabricate their display units offered to construct light boxes for the Shoemart chain of stores wherein 10 light boxes were created for them. Upon the termination of contract with Metro Industrial Service, SM hired EYD Rainbow Advertising Co. to make light boxes. When P&D knew about the exact copies of its light boxes installed at SM City branches in 1989, it investigated and found out that North Edsa Marketing Inc (NEMI), sister company of SM was primarily selling ad space in lighted display units. P&D sent letter to both NEMI and SM enjoining them to cease from using the subject light boxes and remove them from SM establishments. It also demanded to discontinue the use of its trademark “poster ads” with compensatory damages of 20M. SM suspended the lease of light boxes in its branches while NEMI took down its advertisement for poster ads. Claiming both failed to meet its demand P&D filed a case for infringement of trademark, copyright, unfair competition and damages.

SM denied the charges against it and noted that the registration of mark “poster ads” is limited to stationeries like letterhead and envelope. It further stresses that it independently develop its own poster panels using techniques and available technology without notice to P&D copyright. It further contends that “poster ads” is a generic name that cannot be appropriated for a trademark and that P&D’s advertising display units contained no copyright notice in violation of Section 27 of P.D. 49. NEMI likewise repleaded the averments of SM and denied to have manufactured, installed or advertised the display units. The RTC decided in favor of P&D but on appeal the Court of Appeals reversed its decision. In its judgment its stand is that the copyright of the plaintiff is limited to its technical drawings only and not the light boxes itself. When a drawing is technical, the copyright over the drawing does not extend to actual object. Thus the CA is constrained to adopt the view of the respondents that the “poster ads” is a generic poster term ads and in the absence of convincing proof that such wording acquired secondary meaning, the P&D’s exclusive right to use “poster ads” is limited to what is written on its certificate of registration which is stationaries.

Primicias v Fugoso 80 PHIL 71 (1948)

Facts: An action was instituted by the petitioner for the refusal of the respondent to issue a permit to them to hold a public meeting in Plaza Miranda for redress of grievances to the government. The reason alleged by the respondent in his defense for refusing the permit is, "that there is a reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, specially on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order." Giving emphasis as well to the delegated police power to local government. Stating as well Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting as an offense against public peace, and penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful assembly." Included herein is Sec. 1119, Free use of Public Place.

Elidad Kho v Court of Appeals and Summerville General Merchandising G.R. No. 115758. March 19, 2002

Facts:

Petitioner is doing business under the name of KEC Cosmetics Laboratory and is the registered owner of copyright Chin Chun Su and Oval Facial Cream Container with a patent right on Chin Chun Su & Device and Chin Chun Su for medicated cream after purchasing the same from Quintin Cheng, a registered owner in Supplemental Register of the Philippine Patent Office. It alleges that respondent Summerville advertised and sold the petitioner’s cream products under the brand name Chin Chun Su using similar container that the petitioner used thereby misleading the public and depriving the petitioner of business sales and income. It enjoins the respondent from allegedly infringing its copyright and patent right over the same product. In defense respondent claims to be the exclusive and authorized importer, re-packer and distributor of the Chin Chun Su product manufactured by Shun Yi Factory in Taiwan authorizing Summerville to register its trade name Chin Chun Su Medicated Cream with the Philippine Patent Office. It also points out that the assignee of the patent registration certification in the Philippines, Quintin Cheng, has already been terminated by the said Taiwanese Manufacturing Company. Trial court granted the injunction in favor of the petitioner. On appeal, respondent prays for the nullification of the writ of preliminary injunction which was set aside by the Court of Appeals on the account that the registration of the trademark Chin Chun Su by KEC with the supplemental register of the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer cannot be equated with registration in the principal register duly protected by the Trademark law.

Creser Precision Systems Inc. v CA and Floro International Co. GR NO. 118708, February 2, 1998

Facts: 

Respondent was granted by the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer (BPTTT) a Letter of patent for its aerial fuze on January 23, 1990. Sometime in 1993, respondent discovered that the petitioner submitted samples of its patented aerial fuze to the AFP for testing claiming to be his own. To protect its right, respondent sent letter of warning to petitioner on a possible court action should it proceed its testing by the AFP. In response the petitioner filed a complaint for injunction and damages arising from alleged infringement before the RTC asserting that it is the true and actual inventor of the aerial fuze which it developed on 1981 under the Self Reliance Defense Posture Program of the AFP. It has been supplying the military of the aerial fuze since then and that the fuze of the respondent is similar as that of the petitioner. Petitioner prayed for restraining order and injunction from marketing, manufacturing and profiting from the said invention by the respondent. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner citing the fact that it was the first to develop the aerial fuze since 1981 thsu it concludes that it is the petitioner’s aerial fuze that was copied by the respondent. Moreover, the claim of respondent is solely based on its letter of patent which validity is being questioned. On appeal, respondent argued that the petitioner has no cause of action since he has no right to assert there being no patent issued to his aerial fuze. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court dismissing the complaint of the petitioner. It was the contention of the petitioner that it can file under Section 42 of the Patent Law an action for infringement not as a patentee but as an entity in possession of a right, title or interest to the patented invention. It theorizes that while the absence of a patent prevents one from lawfully suing another for infringement of said patent, such absence does not bar the true and actual inventor of the patented invention from suing another in the same nature as a civil action for infringement.

Pearl and Dean Inc. v Shoemart Inc. GR No. 148222, August 15, 2003

Facts:

Plaintiff P and D is engaged in manufacturing advertising display units called as light boxes. These are specialty printed posters with plastic sheets and illuminated back lights that are mainly used as stationeries. They secure copyright registration over these advertising light boxes and marketed using the trademark “poster ads.” They applied for the registration of trademark before the Bureau of Patents, Trademark and Technology Transfer which was approved on September 12, 1988. P and D negotiated with the defendant Shoemart for the lease and installation of the light boxes in SM City North Edsa but was given an alternative to have them leased to SM Makati and SM Cubao while the said branch was under construction. Only the contract with SM Makati was returned with signature. In 1986 the counsel of Shoemart informed P and D that it is rescinding its contract for SM Makati due to non-performance of the terms thereof. Two years later, the Metro Industrial Services, the same company contracted by the plaintiff to fabricate their display units offered to construct light boxes for the Shoemart chain of stores wherein 10 light boxes were created for them. Upon the termination of contract with Metro Industrial Service, SM hired EYD Rainbow Advertising Co. to make light boxes. When P and D knew about the exact copies of its light boxes installed at SM City branches in 1989, it investigated and found out that North Edsa Marketing Inc (NEMI), sister company of SM was primarily selling ad space in lighted display units. P and D sent letter to both NEMI and SM enjoining them to cease from using the subject light boxes and remove them from SM establishments. It also demanded to discontinue the use of its trademark “poster ads” with compensatory damages of 20M. SM suspended the lease of light boxes in its branches while NEMI took down its advertisement for poster ads. Claiming both failed to meet its demand P and D filed a case for infringement of trademark, copyright, unfair competition and damages.

SM denied the charges against it and noted that the registration of mark “poster ads” is limited to stationeries like letterhead and envelope. It further stresses that it independently develop its own poster panels using techniques and available technology without notice to P and D copyright. It further contends that “poster ads” is a generic name that cannot be appropriated for a trademark and that P and D’s advertising display units contained no copyright notice in violation of Section 27 of P.D. 49. NEMI likewise repleaded the averments of SM and denied to have manufactured, installed or advertised the display units. The RTC decided in favor of P and D but on appeal the Court of Appeals reversed its decision. In its judgment its stand is that the copyright of the plaintiff is limited to its technical drawings only and not the light boxes itself. When a drawing is technical, the copyright over the drawing does not extend to actual object. Thus the CA is constrained to adopt the view of the respondents that the “poster ads” is a generic poster term ads and in the absence of convincing proof that such wording acquired secondary meaning, the P and D’s exclusive right to use “poster ads” is limited to what is written on its certificate of registration which is stationaries.

Smith Kline Beckman Co. v Court of Appeals and Tryco Pharma GR No. 126627, August 14, 2003

Facts:

Petitioner Smith Kline Beckman Co., licensed to do business in the Philippines, filed on October 8, 1976 as assignee before the Bureau of Patents an application for patent on its invention called “Methods and Compositions for Producing Biphasic Parasiticide Activity Using Methyl 5 Propylthio-2-Benzimidazole Carbanate.” A Letters of Patent was issued to the petitioner on September 24, 1981 for a period of 17 years. The patent provides that the patented invention consists of Methyl 5 Propylthio-2-Benzimidazole Carbanate used as an active ingredient in treating gastrointestinal parasites and lung worms in animals. The respondent Tryco Pharma manufactures, distributes and sells veterinary product, one of which is the Impregon, a drug having Albendazole as its active ingredient effective against gastrointestinal worms in animals. Petitioner now sues the respondent for patent infringement and unfair competition before the RTC as it claims that their patent includes the substance Albendazole used by the respondent and they sold and used the drug Impregon without the petitioner’s authorization and committed unfair competition for selling as its own the drug that substantially functions to achieve the same result. Petitioner further contends that under the doctrine of equivalents in determining patent infringement, the active substance Albendazole used by the respondent is substantially the same as Methyl 5 Propylthio-2-Benzimidazole Carbanate covered by its patent with the same use of combating worm infestations in animals. It prodded the court to go beyond the literal words used in the Letter of Patent issued to them to consider that the words Methyl 5 Propylthio-2-Benzimidazole Carbanate and Albendazole are the same. Respondent avers that the Letter of Patents issued to petitioner does not cover Albendazole in that the word does not appear on it. Even if the patent were to include Albendazole it is unpatentable. They secured approval from the Bureau of Foods and Drugs to manufacture and market Impregon with the Albendazole as its active ingredients. The petitioner has no proof that they passed their veterinary products as that of the petitioner.

Francisco Joaquin vs Franklin Drilon GR No. 108946, January 28, 1999

Facts:

BJ Productions, Inc (BJPI) is a holder of a Certificate of Copyright no. M922 issued on January 28, 1971 of “Rhoda and Me” which is a dating show aired from 1970 to 1977. It submitted to the National Library an addendum its certificate of copyright specifying the show’s format and style of presentation. While watching the television, its President, Francisco Joaquin saw on RPN Channel 9 the episode on “It’s a Date” produced by IXL Productions. He wrote a letter to IXL’s president Gabriel Zosa informing him that BJPI has a copyright of the same format as shown on their “It’s a Date” show in their “Rhoda and Me” show. Zosa sought to register IXL’s copyright to their first episode of “It’s a Date” to the National Library. Petitioner filed a complaint in violation of PD No. 49 against the respondent before the RTC of Quezon City. Respondent sought a review of the resolution from the Asst. City Prosecutor before the Department of Justice.

Sec. of Justice Franklin Drilon directed to move for dismissal of the case against the respondents and denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration hence this petition before the Supreme Court.

Manly Sportswear Manufacturing Inc. v Dadodette Enterprises and/or Hermes Sports Center GR No. 165306, September 20, 2005

Facts:

The NBI secured a search warrant on March 14, 2003 from the RTC to act upon the information that respondents were in possession of goods copyright of which belongs to the petitioner. Finding reasonable grounds in violation of Section 172 and 217 of RA 8293 a search warrant was issued. Respondents move to quash and annul the search warrant contending it is invalid and the requisites for its issuance are not complied with. They insist that the sporting goods manufactured and registered in the name MANLY is just ordinary and common and not among the classes protected under RA 8293. The court granted the motion to quash declaring the search warrant null and void because there were certificates of registrations issued earlier than MANLY for the same sporting goods under various brands thereby negating the fact that their products are copyrighted and original creations. Motion for reconsideration was denied by the appellate court sustaining the lower court’s decision thus this instant petition for review for certiorari.

Coffee Partners, Inc. vs. San Francisco Coffee and Roastery, Inc. G.R. No. 169504, March 3, 2010

Facts:

The petitioner holds a business in maintaining coffee shops in the Philippines. It is registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission in January 2001. In its franchise agreement with Coffee Partners Ltd, it carries the trademark “San Francisco Coffee.” Respondent is engaged in the wholesale and retail sale of coffee that was registered in SEC in May 1995 under a registered business name of “San Francisco Coffee &Roastery, Inc.” It entered into a joint venture with Boyd Coffee USA to study coffee carts in malls.

When respondent learned that petitioner will open a coffee shop in Libis, Q.C. they sent a letter to the petitioner demanding them to stop using the name “San Francisco Coffee” as it causes confusion to the minds of the public. A complaint was also filed by respondents before the Bureau of Legal Affairs of the Intellectual Property Office for infringement and unfair competition with claims for damages. Petitioners contend that there are distinct differences in the appearance of their trademark and that respondent abandoned the use of their trademark when it joined venture with Boyd Coffee USA. The Bureau of Legal Affairs of the IPO held that petitioner’s trademark infringed on the respondent’s trade name as it registered its business name first with the DTI in 1995 while petitioner only registered its trademark in 2001. 

De Los Santos v Yatco (106 PHIL 745)

Article IX (B), Section 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. (2) Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, and, except to positions which are policy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical, by competitive examination. (3) No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. (4) No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political campaign. (5) The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees. (6) Temporary employees of the Government shall be given such protection as may be provided by law.

Facts:

Petitioner files for certiorari to revoke the order of respondent Judge Yatco for cancelling his previous order for execution on the parcel of land owned by the petitioner. The said parcel of land is being occupied by Fernando Mendoñez with an agreement to pay in installment the said land to the petitioners and that he shall voluntarily vacate the land and the payments he previously made shall be forfeited in favor of the plaintiff. A civil case was filed by the petitioner against Mendoñez for failure to pay as per agreement of both parties. Petitioner later filed a motion for execution to take the land back. Defendant Mendoñez moved for postponement to give both parties sufficient time to come to an agreement which was allowed by the respondent judge. It was settled by both parties that Mendoñez will secure a GSIS loan however when he was ready to make the payment the petitioner refused to abide with their agreement and now asking for a higher amount of money for payment. Finding no justification on the issuance of the writ of execution, Judge Yatco quashed said order hence this petition for certiorari based on lack of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion.

Acena v Civil Service Commission 193 SCRA 623 (1991)

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari to annul the resolution of the Civil Service Commission which set aside the order of the Merit Systems Protection Board declaring the herein petitioner as the legitimate Administrative Officer of Rizal Technological Colleges. Acena was assigned as Admin. Officer by then President of Rizal Technological Colleges and was subsequently promoted as Associate Professor on temporary status pending his compliance to obtain a Master’s Degree while assuming the position of Acting Admin Officer at the same time. The Board of Trustees designated Ricardo Salvador as Acting Admin Officer and pursuant to the same, the new College President Dr. Estolas revoked the designation of the petitioner as acting Admin Officer. Petitioner sent a letter to the CSC stating his desire to keep his appointment as Admin Officer instead of Associate Professor. Thus the latter’s appointment was withdrawn. He also filed a complaint for injunction of damages to Dr. Estolas assailing the validity of his dismissal from his position as violation of security of tenure. He filed another complaint for illegal termination against Dr. Estolas before the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). The CSC opined that Acena is still the Admin Officer since his appointment as Asso. Prof. was withdrawn. Dr. Estolas filed petition for review to the Office of the President. The Presidential Staff Director referred the complaint back to the CSC. In the dispositive portion of its resolution, the CSC finds the action of Dr. Estolas valid and set aside the previous opinion made by the CSC and the order of the MSPB. The petitioner files a petition for certiorari against the CSC decision on jurisdictional issue.

Flores v Drilon (223 SCRA 568)

FACTS:

The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged with prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. Said provision provides the President the power to appoint an administrator of the SBMA provided that in the first year of its operation, the Olongapo mayor shall be appointed as chairman and chief of executive of the Subic Authority. Petitioners maintain that such infringes to the constitutional provision of Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that "no elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public officer or position during his tenure," The petitioners also contend that Congress encroaches upon the discretionary power of the President to appoint.

Saligumba v COA (117 SCRA 669)

Article IX (D), Section 2.  Section 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post- audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and universities; (c) other government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the Government, which are required by law or the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. However, where the internal control system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt such measures, including temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts of the Government and, for such period as may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto. 
(2) The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds and properties. 

Saligumba v COA (117 SCRA 669)

FACTS:

This is a petition for review of the decision rendered by the COA regarding the Administrative case filed by petitioner against Leonardo Estella, Auditing Examiner III of the Auditor’s office of Misamis Occidental. The charge was that the respondent raped Editha Saligumba on several occasions. The COA dropped the administrative complaint due to insufficient evidence. Saligumba petition the court to review such action taken by the COA.

Civil Liberties Union v Executive Secretary (194 SCRA 317)

Article IX (B), Section 7. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including Government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

Civil Liberties Union v Executive Secretary (194 SCRA 317)

FACTS: The petitioner are assailing the Executive Order No. 284 issued by the President allowing cabinet members, undersecretary or asst. secretaries and other appointive officials of the executive department to hold 2 positions in the government and government corporations and to receive additional compensation. They find it unconstitutional against the provision provided by Section 13, Article VII prohibiting the President, Cabinet members and their deputies to hold any other office or employment. Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B further states that “Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries." In the opinion of the DOJ as affirmed by the Solicitor General, the said Executive Order is valid and constitutional as Section 7 of Article IX-B stated “unless otherwise allowed by law” which is construed to be an exemption from that stipulated on Article VII, section 13, such as in the case of the Vice President who is constitutionally allowed to become a cabinet member and the Secretary of Justice as ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council.

Tobias v Abalos 239 SCRA 106 G.R. No. L-114783 December 8, 1994

Facts:

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong.” Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. The petitioners contend on the following:

(1) Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 contravenes from the "one subject-one bill" rule provided in the Constitution by involving 2 subjects in the bill namely (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.

(2) The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution.

(3) The said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements.

(4) That Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5(4) of the Constitution stating that “within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW NOTES

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW NOTES

By: Evelyn Chua Bergantinos-De Matias

PEOPLE’S INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM

(Lambino et al. vs Comelec GR No. 174153)

3 Ways to Amend Constitution:

1. thru Congress by ¾ of votes by its members } can propose both revision & amendment

2. thru Constitutional Commission                    } of Constitution

3. thru People’s Initiative   à may only propose an amendment of the Constitution

Requirements for People’s Initiative:

1. People must author and sign the proposal with no agent or representative allowed to sign on their behalf.
2. The full text of the proposed amendments must be written on the face of the petition or attached to it.

PARTY LIST INVIOLABLE PARAMETERS:

(Veterans vs Comelec GR no. 136781)

1. 20% Allocation à combined no, of all party list congressmen shall not exceed 20% of the total membership of the House of Representative
2. 2% Threshold  à only parties garnering a minimum of 2% of the total valid votes cast for the party list system are qualified to have a seat in the House
3. 3-seat Limit  à each qualified party, regardless of the no, of votes it actually obtained is entitled to a maximum of 3 seats only – 1 qualifying and 2 additional seats
4. Proportionate Representation  à the additional seat which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in proportion to their total no. of votes

GUIDELINES FOR POLITICAL PARTIES TO BE REGISTERED UNDER THE PARTY LIST SYSTEM

(Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs Comelec  GR NO. 147589)

1. Must represent marginalized and under-represented sectors
2. Major political parties must comply with this statutory policy
3. Must be subject to Constitutional prohibition against religious sects
4. Party must not be disqualified under RA 7941 (Party List System Act)
5. Party must not be an adjunct to projects funded by the govt.
6. Party and its representatives must comply with the law requirements
7. The nominee must represent a marginalized or under-represented sector
8. The nominee must be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation.

ANIMOS MANINDI  à  intention to return permanently and reside in the place of origin

ANIMOS REVERTINDI à continuously going back to the place of residence

THE PASSAGE OF BILL IN THE PHILIPPINES

THE PASSAGE OF BILL

(Source: Senate of the Philippines)

Summary

The following is a summary of how a bill becomes a law:

Filing/Calendaring for First Reading

A bill is filed in the Office of the Secretary where it is given a corresponding number and calendared for First Reading.

First Reading

Its title, bill number, and author’s name are read on the floor, after which it is referred to the proper committee. (note the 1 subject – 1 title rule)

Committee Hearings/Report

Committee conducts hearings and consultation meetings. It then either approves the proposed bill without an amendment, approves it with changes, or recommends substitution or consolidation with similar bills filed.

Calendaring for Second Reading

The Committee Report with its approved bill version is submitted to the Committee on Rules for calendaring for Second Reading.

Second Reading

Bill author delivers sponsorship speech on the floor. Senators engage in debate, interpellation, turno en contra, and rebuttal to highlight the pros and cons of the bill. A period of amendments incorporates necessary changes in the bill proposed by the committee or introduced by the Senators themselves on the floor.